Could consciousness be physically realised? by Boutel, Adrian
_______________
Could Consciousness Be 
Physically Realised?
_______________
Adrian Boutel
King’s College
This dissertation is submitted for the degree of  Doctor of  Philosophy.
September, 2010
Preface
This dissertation is the result of  my own work and includes nothing which is the 
outcome of  collaboration except where specifically indicated in the text.  No part of  this 
thesis has been submitted for any other qualification.
Statement of  Length
This dissertation contains fewer than 80,000 words and therefore does not exceed the 
word limit set by the Degree Committee of  the Faculty of  Philosophy.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my supervisors, Prof. Jane Heal and Dr. Alex Oliver, for their help, 
support, patience and impatience.  Without them nothing would have been possible.  
Thanks also go to the graduate students in the Philosophy Faculty for discussions, beers, 
and the reaffirmation that philosophy is an excellent project on which to expend  
irreplaceable years; to Lesley Lancaster and the Philosophy Faculty Office for their 
frequently supererogatory assistance; and to the graduate community of  King’s College, 
for a rounded academic experience and invaluable distractions.
The biggest thanks go to my wife, Tamima, for untiringly supporting me despite 
absence, stress and lack of  remunerative employment.  Long may our adventures 
continue.
For Skander and Laurie
Could Consciousness Be Physically Realised?
Summary of  PhD Dissertation
Adrian Boutel
King’s College
University of  Cambridge
I defend physicalism about phenomenal consciousness against recent epistemic 
arguments for dualism.  First I argue (as against Kripke) that psychophysical identities 
can be a posteriori (and apparently contingent, and conceivably false).  Their epistemic 
status is due to the analytic independence of  phenomenal and physical-functional terms. 
Unlike Kripke’s own explanation of  a posteriori necessity, analytic independence is 
consistent with—indeed explained by—the direct reference of  phenomenal terms, so 
Kripke’s argument against psychophysical identities fails.  I then argue (as against White 
and Chalmers) that direct reference does not itself  make identities a priori.
Next I endorse the “a priori entailment thesis”: if  physicalism is true, phenomenal 
truths follow a priori from a complete statement of  the facts of  physics.  I argue that 
physicalists must accept a priori entailment if  we are to avoid brute or “strong” a posteriori 
necessities.  I show that a priori entailment is consistent with analytic independence, and 
so make room for what Chalmers calls “type-C” physicalism.  Jackson’s “Mary”, who 
knows all the physical facts, would be able to deduce the physical-functional reference of  
phenomenal terms, and so the truth of  psychophysical identities, without appealing to 
analytic connections.  The “knowledge” argument for dualism therefore fails.  The lack 
of  such connections does, however, help explain why Mary’s deduction seems intuitively 
impossible.
A priori entailment makes zombie scenarios inconceivable, so Chalmers’s 
“conceivability” argument fails.  It also closes Levine’s “explanatory gap” between 
physical and phenomenal truths.  Though it may not satisfy all demands for explanation, 
any remainder poses no threat to physicalism.
I then defend type-C physicalism against some recent objections to the 
“phenomenal-concept strategy”.  I close by observing that while the view I defend can 
rebut epistemic arguments for dualism, it leaves the question of  whether consciousness 
has a physical basis as a matter for empirical investigation.
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1. Phenomenal consciousness, physicalism, and the epistemic 
arguments for dualism
A. Phenomenal consciousness
1.1. Introduction
There’s something it’s like to be me.  You’re going to have to trust me on that.  When 
things happen to me—when I have experiences—those experiences feel like something 
to me.  I imagine, though I cannot be absolutely sure, that the same is true for you, and 
for everyone else: that for all of  us experiences have a “subjective character” (Nagel, 
1974).  Recall any of  your own experiences, and think of  what it was like to have it.  Can 
you do that?  Good.  To be “phenomenally conscious” is just for your experiences to be 
like something in that way.
The notion of  phenomenal consciousness is traditionally introduced with this sort 
of  appeal to the reader’s introspection.  And for good reason.  Our experiences’ 
subjective characters are shy creatures: holed up timidly in their owners’ minds, refusing 
to emerge into the light of  day to be publicly identified, compared with others, or poked 
and prodded by psychologists and neuro-scientists.  So I cannot tell you what they are by 
pointing you to mine, or by pointing at public examples we can both attend to.  I must 
ask you to look to your own, in the confident but not quite certain assumption that you 
have some to look to.
Why is this?  The problem, it seems, is that an experience’s subjective character 
appears quite distinct from its objective nature, as it might be described by a third party.  
An outside observer can talk about such matters as what causes an experience, what 
goes on in the experiencer’s body and brain, and how such experiences affect people’s 
behaviour.  But such objective talk does not communicate what it is like to have that 
experience.  On the contrary, it seems that someone might know all such objective facts 
but still, when they finally have that experience, grasp something new. “So that’s what it’s 
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like to bungy-jump/taste umami/have a child.”1 
Of  course, no one yet knows all the objective facts about any experience.  
Psychology, neuro-biology and the other relevant sciences aren’t finished.  But it doesn’t 
seem that that is the problem.  Rather, it seems unlikely that any description of  the 
process of  umami-eating in physical or neuro-biological (or other non-phenomenal) 
terms could capture the subjective character of  that taste, or of  tasting generally. 
This thesis deals with two competing responses to this apparent distinctness.  One 
concludes that subjective character seems distinct from objective nature because it is 
distinct.  On this view, the phenomenal aspect of  experience is something fundamentally 
different from everything physical that goes on in us when we have experiences.  The 
other view is that the appearance of  distinctness is just an appearance.  Although 
subjective character is entirely physical, we relate to our own experiences in a peculiar 
way which obscures that physical nature.
In part B of  this chapter, I discuss the second “physicalist” view, and the contrast 
between it and the first “dualist” view, in more detail.  In part C of  this chapter, I outline 
the arguments for dualism that will be discussed in the body of  the thesis, along with the 
physicalist responses I will offer.  In part D I lay out some of  the philosophical 
background and assumptions that underlie the thesis, and collect some terminology.  In 
the rest of  this part A, I will say a little more about subjective characters.
1.2. Phenomenal properties of  experience
The subjective character of  an experience is, I will take it, a property of  that experience.  
Consistently with common usage, I will call these properties “phenomenal” properties.  
They are also referred to as “qualia” (singular “quale”), roughly Latin for “whichnesses”.  
However, because “qualia” sometimes connotes that the properties in question are very 
special (in ways discussed in §1.3 below), I will generally prefer “phenomenal 
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1 This is, more or less, the “Mary” thought experiment from (Jackson, 1982), which will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 5.
properties”, except where their purported specialness is in focus.
As to properties, I take them at least to be genuine denizens of  the world: they can 
be borne, cause and be caused, be referred to by terms, and have their own (second-
order) properties.  Beyond that realism, I do not assume a particular metaphysical view 
of  their nature.
Phenomenal properties classify experiences by subjective character.  That is, two 
experiences share a phenomenal property (or properties) just if  it feels the same to have 
those experiences.
Experiences can have other sorts of  property, of  course.  For example, an 
experience might be long-lasting or quick; experiences of  a particular type might be 
frequent.  They may also have causal and representational properties, and stand in causal 
and representational relations.  Such properties and relations may be candidates for the 
physical basis of  phenomenal properties, but, as will be discussed shortly, they are not 
what we have in mind when we think of  an experience’s subjective character.
I use “experience” very generally, to include at least everything with a subjective 
character.  That includes perceptual experiences—including those in modalities such as 
proprioception, balance, and so on, beyond the traditional five senses.   I will otherwise 
remain neutral on what counts as an experience.  If  there are non-perceptual 
experiences, they are included: if  there is something it is like to believe something, then I 
will count believing as an experience.  Also included are experiences which represent the 
world erroneously—illusions and hallucinations—and experiences which do not purport 
to represent the world at all.  
As mentioned, phenomenal properties characterise kinds of  experience.  And those 
kinds (in ordinary cases) have members, that is, token experiences which bear the 
relevant property.   In general, I will talk about properties or their instances, rather than 
the kinds they characterise.  To do so I will use singular property terms (such as 
“redness”).  I will have little occasion to use the corresponding predicates (“is red”). 
Finally, I take it that there are phenomenal properties.  Some people (notably 
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Dennett, discussed below) deny that such properties exist at all.  Eliminativism is, 
obviously, one way of  avoiding dualism. It is also a heroic denial of  the apparently 
obvious, and as Dennett himself  laments (2007, p. 15) he has so far convinced few.  
Perhaps he will eventually be proved right: at the very least, he gives interesting reasons 
to doubt the seemingly undoubtable.  But in the meantime it is worth the physicalist’s 
time to treat phenomenal properties as real, and tackle the arguments that they cannot 
be physical.
1.3. The peculiarities of  phenomenal properties
It may not be possible to describe phenomenal properties so as to enlighten someone 
who has never had them.  Nonetheless, there is plenty which those of  us who have had 
them can say about them.  In particular, phenomenal properties are often said to be 
special in various ways.
A useful explication of  the supposed peculiarities of  phenomenal properties is 
given by Dennett (1990).  As just mentioned, Dennett denies that there are any such 
properties as qualia.  So he can hardly rely on identifying them introspectively.  (“Those!  
They don’t exist.”)  Instead, he characterises his target by giving a list of  five “fascinating 
second-order properties” that qualia are typically taken to have, and then denies that 
anything has those second-order properties.
Qualia, Dennett says, are supposed to be: ineffable, intrinsic, atomic, private and 
“directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness” (1990, p. 522).2  In what 
follows I briefly describe these peculiarities, though I will describe them as I understand 
them rather than faithfully following Dennett.  
Note that I am not claiming that phenomenal properties have these features.  As will 
be discussed in chapter 9, I tend to agree with Dennett that they have none of  them.  I 
disagree with Dennett’s eliminativism, however, because I do not take these peculiarities 
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2 Dennett assimilates being intrinsic with being atomic/unanalysable (p.523).  I will treat those as separate 
features.
to be definitional of  “phenomenal properties”.  Rather, my reaction to the absence of  
the peculiarities is a) to insist that I am not wrong in saying that my experiences have 
subjective characters, but b) to accept that those subjective characters are not so special, 
after all.  Dennett rejects this sort of  view on the basis that there is no way to 
characterise “phenomenal” properties without implicitly reasserting their specialness.  I 
think it does justice to Dennett’s point to identify phenomenal properties as the 
properties of  experience which seem special.  Failing that, I am content to identify them 
simply as those qualities I introspect in my experience, and which I trust and assume you 
also introspect in yours.  With that caveat, the supposed peculiarities of  phenomenal 
properties are these:
• Ineffable.  It seems impossible to describe what it is like to have an experience.  
The idea is not that we cannot talk about the subjective character of  experience at all.  It 
is easy enough to construct a term for, say, the subjective character of  seeing blue. “The 
subjective character of  seeing blue” is one, but “phenomenal blueness” is shorter, and 
there will be occasion in what follows to use an arbitrary label like “X”.   Moreover, 
there is a lot we can say about the subjective characters so named: for example, what 
sorts of  thing give rise to them, how pleasant they are, and how closely they resemble 
other experiences’ characters.
What we cannot do is say what it’s like to see blue in a way that would enlighten 
someone who had been blind from birth.  Two people who have both seen blue can 
discuss what it’s like, but even they can only assume that what it’s like is the same for both 
of  them.  They cannot describe what it’s like so as to confirm or rebut that assumption.
• Intrinsic. Phenomenal properties seem to be intrinsic to experiences: that is, 
independent of  the relations in which those experiences stand to other things, and in 
particular of  their causes and our reactions to them.  We can, it seems, imagine 
something displaying all the characteristic behavioural effects of  pain in response to 
damage, but not feeling pain; similarly, we can imagine feeling pain without displaying 
any such behaviour, or in response to non-existent damage.
• Atomic. Phenomenal properties seem simple and unanalysable.  To be sure, as 
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Dennett notes, with due attention we can detect structure in them.  Wine tasting is a 
good example: with training, the taste of  a wine can be identified as a combination of  
tannic astringency, sweetness, alcohol and various more particular tastes and odours 
labelled with picturesque vocabulary.  But still, qualia do not seem complex in the way 
that, say, patterns of  neural activation are complex.
• Private.  Not only can others not describe their qualia to us, we cannot determine 
conclusively how others feel from any objectively available evidence, including their 
behaviour.   No such evidence rules out the sort of  scenario just mentioned, whereby 
someone has all the external manifestations of, say, pain, but in fact lacks it.
That is not to say we cannot know what qualia other people have.  Assuming a 
suitably fallibilist account of  knowledge, someone else’s behaviour can provide enough 
evidence that they are in pain for me to know that they are, notwithstanding the in-
principle possibility that their qualia are absent or abnormal.  But that possibility of  
error seems to distinguish our knowledge of  others’ phenomenal properties from 
knowledge of  our own, thanks to the last peculiarity…
• Directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness.  We face no difficulties in 
identifying our own qualia: all we need to do is pay attention.  I might be wrong about 
why I am in pain, but I cannot be wrong that I am in pain: its feeling to me like I am in 
pain is precisely what it is for me to be in pain.  So our judgements about which 
phenomenal properties we currently have are infallible (that is, not possibly wrong) and 
incorrigible (that is, not correctible by better evidence).
1.4. Contrast with objective properties
The objective features of  experience, by contrast, lack these apparent peculiarities.  Our 
judgements about experiences’ causes and effects are not, in general, taken to be 
infallible or incorrigible.  Nor is there any difficulty in principle with describing, say, the 
neuro-chemical properties of  experiencers’ brains.  Not that describing them is easy, but 
it seems like something we could do after enough empirical investigation, of  a kind we 
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are already undertaking.  By the same token, objective properties are not private.  To be 
sure, the neuro-chemical properties of  someone’s brain are relatively inaccessible.  But 
there is no difficulty in principle with third parties discovering them.  Indeed, far from 
my having privileged access to my neural properties, as things stand it is a lot easier for a 
clinician with an fMRI machine to detect them than for me to.
On the other hand, it is at least plausible that there are atomic and intrinsic objective 
properties.  As to atomic: we expect, or at least hope, that there will turn out to be some 
fundamental level of  physics at which analysis ceases.  As to intrinsic: while it is arguable 
that the objective properties science tells us about are, in general, characterised 
dispositionally, and so relationally,3 it is natural to suppose that at bottom there are 
intrinsic properties, which serve as the categorical basis of  all the dispositions.
So these two features may not distinguish phenomenal properties from all objective 
properties.  But they would distinguish them from most, including, for example, other 
mental properties—which are complex properties residing in the high-level domain of  
psychology, not in fundamental physics.  Some problems facing a physicalist who wants 
to treat phenomenal properties as basic properties will be discussed in §1.10.
So, if  phenomenal properties have the peculiarities they are credited with, they are 
unlike objective properties.  But that does not yet make them non-physical.  For all that’s 
been said so far, they might be unusual physical properties.  Before that suggestion can 
be assessed, more needs to be said about what is meant by a “physical” property.
B. Physicalism
1.5. Introduction
In this section I outline what I understand by “physicalism”, and what I take it to be for 
some phenomenon not described by the science of  physics to be physical.  
My purpose here is not to defend physicalism, or even this conception of  it, against 
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3 See, for example, (Russell, 1927), (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 130), (Blackburn, 1990).
general objections.  Physicalism faces serious general challenges, to be sure, but this 
thesis focuses on whether phenomenal consciousness poses a special problem for 
physicalism.  If  you think physicalism is false about everything, then you may find that 
question of  little interest.  If  you prefer some other conception of  physicalism, on the 
other hand, the question will still arise.  Perhaps other conceptions of  physicalism may 
not able to give the same answers I give to the problems posed by consciousness; 
perhaps they have better ones.  Nonetheless, the framework sketched here is one which I 
find both to be plausible and to have the resources to answer the arguments for dualism 
about phenomenal consciousness, while granting enough of  their premises to count as 
charitable.
1.6. Physicalism and dualism
Physicalism is, to a first approximation, the view that everything is physical.  It is a 
variety of  monism, the view that there is one ultimate kind or highest type, into which 
everything falls; and is thus opposed to dualism, the view that there are two.  
I use “physicalism” rather than “materialism” to reflect the fact that there is more 
to physics than the matter that makes up physical objects.  There are physical 
phenomena which are not matter, notably energy.  And physics deals with phenomena in 
other ontological categories, of  which it is at least odd to say they are “made of  matter”; 
in particular, physical laws, properties and events. This is not a substantive point—I am 
certainly not suggesting that contemporary “materialists” are mistaken on either point—
but a label had to be chosen.
Physicalism is a metaphysical doctrine about the ontological relation between the 
phenomena of  physics and the other contents of  the world.  It is not a doctrine about 
the epistemic relations between our knowledge of  the facts of  physics and of  other 
facts, nor a linguistic one about the relations between statements of  such facts.  In 
particular, it should not be confused with the claim (apparently made by logical 
positivists under the same name) that all statements are translatable into physical 
statements (Hempel, 1980, p. 18).  That is not to say that physicalism does not have 
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epistemic or semantic consequences, but if  it does they are not definitional. 
The opponent of  physicalism need not establish the contrary universal claim that 
nothing is physical, but only that there is something non-physical.  Historically the most 
prominent form of  dualism has been substance dualism, the view that in addition to 
physical stuff  there is a non-physical substance. In particular, Cartesian dualism is the 
view that mind is a non-physical substance.  In recent debate, however, “aspect” or 
property dualism has been prominent: the view that some properties are not physical 
properties.  One version of  aspect dualism is the subject of  this thesis: phenomenal 
property dualism, the view that phenomenal properties are not physical properties.
1.7. The limits of  physicalism
I said physicalism is the claim that “everything” is physical, but the claim is not really 
universal.  I follow Melnyk (2003, p. 10) in limiting the scope of  physicalism about 
particulars to those that either a) exist contingently, or b) figure in causation (either as 
causes or effects).   Perhaps there are particulars which both exist necessarily and are 
causally inert (Platonic numbers, perhaps).  Physicalism as I intend it neither denies that 
such things exist nor claims that, if  they exist, they are physical.
Even with that limitation, however, there may be phenomena besides 
consciousness which pose problems for general physicalism.  Most of  them, including 
morality, religion and aesthetics, are outside the scope of  this thesis.  As it happens, I 
believe phenomena in those domains are physical, if  they exist at all; but if  I am wrong, 
the arguments discussed here will be unaffected.   This thesis can then be seen as 
defending a more specific physicalism about phenomenal consciousness: the view that 
consciousness is physical, even if  other things might not be. 
I do need to say a little more, however, about one such phenomenon: intentionality.  
I will assume that intentionality, too, is physical, and that problems such as 
“Kripkenstein” on rule-following (Kripke, 1982) can be overcome.  But this assumption 
cannot be carved off  in the same way, since many philosophers take phenomenal 
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consciousness to be representational.4  If  they are right, then physicalism about 
consciousness requires physicalism about representation.   If  it turns out that 
intentionality is irreducibly normative5 or otherwise non-physical, then physicalism about 
consciousness falls with physicalism about intentionality.
Still, the arguments for dualism about consciousness are independent of  the status 
of  intentionality.  Tackling these independent arguments is worthwhile, even if  the result 
is only that consciousness is non-physical in one respect rather than two.  I will say a 
little more about the position here at the end of  chapter 4.
1.8. Physical but not of  physics—supervenience and realisation
The phenomena described by the science of  physics are “physical” in a straightforward 
sense.  Note that those phenomena are not limited to those described by micro-physics; I 
include macro-physical phenomena as well.  The ontological relation within physics 
between phenomenal at the macro- and micro-levels is an interesting question, but I put 
it aside here.
What’s distinctive about physicalism is the claim that other phenomena, not 
described by physics, are physical.  What does this mean?
a)  Supervenience
At a minimum, I take physicalism about some phenomenon or domain to be committed 
to supervenience: the relevant facts are metaphysically fixed by the facts of  physics.  To 
borrow a metaphor from Kripke (1981), once God had established the facts of  physics 
in our world, he had no more work to do to establish the facts of  chemistry and biology.  
If  supervenience is false—if  God did have more work to do—then the phenomenon or 
domain is ontologically distinct from the physical, and physicalism is false.  
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
10
4 For example, (Lycan, 1987, p. 80), (Hill, 2009), (Crane, 2009).
5 See generally the discussion in (Wedgwood, 2009).
Consistent with the ontological understanding of  physicalism, by the “facts of  
physics” I mean the particulars, properties and relations described by physics along with 
the laws of  physics governing their behaviour and interactions.  That is, I use “fact” to 
mean an aspect of  the world, not a statement about it.  (Where some would use “fact” 
to mean “true statement”, I will use “truth”.)  As with properties, beyond assuming 
realism about facts I pass over questions about their metaphysical nature.   
Physicalist supervenience involves metaphysical, rather than merely nomological, 
fixing.  In nomological supervenience, the chemical facts (for example) are fixed by the 
facts of  physics together with “bridge” laws, not themselves fixed by physics, that relate 
the two domains.  In that picture, God had more work to do after establishing the facts 
of  physics: he had to write the bridge laws.  Since nomological relations can hold 
between ontologically distinct phenomena, nomological supervenience is quite 
consistent with dualism.  David Chalmers, for example, though a dualist about 
phenomenal properties, believes that the phenomenal facts nomologically supervene on 
the physical facts (Chalmers, 1996, p. 127).
I take physicalism to be committed only to global supervenience.  That is, the 
supervenience “base” which fixes the other facts is the totality of  the facts of  physics.  
Supervening facts need not be fixed by a subset of  those facts, such as those in their 
spatio-temporal vicinity.  There may be biological facts about me, for example, that are 
fixed by historical facts, or even by distant physical phenomena.  It is sometimes 
objected that global supervenience is too weak for physicalism, because it allows facts 
about high-level phenomena to supervene on manifestly irrelevant low-level facts.  For 
example, it is consistent with global supervenience that all our visual qualia would have 
been different if  there had been a teapot orbiting Saturn in 2001.   Now presumably a 
final physicalist theory will (if  it is to be at all plausible!) rule out such absurd 
possibilities, by specifying more restricted supervenience bases for phenomenal 
properties.  But such possibilities are not inconsistent with physicalism as such.
A common, and roughly correct, way to express the notion of  “fixing” is to say 
that the supervening facts could not have been different unless the facts of  physics had 
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also been different. In possible-worlds talk: there is no metaphysically possible world in 
which the facts of  physics are the same as ours, but the supervening facts are different.  
This formulation needs one qualification, however.  The world could have been just 
as it is physically, but contained an extra non-physical phenomenon (call it “ectoplasm”).  
And the ectoplasm might have made a difference to, say, the biological facts: perhaps 
there might have been ectoplasmic animals.  Although this possibility is consistent with 
physicalism about (actual) biology, on the formulation just given it would entail that 
biology did not supervene on physics.
To reflect this, I take supervenience as requiring only that the supervening facts 
could not have been different if  the facts of  physics were the same and there were no 
ectoplasm.  In possible-worlds talk, supervenience requires only that the purportedly 
supervening facts are the same in “minimal” physical duplicates6 of  our world—that is, 
worlds in which the facts of  physics are the same and there is nothing non-physical.
As I said, I take physicalism to be an ontological doctrine, not an epistemic or a 
semantic one.  Accordingly, I take supervenience to be an ontological relation: 
supervening phenomena are in some sense “the same stuff ” as the phenomena of  
physics.  (What sense that is will be discussed in b) below.)  Even if, contra Hume, there 
can be necessary connections between distinct existences, a fixing relation between 
phenomena that are ontologically entirely distinct would hardly support the physicalist’s 
basic claim of  ontological unity.
Nonetheless, supervenience will have semantic consequences.  In particular, a 
statement of  supervenience will be necessarily true if  it is true at all.  By a “statement of  
supervenience” I mean a material implication with a statement of  a supervening fact as 
the consequent, and a statement of  the facts it supervenes on as the antecedent.  That is 
not to say such statements are a priori: they may be a posteriori necessary truths.  However, 
if  the argument in chapter 4 is correct, some of  them will indeed be a priori.
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b) Realisation
What ontic connection could underlie supervenience?  The intuitive thought is that it is a 
matter of  constitution: everything else is made up of  the stuff  of  physics. And if  each 
chemical token—say a molecule of  alcohol—just is its constituent fundamental particles, 
arranged a certain way, it follows that it is not metaphysically possible for the chemical 
facts about that molecule to differ unless the facts about those particles and their 
arrangement also differ.  However, this sort of  constitutive identity claim is problematic: 
statues and their constituent lumps of  clay notoriously have different properties, 
including but arguably not limited to modal ones.
The most plausible account of  the connection, it seems to me, is that given by 
Melnyk’s “realisation” physicalism (Melnyk, 2003).  On that view, which Melnyk sees as a 
generalisation of  psycho-functionalism in philosophy of  mind, properties and kinds not 
described by physics are characterised by functional roles.  Particulars—objects, events, 
property instances—not described by physics are “realised” by physical particulars 
playing the relevant roles.  The roles the physical particulars play is determined by 
physics: by its laws and the distribution of  its particulars.  Physically realised functional 
particulars may themselves play roles, and thereby realise further functional particulars, 
and so on; but at bottom the realisers are physical.
Melnyk is open-minded about what sort of  role is involved.  As in 
psychofunctionalism, the roles may be causal, or informational.  But they need not be.  
For my purposes, I will take a role simply as a relation or relations in which a particular is 
to stand.  But I assume the plausible candidates for the functional character of  
phenomenal properties involve causal or informational relations.
As applied to phenomenal properties, realisation physicalism claims 1) that they are 
either functional or described by physics and 2) that if  they are functional, all their 
instances are realised, directly or indirectly, by particulars described in physics. 
Although, as Melnyk is at pains to stress, realisation is not identity, it is a close 
enough connection to give rise to metaphysical supervenience: the facts about functional 
phenomena cannot be different unless something is different about either the tokens of  
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physics or their roles (Melnyk, 2003, ch. 2).
Realisation, like functionalism generally, is a topic-neutral notion.  Functional roles 
might, for all the notion of  realisation requires, be realised by non-physical tokens.  This 
has two implications.
The first is that the possibility of  non-physical realisation—in fact, the possibility 
of  multiple realisation generally—means that the facts of  physics are not metaphysically 
necessitated by the supervening facts.  There may be worlds in which the phenomenal 
facts, for example, are the same as in ours, but phenomenal properties are non-physically 
realised or, a fortiori, physically realised in a different way.  Supervenience is not 
symmetric.
The second is that there are phenomena in the world which are, in a sense, not 
physical: functional phenomena, which are neither described in physics nor necessarily 
ontologically connected to anything which is.  Even if  the actual realisers are all physical, 
one might ask, is this really consistent with physicalism about everything?  As far as I can 
see that is a question of  labelling on which nothing much turns.  It does seem to me that 
this position is consistent with the intuitive content of  “physicalism”.  But at any rate the 
position itself  is clear enough, and it is the position I will seek to defend against the 
dualist arguments.  Where appropriate, I use the adjective “physical-functional”—
following Loar (1998)—to refer indifferently to both “strictly” physical and functional 
phenomena.
In summary, then, the claim that phenomenal properties are physical is a claim that 
they are functional properties all of  whose actual instances are realised (ultimately) by 
phenomena described by physics.  That is what is essential for what follows.  In the rest 
of  this part, I will clarify some other aspects of  my understanding of  physicalism, in 
order to avoid possible confusion and perhaps forestall some objections.
1.9. Physicalism and identity
Realisation physicalism claims no identities between the phenomena of  physics and 
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other phenomena.  This allows it to avoid the grosser pitfalls of  identity physicalism: the 
need to claim, for example, that something described in physics is identical to the 
property of  being a predator or a reserve currency, or the chauvinistic implication that 
only beings with our specific physical makeup can have pain.  
On the other hand, it does identify phenomena not described in physics with 
functional phenomena (Melnyk, 2003, p. 8).  This identification means that realisation 
physicalism does not leave phenomena lying around the universe that are ontologically 
distinct from everything physical.  This, too, I take as a minimal commitment of  
physicalism.  If  there is some phenomenon—phenomenal properties, say—which 
cannot be identified with anything physical, then it seems to me that phenomenon is 
non-physical.  It is, after all, distinct from everything physical; what else could be said?
1.10. Expanding the physical
Well, one thing could be said.  Something which is not identifiable with anything else 
physical might nonetheless be treated as physical itself: as an addition to the inventory of 
physics.  Newly discovered fundamental particles, for example, presumably must be 
treated this way.  Daniel Stoljar’s “O-physicalism” treats phenomenal properties as 
phenomena of  physics that are independent of  the phenomena discussed by current 
physics (Stoljar, 2001).  
This approach raises the issue, discussed below, of  how to demarcate the 
phenomena of  physics—there must be some way to distinguish, in principle, an enlarged 
physicalism from dualism.  But even if  such a demarcation can be found, and the views 
in question come out on the right side, they nonetheless lack the ontological and 
explanatory advantages that make monism attractive.  If  phenomenal properties are part 
of  the fundamental furniture of  the universe, it does not seem to me to matter much 
whether they are “physical” or not: our ontological budget is still that much bigger, and 
the hope of  explaining consciousness in terms of  more basic phenomena is lost.  The 
situation is not much better if  phenomenal properties are not taken as fundamental 
themselves, but instead supervene on extra fundamental phenomena (Stoljar, 2001, p. 
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270), (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 129ff).  Such a position gives scope for explaining 
phenomenal properties in more basic terms, but the explanations will be sui generis.  The 
science of  consciousness—as Chalmers suggests in the later chapters of  (Chalmers, 
1996)—will be radically distinct from chemistry, biology, and the other physical sciences.
For these reasons, I would regard any view which accounts for phenomenal 
properties by expanding the ultimate furniture of  the world as a loss, however it is 
labelled.
1.11. Physics? What physics?
The formulation of  physicalism by appeal to the science of  physics runs into a problem 
identified by Hempel (1969) and also pressed by Crane & Mellor (1990).  On the one 
hand, current physics is very likely to be false, so if  physicalism is committed to 
everything being realised by stuff  described by physics as of  2010, then it also is likely to 
be false.  On the other hand, if  physicalism appeals to correct, or final, or perfected 
physics, then we cannot know, in 2010, what ontological furniture it will end up 
including.  So it may be that future physicists will discover that the (as yet marginal) 
interpretation of  quantum physics associated with (Wigner, 1963) is correct, and 
consciousness plays a crucial role in collapsing wave-functions, so that consciousness is 
itself  part of  the subject matter of  physics.  Or, physics might expand to study the 
causal interactions between mind and matter in the pineal gland.  The general concern is 
that a definition in terms of  future physics, by leaving open what counts as physical, fails 
to rule out any ontological possibilities.
There are several possible responses to this problem.  One might start by 
generalising “physics” by reference to the questions it addresses, rather than the answers 
it currently gives (Poland, 1994); or one might treat “physics” as a family resemblance 
term rather than one susceptible to precise definition (Jackson, 1998).  Melnyk (2003, ch. 
5) claims that we can “endorse” current physics without believing it to be true, but also 
(p. 15) applies an idea he calls the “spirit of  physicalism”: he will be happy as long as 
there is a basic science and it is the institutional descendant of  current physics.
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This issue is a problem for physicalism generally, rather than a special problem for 
physicalism about phenomenal consciousness.  So I will not attempt to solve it.  Instead, 
in light of  what I see as the aims and benefits of  physicalism, I will take an approach 
borrowed from David Papineau (2002, p. 41).  What matters is that the domain of  the 
basic science, whatever it turns out to be, does not include the phenomena under 
discussion—in this case phenomenal properties—nor (in light of  the discussion in §1.10 
above) phenomena on which only they supervene.  As long as phenomenal properties 
are ontologically dependent on the same class of  phenomena as, say, chemical 
properties, that is enough.
1.12. Reduction and elimination
Physicalism about a domain is often taken to imply that the domain can be reduced to, 
or eliminated in favour of, physics.   In contrast, realisation physicalism is “retentive”: 
functional phenomena, though intimately connected to their realisers, nonetheless count 
as genuine ingredients of  the world.  As such, I take it that they can cause and be caused. 
To be sure, they will do their causing in virtue of  the causal powers of  their realisers.  
Many have believed that there is a problem of  epiphenomenalism here.7  This is an 
extremely controversial area.  I am inclined to accept Melnyk’s view (2003, p. 123ff) that 
the co-existence of  causal stories at both high and low levels does not involve 
problematic double causation.  Again, however, I set aside general concerns about 
physicalism in order to focus on the special problem of  physicalism about phenomenal 
consciousness.
Realisation physicalism is reductive in some senses of  that contested term, but not 
others.  In particular, as will be seen in chapter 8, realisation ensures there will be 
reductive explanations of  supervening facts.  It does not, however, imply analytical or 
semantic reductionism.  Much of  the thesis will be taken up with defending the claim 
that phenomenal terms, in particular, can refer to physical-functional phenomena 
without having physical-functional analyses.
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1.13. Contingency and a posteriori status
The truth of  realisation physicalism is both contingent and a posteriori.  It would be false 
if  there were non-physical phenomena.  And there is nothing impossible, I take it, about 
ectoplasm or non-physical properties.   While physicalism claims that there is a necessary 
relation among the actual facts, it does not claim that there could not have been other 
facts as well.
Moreover, if  phenomenal properties are functional, then phenomenal properties 
could have been realised by non-physical phenomena.  So physicalism about 
phenomenal properties, or any other particular domain, is also contingent.
The contingent absence of  the non-physical is an a posteriori fact.  I am aware of  no 
transcendental or Kripkean argument which shows that, although there might have been 
non-physical phenomena, we can nonetheless know a priori that there are none.8
C. The distinctness of  the phenomenal: the epistemic arguments for dualism, and the type-C 
response
1.14. Introduction
Given the apparent peculiarities of  phenomenal properties discussed in part A of  this 
chapter, and the account of  physicalism just given in part B, is there reason to think that 
phenomenal properties are non-physical?  In this section, I sketch the dualist arguments 
with which this thesis grapples, and the responses I will offer.  This outline glosses over 
many of  the subtleties discussed in later chapters, but should provide a road map for 
what follows.
For the realisation physicalist, the most problematic peculiarities are the supposed 
intrinsic and atomic nature of  phenomenal properties.  If  realisation physicalism is true, all 
properties beside those described in fundamental physics are functional.   So the 
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physicalist about phenomenal properties must claim either that phenomenal properties 
are described by fundamental physics or that they are, despite appearances, functional.  
But if  they are functional, they are complex: they involve both a role and a physical (or 
lower-level functional) realiser.  They are also relational: having a role involves having 
relations—in particular, causal relations—to other particulars.
Now, the intuition that phenomenal properties are intrinsic and atomic is 
inconsistent with “analytic functionalism”, the view advanced by David Lewis (1995) and 
others.  On that view the functional nature of  phenomenal properties is available a priori 
via conceptual analysis.  If  such analyses were available, there would be no problem: 
physicalism about phenomenal consciousness would be analytically true.  
Sadly, contra Lewis, it seems that they are not available.  Given such analyses, it 
would be analytically false that an experience could have a phenomenal property without 
the relevant functional role.  If, for example, phenomenal terms could be analysed in 
terms of  typical causes and effects, it would analytically false that there is someone who 
shares my phenomenal properties but reacts to them entirely differently, or who 
undergoes the same stimuli as me but whose resulting experiences feel completely 
different.  But such scenarios do not seem incoherent.9  And the same goes for 
functional analyses generally.  There does not seem to be any analysis of  phenomenal 
terms in purely physical-functional vocabulary.
Now, if  there are no such analyses, then analytic functionalism is false; but 
functionalism can still be true.  The unavailability of  functional analyses tells us that we do 
not conceptualise phenomenal properties in functional terms; it does not tell us that they 
are not functional properties.  This thesis will defend the view that phenomenal 
properties can be functional even though their functional nature is not apparent on a 
priori reflection.  It will defend it against arguments of  two general kinds, discussed in 
turn below.
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1.15. Arguments that psychophysical identities must be a priori
Of  course, if  we think phenomenal properties are intrinsic and they are not, then we are 
importantly wrong about their nature.  That conflicts with the idea that qualia are directly 
apprehensible in consciousness: how could they have a hidden functional nature? 
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with arguments that, thanks to our special epistemic relations 
to phenomenal properties, their physical-functional nature would be apparent if  they 
had one. I start with the argument in (Kripke, 1981) that psychophysical identities 
cannot be a posteriori.
According to Kripke, statements of  identity are, if  true, necessarily true.  (As long 
as the terms in the statement are “rigid designators”, a qualification which will be 
addressed in §§2.2 and 2.7.)  Where an identity statement is nonetheless a posteriori, it is 
because the referent of  at least one of  the terms flanking the “is” of  identity is picked 
out indirectly, as whatever satisfies a certain description.  The statement is then a posteriori 
because we cannot determine its truth without empirically discovering what in fact 
satisfies that description.
But, Kripke argues, this story cannot be told about psychophysical identity 
statements—statements like “pain is C-fibre stimulation”, involving a phenomenal and a 
physical-functional term.  For phenomenal terms refer to phenomenal properties directly, 
not indirectly via descriptions.  So, Kripke argues, psychophysical identity statements 
must be a priori if  they are true at all.  And since they are not true a priori, he concludes, 
they are false.
In response, I will argue that Kripke’s account is not the only way for identity 
statements to be a posteriori.   Rather, an identity statement will be a posteriori as long as 
the phenomenal term and the physical-functional term are analytically independent.  If  two 
terms are not analytically connected, then it cannot be known a priori that they co-refer, 
regardless of  how their reference is determined.  And if  phenomenal terms indeed refer 
directly, then they will be analytically independent of  physical-functional terms.  By the 
same token, direct reference explains why psychophysical identity statements are 
counter-conceivable.  It also offers an explanation of  the intuition of  distinctness that, 
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arguably, underlies their apparent contingency.  
In chapter 3 I address two further arguments that directly referring phenomenal 
terms cannot figure in a posteriori identities.  White (2007), argues that the terms in a 
posteriori identity statements must refer indirectly, via what White calls “representational 
modes of  presentation” (see §1.19 below; roughly, terms representing the properties of  
the referent in virtue of  which the term refers to it).  Without such modes of  
presentation, White argues, we cannot describe scenarios in which the identity statement 
is false.  And if  we can’t describe such a scenario, then we cannot rationally doubt that 
the identity statement is true; which means it is true a priori.
I argue that such modes of  presentation are not needed to explain a posteriori status, 
because such scenarios are not needed for rational disbelief.  Absent analytic 
connections, there is no way to know a priori that such scenarios are unavailable.  
Finally, I respond to what Papineau calls the “semantic stability” argument.  This 
argument claims that the reference of  phenomenal terms—and of  physical-functional 
terms—is completely independent of  a posteriori facts.  If  that were so, co-reference of  
phenomenal and physical-functional would also independent of  a posteriori facts, and 
psychophysical identity statements would be a priori if  true at all.  I argue that the 
“semantic stability” ascribed to phenomenal terms by this argument is a much stronger 
notion than mere direct reference, and suggests a deeply mysterious a priori connection 
between a term and the referent itself.  The better view is that reference, whether direct 
or indirect, is determined by properties of, or relations to, referents—and that what 
bears those properties or stands in those relations is an a posteriori matter.  The direct 
reference of  phenomenal terms does not mean that no such properties or relations are 
involved, just that we do not know a priori what they are.
1.16. Arguments that global supervenience statements must be a priori
The next part of  the thesis addresses arguments which depend not on our supposed 
ability to directly identify phenomenal properties, but on more general considerations 
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about the epistemic consequences of  metaphysical supervenience.  
As discussed in part B above, I take physicalism to be committed to global 
supervenience: the facts of  physics metaphysically fix the other facts.  So if  physicalism 
is true, statements expressing that supervenience are necessary truths.
However, like psychophysical identity statements, psychophysical supervenience 
statements seem to be a posteriori.  That is, it seems that someone who knew all the 
physical facts would not thereby know, or be able to deduce, any phenomenal facts.  This 
is the point famously made by Frank Jackson in (1982).
Can supervenience statements also be both necessary and a posteriori?  If  not, then, 
unless one can claim they are a priori, one must conclude that they are not necessary, and 
so that physicalism is false.
One might think the analytic-independence response can be applied to 
supervenience as well as identity.  If  phenomenal terms are analytically independent 
from physical-functional terms, that response would go, the relationship between the 
antecedent and the consequent of  a global supervenience statement will be a posteriori, 
regardless of  its modal status.  But that response faces a new problem here.  If  one 
knows all the facts of  physics then—assuming that reference is a physical phenomenon
—one knows all the facts involved in fixing reference.  And that means that the a 
posteriori status of  a necessary truth cannot be explained by the need for a posteriori 
determination of  the reference of  terms.  Someone who knows the antecedent thereby 
knows the facts needed to determine reference, and can use them to derive the 
consequent a priori.
I believe that the only way to insist that global supervenience statements are a 
posteriori is to treat them as “brute” or “strong” a posteriori necessities: necessary truths 
whose a posteriori status is not explained by their semantic features.  For reasons given in 
chapter 4, I reject such necessities.  Instead, I accept the “a priori entailment thesis” (or 
“APET”): a statement of  all the ontologically fundamental facts a priori entails any 
statement of  a supervening fact.  Given the APET, in order for physicalism to be true a 
statement of  all the facts of  physics must entail phenomenal truths a priori.
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On that basis, I accept that supervenience statements, including those whose 
consequents are phenomenal statements, are a priori.  But here the analytic independence 
I appeal to in chapters 2 and 3 seems to come back to bite me: how can an a priori 
implication from physics to a phenomenal statement be licensed, if  the vocabularies are 
analytically disjoint?
In fact the solution is in the problem.  The reason global supervenience statements 
cannot be a posteriori is that knowing all the facts of  physics means knowing all the a 
posteriori facts that determine the reference of  terms, including of  phenomenal terms.  
But the same knowledge of  reference would allow one to deduce that a phenomenal 
term and a physical-functional term co-refer, without appealing to analytic connections 
between them.  Given the resulting knowledge of  psychophysical identities, it is then 
logically straightforward to deduce phenomenal statements from physical-functional 
statements.  
Of  course this does not establish that physicalism is true: that phenomenal and 
physical-functional terms do co-refer.  But it does rebut a reason to think they do not.
In the three following chapters, 5 through to 7, I apply this approach to three 
arguments against physicalism that appeal to epistemic “gaps” between physics and 
phenomenal consciousness.  In chapter 5, I apply it to Jackson’s “knowledge” argument 
(Jackson, 1982).  I argue that the APET not only commits physicalism to a priori 
derivability of  phenomenal truths from physics, it also shows how the derivation could 
be done.  On the other hand, the analytic independence of  phenomenal terms from 
physical-functional terms explains the appearance of  an unbridgeable epistemic gap.  In 
particular, it can explain the a posteriori status of  local supervenience statements, in which 
the antecedent states only the physical basis of  some phenomenal property.
The same response works against the argument from the conceivability of  zombies, 
or so I argue in chapter 6.  The “conceivability” argument claims that there are 
conceivable scenarios in which the facts of  physics are as they actually are but the 
phenomenal facts are different, and concludes that such scenarios are possible—and 
thus that physicalist supervenience is false.  I respond that the APET shows how, if  
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physicalism is true, such scenarios would fail to be conceivable.  Since a complete 
statement of  the facts of  physics a priori implies the actual phenomenal truths, the 
conjunction of  such a statement with a non-actual phenomenal statement is a priori false.  
Hence the scenario is inconceivable.  Again, the analytic independence of  phenomenal 
terms from physical-functional terms explains why such scenarios seem conceivable.
In chapter 7, I turn to the “explanatory gap” argument, which claims that 
knowledge of  physical facts does not allow us to explain phenomenal facts.  However 
much one knows about the physical basis of  an experience, one version of  the argument 
goes, one’s physical knowledge will never entail the phenomenal truths a priori, so it will 
always make sense to ask why those physical phenomena have their subjective character.  
As before, the APET shows how knowing all the facts of  physics would allow one to 
deduce phenomenal truths from physics a priori.  And the a posteriori status of  local 
supervenience explains why reductive explanations—of  phenomenal facts in terms of  
the physical facts they supervene on—do not seem complete.  A priori entailment of  that 
form, which appeals to facts about the reference of  terms rather than facts about the 
phenomena involved in the explanation, may be explanatorily unsatisfying.   But if  
explanation requires more than a priori entailment, the APET does not commit 
physicalism to explanation.   
Finally,  I address Joseph Levine’s claim (Levine, 2001) that the need we feel for 
explanations of  psychophysical identity statements implies that phenomenal terms have 
representational modes of  presentation.  I argue that, like the intuition of  distinctness 
discussed in chapter 2, this sense of  “gappiness” can be explained by the direct reference 
of  phenomenal terms.
This response to the epistemic gaps makes me a “type-C” physicalist, in David 
Chalmers’s classification (Chalmers, 2003a).  A “type-A” physicalist believes that there 
are no troublesome epistemic gaps; the facts of  physics imply the phenomenal facts 
straightforwardly via conceptual analysis.  Lewis’s analytic functionalism is an example of 
this type.  A “type-B” physicalist believes that the epistemic gaps are real and 
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insuperable: the facts of  physics entail the phenomenal facts only a posteriori.  Type-C 
physicalism claims that the epistemic gaps are closeable in principle—the facts of  
physics imply the phenomenal facts a priori—but nonetheless present real epistemic 
hurdles, ones that cannot be overcome by conceptual analysis.  The benefit of  a type-C 
view is that it avoids both strong necessities and implausible physical-functional analyses 
of  phenomenal terms.  The only disadvantage has been the apparent impossibility of  a 
priori implication without analytic connections, an objection I take the argument in 
chapter 4 to answer.
1.17. Explaining direct reference
In chapter 8, I turn to explanations of  the direct reference of  phenomenal terms.  How 
do phenomenal terms pick out phenomenal properties, if  not via descriptions of  their 
features?  Several accounts of  direct reference have been proposed by type-B 
proponents of  the “phenomenal-concept strategy”.   I explain why I favour Brian Loar’s 
“recognitional concept” account, with some relatively minor modifications.  I also 
respond to some general objections to the strategy.  In particular, I consider whether our 
phenomenal concepts give us a “substantial grasp” of  the nature of  phenomenal 
properties, which is inconsistent with the “bareness” of  direct reference.  I will argue 
that, while it is not at all clear that we have substantial grasps, if  they amount to 
propositional knowledge then the type-C approach explains how it could be derived a 
priori from complete physical knowledge.  If  they are not propositional knowledge, then 
their non-deducibility from physics is not a problem for physicalism.
1.18. Conclusion
In the final chapter, I turn back to the supposed peculiarities of  qualia identified in part 
A of  this chapter.   I suggest that the direct-reference account can explain why 
phenomenal properties appear intrinsic and atomic, rather than functional.  I also 
consider whether the other supposed peculiarities (or the appearance thereof) can be 
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explained. 
Finally, I summarise the resulting dialectical position.  As mentioned, the argument 
does not establish that physicalism is true.  Rather, it clears the way for physicalism about 
phenomenal consciousness by removing some significant philosophical obstacles.  
Actually establishing the physical-functional nature of  phenomenal properties remains 
an empirical project.  But once the dualist arguments have been rebutted, that empirical 
investigation can proceed free of  the “hard problem” worry that phenomenal 
consciousness is a priori distinct from anything physical science could discover about the 
mind.
D. Addendum: presuppositions and terminology
The first two parts of  this chapter described the battleground on which the conflicts 
described in the third part arise.  In this part the camera retreats somewhat, and I will lay 
out the background philosophical views which the argument in this thesis presupposes, 
but which I will not explicitly defend.  This provides a natural opportunity to collect and 
clarify some of  the terminology used throughout the thesis.
 Some of  the views laid out here are controversial, to be sure.  In many cases, 
however, their falsity would not affect the issues discussed in the thesis, except perhaps 
to require some reframing.  Others are, dialectically, concessions to the dualist: positions 
on which the arguments against physicalism depend, but either with which I agree or of  
which I do not see much hope of  refutation.  A few are genuine presuppositions on 
which my argument turns.  But none of  them, I take it, are indefensible, or lacking in 
respectable defenders.
1.19. Representation
a) Generally
Central to the thesis is the claim that features of  phenomenal terms can explain 
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phenomena which the dualist ascribes to the ontological status of  phenomenal properties.  
The view I take of  properties was stated in part B above; here is how I take terms.  I use 
“term” for any item which represents some phenomenon or phenomena.  A term might 
be a linguistic item—a single word, or a longer phrase.  It might also be a mental item, 
which I call a “concept”.  Terms will be named by enclosing them in quotation marks, 
except when I am referring specifically to concepts, when I will use bold type.  (When I 
occasionally need to refer specifically to linguistic terms I will say so.)  Terms combine in 
various ways to form “statements”, which represent facts.  Linguistic statements I call 
“sentences”; mental ones, “beliefs”.  (The distinction between beliefs and other 
propositional attitudes such as desires, hopes and fears will not be relevant.)   In some 
contexts I will speak of  “scenarios”, which are statements, or conjunctions of  
statements, which describe (purportedly) possible states of  affairs in some detail.  The 
distinction between a scenario and a mere statement is not intended to be a precise one; 
nothing will turn on it. 
I take concepts to be mental representations, which represent in more or less the 
same way words do.  Like words, they have (or can have) modes of  presentation and 
referents.  They are not to be identified with any of  those things: in particular they are 
not the meanings of  words.  Where I say that a word “expresses” a concept, all that is 
meant is that the word and concept have the same representational content, and that the 
mental representation plays some role in the production of  the linguistic one.  I am in 
general sympathy with Balog’s account of  concepts as something like words of  
Mentalese (Balog, Forthcoming, Appendix).
Terms, whether words or concepts, may have referents: the worldly phenomena 
which they represent.  Or they may be “empty”, failing to refer to anything.  Since terms 
are themselves worldly phenomena, a term may refer to another term, as in quotation; 
but that is not the usual case.  As mentioned in §1.7, I assume the relation between term 
and referent is a physical one.  More particularly, I am sympathetic to the teleosemantic 
account of  reference (Millikan, 1984).
Between a term and its referent stands its mode of  presentation.  As Block (2007, p. 
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261) notes, these protean things have been given responsibility for both determining the 
reference of  terms and explaining their cognitive significance.  I will take the reference-
determining role as primary.  The cognitive role of  reference-determining modes of  
presentation, and in particular their relevance to the a posteriori status of  identity 
statements, will be a topic for chapters 2 and 3. 
A mode of  presentation, then, is the property (or relation, or combination of  the 
two) which a phenomenon must bear (or stand in) in order to be the referent of  that 
term.  Put another way, it is how a term’s referent is “picked out”: the term refers to 
whatever phenomenon bears the property or stands in the relation.
Following White (2007), however, I distinguish representational and non-representational 
modes of  presentation.10  The non-representational mode of  presentation is simply the 
reference-determining property or relation just mentioned.  A representational mode of  
presentation is a representation of  that property or relation which forms part of  the 
original term’s meaning or narrow content.  
Representational modes of  presentation include, but are not limited to, definite 
descriptions of  the referent of  the kind Kripke invokes in his account of  descriptive 
reference (Kripke, 1981).  They also include Chalmers’s and Jackson’s “application 
conditionals”, discussed in chapter 4 below (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001).
Importantly, I take it that a term may lack any representational mode of  
presentation.  The reference of  such terms is what I call “direct”.  In that case, the 
term’s reference is determined by the metaphysical mode of  presentation alone.11  If  
Kripke is right about proper names, they are examples of  directly referring terms.  There 
may also be “incomplete” representational modes of  presentation, which represent 
some but not all of  the properties or relations that determine the term’s reference.  In 
such a case the representational mode merely constrains the reference of  a term, but 
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10 Ned Block makes what he calls a “similar but not identical distinction” between cognitive and metaphysical 
modes of  presentation (Block, 2007, p. 261).  Joseph Levine similarly distinguishes between “ascriptive” and 
“non-ascriptive” modes of  presentation (Levine, 2001, p. 53).
11 For reasons given in part B of  chapter 3, I do not believe that terms (at least of  the kind at issue) can refer 
without even a metaphysical mode of  presentation.
does not completely determine it, leaving the rest of  the work to the metaphysical mode.  
This possibility will be mentioned in §8.5 below.
Finally, there are representers that are not word-like: images, maps, models and so 
forth.  The arguments discussed in this thesis involve representers which can figure in a 
priori identity statements and implications.  To the extent, if  any, that images and other 
representations can figure in such logical relations, they can be considered “terms” for 
my purposes.  I will not deal with them separately.
b) Phenomenal and physical-functional terms
Much of  the thesis is concerned with the epistemic relations between phenomenal terms 
and physical-functional terms.  The difference between the two is not what they refer to
—that would be inconsistent with physicalism—but how they refer.
A physical-functional term is one which is either physical or functional.  A physical term 
is a term in the theoretical vocabulary of  physics.  It need not appear in current physics, 
but may be a term for an as-yet-undiscovered physical phenomenon.  A functional term is 
one which is analytically functional: in my terms, it either is, or is analytically associated 
with, a description of  a functional role.
“Phenomenal” terms are terms of  the kind we currently use to refer to 
phenomenal properties: ordinary terms like “pain”, “itchiness” and “redness”.  If  
physicalism is true, then there can be physical-functional terms (probably not yet coined) 
which refer to phenomenal properties.  There are also ways to refer to phenomenal 
properties that appeal to their relations to physical-functional phenomena.  “The feeling 
of  a wasp sting”, for example, picks out a subjective character by its physical cause.  
Such physical-functional and relational terms aren’t phenomenal terms in the sense at 
issue.  In particular, using a genuine phenomenal term one can coherently wonder if  
other people get that feeling when they’re stung, or imagine not having that feeling when 
one is stung.
Finally, a “phenomenal statement” is a statement that contains a phenomenal term, 
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in the sense just given.  A “physical-functional statement” is, strictly speaking, one which 
includes only physical-functional terms.  For practical purposes, however, I will count 
statements as physical-functional when they include ordinary terms that are outside the 
problem areas (morality, aesthetics and so on) mentioned in §1.7 above.
1.20. Metaphysics and epistemology
a) Modality
I subscribe to what Lewis (1986) called “linguistic ersatzism” about possible worlds: the 
view that they are complete, consistent descriptions of  situations.  Taking them as 
something more, whether full-blown Lewisian worlds or some sort of  universal, seems 
to me—as it did to Kripke (1981, p. 43ff)—to be taking them too seriously.  Not only 
are such inflationist worlds ontologically spendthrift, it is unclear how we could know 
about what goes on in them.   Accordingly, I share Chalmers’s “modal rationalism”: the 
view that metaphysical possibility just is logical possibility, that is, coherent describability 
(Chalmers, 2002).  Kripke’s defence of  the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a 
priori did not establish a distinction between metaphysical and logical possibility; rather it 
showed that consistency must be evaluated in light of  how terms refer in counterfactual 
contexts, as well as their other semantic features.
Note that modal rationalism in this sense does not entail that our intuitions about 
particular modal hypotheses are especially reliable.  Compare (Bealer, 2007).  The 
“rationalism” in my “modal rationalism” refers to the role of  logic, rather than to a 
faculty for intuiting modal truths.
Though I am committed to this view of  modality, for present purposes I put it in 
the “concession to the dualist” basket.  Modal rationalism makes possibility equivalent to 
a certain kind of  conceivability, and so establishes a key premise of  Chalmers’s argument 
(see chapter 6 below).  More generally, it entails that physicalism is committed to the 
existence of  epistemic relations between physics and purportedly supervening domains.  
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b) Ontology
My takes on properties and facts were described in part B of  this chapter.  I should also 
say that I take a “state” to be an instantiation of  a property by a particular, or the 
bearing of  a relation between particulars.  I take an “event” to be a change in the 
instantiation of  properties or the bearing of  relations.  
I do not think that anything in the thesis turns on these choices, but I set them out 
in the interests of  clarity.  
c) A priori/a posteriori
Knowledge is “a priori” just if  it is independent of  experience, and a posteriori otherwise.  
That brief  definition requires a few comments.  First, I count a statement as a priori if  it 
is a priori knowable, even if  it is not a priori synthesizable (Stoljar, 2005).  That is, a 
statement can be a priori even if  the terms used to formulate it can only be acquired by 
having a certain sort of  experience, as long as belief  in the statement is justifiable 
independently of  experience.   Second, I take introspective experience—such as we 
might have when we attend to our phenomenal properties—to be experience.  Finally, I 
will not count “defeasible” a priori statements—those we are entitled to presume are true, 
but which experience may nonetheless reveal to be false—as a priori.  See (Hawthorne, 
2002).  Not because I think it is wrong to do so, but because that status is clearly not 
sufficient for metaphysical necessity.
d) Analytic/synthetic
A statement is “analytic” if  it is true by virtue of  the meanings of  the terms it contains; 
synthetic otherwise.  “Bachelors are unmarried” is the canonical example of  an analytic 
statement, and it will do here.  I take it that all analytic truths are a priori, though not vice 
versa.  
By “meaning” I mean narrow content generally; I include content which fixes the 
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actual reference of  a term but which is not synonymous with it.  Accordingly, if  there 
are contingent a priori truths, analytic truths may be contingent.  (By contrast, Kripke 
(1981, p. 122 fn. 63), in developing these distinctions, reserved the label “analytic” for a 
priori truths that were also necessary.  I do not think anything substantive turns on this 
choice of  terminology.)
I accept that there are both a priori truths and analytic ones.  While I believe those 
things for reasons, for present purposes they too are concessions to the dualist.  If  there 
are no a priori truths, then physicalism cannot be expected to produce them, and none of 
the dualist arguments to be discussed can get off  the ground.  If  there are no analytic 
truths, then psychophysical identity statements, as identity statements between formally 
distinct terms, must be a posteriori.  So the dualist arguments discussed in chapters 2 and 
3, at least, must fail.
Two terms are analytically connected if  they are related by meaning, so that there are 
analytically true statements describing the relation between their referents.  Otherwise, 
they are analytically independent.  I take the latter to be the same notion Loar calls 
“conceptual independence” (Loar, 1998, p. 600).  I use “analytically” rather than 
“conceptually” to avoid confusion with my use of  “concept” for mental terms rather 
than meanings.  
The clearest case is of  analytic connection where one term is defined in terms of  
the other (as with the “bachelors are unmarried” example).  However their meanings 
may be linked indirectly, including via a term which appears in both their meanings.  I 
will take “meaning” for this purpose as equivalent to “representational modes of  
presentation”.  That excludes analytic connections which do not constrain the terms’ 
reference; but if  there are such connections, they are not relevant to the arguments to be 
discussed.
And so to work.
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2. Kripke’s argument against psychophysical identities
A. Introduction
This chapter discusses Saul Kripke’s (1981) argument against psychophysical identities.  
Kripke’s target was the “Identity Thesis”, the view, associated with such philosophers as 
David Lewis (1966), David Armstrong (1993) and Jack Smart, that mental phenomena 
are identical to physical phenomena.  
The identity theorists recognised that psychophysical identifications were a posteriori: 
their truth was a matter for scientific discovery rather than conceptual analysis.  They 
took as their model such scientific discoveries as “heat is molecular motion”.12  Those 
scientific identifications were taken to show that a posteriori identities were possible, and it 
seemed reasonable to expect that mind-brain identities (when eventually discovered) 
could be understood on the same model.
The a posteriori status of  these identifications was taken to imply that they were also 
contingent.  Kripke’s challenge begins with the claim that if  such identifications are true at 
all, they will be necessarily true. 
If  they are necessary, three features of  such identifications seem to need explaining 
(call them the “target features”):
A) First, they are a posteriori.  The quite general puzzle about any necessary a 
posteriori claim is that i) because it is a posteriori, discovering its truth requires looking at 
the world to see how things are, while ii) its necessity means that it will be true no matter 
how the world is.  Some story has to be told as to why ii) doesn’t make the investigation 
required by i) redundant.
B) Second, they are counter-conceivable: we can (or seem to be able to) coherently 
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12 This is Kripke’s example; it is technically somewhat inaccurate.  A more precise phrase than “molecular 
motion” might be “translational, rotational or vibrational motion of  particles”.  (Kripke is also using “heat” in a 
non-scientific way, but that’s fine, since the left-hand term is supposed to be from ordinary English.)  In general 
what is important is the existence of  such scientific identifications and their a posteriori status.  I will continue to 
use Kripke’s less prolix example. 
imagine their being false.13  But if  they are necessarily true, then there is no situation in 
which they are false; so what are we imagining?
C) Finally, they appear contingent. There is an intuition that even though, say, heat is 
molecular motion, it might not have been.  If  the identity is necessarily true, why do we 
have this intuition?
If  having the target features is inconsistent with being necessary, and identifications 
are necessary if  they are true at all, then the identifications are false.  The physicalist who 
wishes to assert that phenomenal properties are identical to physical-functional 
properties must, therefore, explain how necessary truths can have the target features.
Kripke provides an explanation for the target features of  the scientific 
identifications that the identity theorists took as their model.  But, he claimed, that 
explanation does not carry over to psychophysical identities, that is, those between 
phenomena such as pain on the one hand and physical phenomena on the other.  In 
parts B to D of  this chapter, I describe Kripke’s argument in detail and defend some of  
its presuppositions.   (Since my concern is ultimately with phenomenal properties, I will 
mostly deal with Kripke’s argument against psychophysical type-identities, but I will 
briefly mention Kripke’s objection to token psychophysical identities in §2.8.)  In part E, 
I show that Kripke’s argument is unsuccessful, because analytic independence provides 
an alternative explanation for the target features which can work for both kinds of  
identification.
Before I begin, a general observation about the relevance of  Kripke’s argument.  
He argues against identities between mental and physical phenomena.  Many have taken 
physicalism to allow weaker relations between them—see, for example, (Boyd, 1980)—
and take this as a strike against, if  not the correctness, at least the significance of  
Kripke’s argument (Chalmers, 1996, p. 148).  As discussed in §1.9 above, I believe that 
such identities are required.  Boyd’s concern was that psychophysical identities were 
inconsistent with mental phenomena being possibly non-physical.  But the possibility of  
non-physical minds is preserved by identifying mental phenomena with functional 
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13 The adjective “counter-conceivable” for statements that are conceivably false is borrowed from (Wright, 2002).  
phenomena (as noted in §1.13).  The presence of  a functional term on the right hand 
side will not affect the current discussion, as long as the identity remains a posteriori, that 
is, as long as analytic functionalism is false.
But in any event, the discussion has implications that go beyond psychophysical 
identities.  Once demonstrated here, the analytic-independence approach will be used to 
explain the appearance of  problematic epistemic “gaps” between the phenomenal and 
the physical domains (chapters 5 to 7 below).  Those gaps are also a problem for 
physicalist views based on weaker relations than identity, such as supervenience.
B. The Kripkean apparatus
2.1. The necessity of  identity
The first step in Kripke’s argument is the claim that scientific and psychophysical 
identifications are necessarily true if  they are true at all.  The major premise here is that 
identity statements in which both terms are “rigid designators” are necessarily true.  The 
minor premise is that both terms in the relevant identity statements are rigid.  I will deal 
with each premise in turn.
I will assume that the identity relation holds between any phenomenon and itself  
necessarily.  In possible-words talk, there is no possible world in which an object is 
distinct from itself.14  So scientific and psychophysical identities, understood as facts in 
the world rather than statements about it, are necessary, like all instances of  the identity 
relation.  What is up for grabs is whether a particular statement of  that identity is 
necessarily true.  Accordingly it is identity statements with which I will be primarily 
concerned from here on.
Where the same term appears on either side of  the identity operator (without 
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14 In (1977) Kripke assumes that “surely” !x☐ (x = x), and derives !x!y((x = y) ⊃ ☐ (x = y)) using a Leibnizian 
principle which, given x = y, allows substitution of  y for x in any property attribution Fx, including such modal 
Fs as “is necessarily identical to x”.  Barcan (1947) derives the necessity of  identity from a Leibnizian definition 
of  the identity relation.
equivocation), as in “water is water”, then the necessary truth of  the identity statement is 
clear; it simply states an instance of  the principle that identity holds necessarily. But it is 
not obvious for identity statements involving two distinct terms, such as “heat is 
molecular motion” or “pain is C-fibre stimulation”.
Indeed, Kripke acknowledged that some identity statements are contingent.  In 
particular, those where the two terms are distinct definite descriptions (“the x such that 
!x is the y such that "y”) will be true if  the descriptions co-refer in the actual world, but 
contingent if  their reference diverges in other possible worlds.  “The first postmaster 
general of  the United States was the inventor of  bifocals” is true of  our world, but false 
of  worlds in which Ben Franklin was pre-empted by an earlier optician (Kripke, 1981, p. 
98).
However, Kripke argued, identity statements in which both terms are rigid designators 
are necessarily true, if  they are true at all.
A term “designates rigidly” if  it has the same referent in every possible world (in 
which that referent exists).  If  two rigid designators co-refer in the actual world, they co-
refer in15 all worlds.  It follows that a true identity statement involving two rigid 
designators can be false of  a possible world only if  the thing designated is not identical 
to itself  in that world.  But the existence of  such a world would contradict the 
assumption that identity holds necessarily.  Moreover “a = a” would be false of  such a 
world, where ‘a’ is either of  the rigid designators.
What about worlds in which the common referent does not exist?  It may be that 
"Hesperus is Phosphorus" is false of  such worlds.  If  so, the identity statement is what 
Kripke calls “weakly” necessary (1977, p. 68); see also (1981, pp. 109-110).  For present 
purposes, however, what matters is that there is no world in which “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” is false because Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct.
Rigid designation is not required for an identity statement to be necessarily true.  
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15 To be clear, by “refer… in” I, like Kripke (1981, p. 109 fn.51), am talking about what our term, used in the 
actual world, refers to when used of another possible world; that is, when used by us in a counterfactual context.  
I am not concerned with what terms refer to when used in some other possible world by the denizens thereof.
Necessity requires only that the two terms co-refer in all possible worlds, not that they 
have their actual referent in all worlds.  What is remarkable about rigidity, however, is that 
it can give rise to necessary co-reference between two logically and analytically 
independent terms.
2.2. Rigid designation
That much seems unassailable; at least I do not care to assail it.  The next part of  the 
argument is more contestable.  Not all terms are rigid; why should we think those in the 
relevant identity statements are?
a) Rigidity of  proper names
Kripke’s basic mode of  arguing that a term designates rigidly is by appeal to semantic 
intuition.  Start with proper names.  Kripke claims we have a “direct intuition of  the 
rigidity of  names, exhibited in our understanding of  the truth conditions of  particular 
sentences” (1981, p. 14).  “Nixon won the 1970 election” is true of  some counterfactual 
situation only if  the winner is the same man who makes that sentence true of  the actual 
world.16  Kripke also suggests an intuitive test for rigidity: if  a term ‘x’ is non-rigid, we 
will accept statements of  the form “x might have been something other than x in fact 
was”; if  we do not, the term is rigid.  So we accept that “someone other than the U.S. 
president in 1970 might have been the U.S. president in 1970”, because “the U.S. 
President in 1970” is non-rigid: it designates whoever has a certain property, and that 
property can be possessed by different people in different worlds.  But we do not assent 
to “Nixon might not have been Nixon”, and that is because “Nixon” is rigid (1981, p. 
45).
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16 Rigid designation by names thus presupposes trans-world identity of  individuals.  I share Kripke’s view that 
regarding trans-world identity as a real problem results from taking possible worlds too seriously (Kripke, 1977, 
p. 80).  Rigid designation by property terms may avoid this problem, since Lewis’s objections to trans-world 
identity of  individuals don’t apply to properties (Lewis, 2009, p. 210).
b) Rigidity and reference-fixing descriptions
One implication of  the rigidity of  names is the falsity of  the Russellian view that a 
name’s meaning is given by an associated definite description.  A description such as 
“the x such that Fx” generally refers differently when used of  different worlds, 
according to the extension of  F in each world, and so is non-rigid.17  Kripke accepts that 
the referent of  a name can (in unusual cases) be picked out by a definite description.18  
But, he claims, such descriptions do not give the meaning of  the name, they merely fix its 
reference.  That is, even if  a name’s referent is picked out according to some identifying 
criterion, that criterion determines the reference of  the name only in the actual world.  
The name then has that referent in every world, regardless of  what satisfies the criterion 
in a particular world.  Again, Kripke supports this claim by appeal to semantic intuition.  
Suppose that the description associated with “Aristotle” were “the tutor of  Alexander”.  
Now imagine a world in which the person we call “Aristotle” did not take that job.  If  
some undistinguished Macedonian tutored Alexander instead, we would say that in that 
world Aristotle did not tutor Alexander.  Similarly, if  no one taught Alexander, we would 
not be forced to say that Aristotle did not exist in that world. We do not regard it as 
necessary that Aristotle taught Alexander.  And the same seems to be true for any other 
description by which we might plausibly identify Aristotle.  So if  “Aristotle” is associated 
with any such description, that description fixes the name’s reference rather than giving 
its meaning.
What Kripke says about descriptive reference can be applied to representational 
modes of  presentation generally, whether or not they amount to definite descriptions.   
Kripke himself, when not arguing with Russell, sometimes talks about reference being 
fixed by “non-rigid designators”, rather than “descriptions”, for example at (1981, p. 
143).
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17 The exception would be if  F were necessarily possessed by x and only by x, in which case the description is 
what Kripke calls “de facto” rigid (1981, p. 21 fn. 21).
18 He mentions “Jack the Ripper”, used to refer to whoever committed certain murders (1981, p. 79).
c) Rigidity in scientific identity statements
So much for proper names.  What about the terms that figure in identity statements such 
as “heat is molecular motion”: are they rigid?
Kripke argues, again by appeal to semantic intuition, that “heat” refers rigidly to 
whatever phenomenon produces a certain sensation (call it “S”) in us.  When 
considering worlds in which that phenomenon does not produce S, perhaps because we 
do not exist, or because we are wired differently, we would say that in such worlds “heat 
does not produce S”; we would not say that “heat does not exist”.  So the description 
“produces S in us” fixes the reference of  “heat”, but does not give its meaning.
Kripke has less to say about the rigidity of  “molecular motion”, though strictly 
speaking it, too, must be a rigid designator if  his argument is to succeed.  “Molecular 
motion” passes Kripke’s intuitive test for rigidity: it does not seem to make sense to say 
that “molecular motion might not have been molecular motion”.  Now, “molecular 
motion”, unlike “heat”, does not seem to involve a reference-fixing criterion, so we 
cannot appeal to the same sort of  modal intuition.  But rigid terms do not have to pick 
out their referent so indirectly.  A term may simply rigidly pick out a property.  Wright 
(2002, p. 405) calls natural kind terms that work this way “primary” natural kind terms.  
If  one is concerned with properties rather than the kinds they characterise, one can 
similarly speak of  “primary” terms for properties.
Is the appeal to semantic intuition sufficient to establish rigidity?  It seems to me 
that it is, at least prima facie. For whether we use a term rigidly or non-rigidly is just a 
question of  how we choose to use the term in modal contexts.  Nothing stops me 
coining the term “scheat” to designate, non-rigidly, whatever causes sensation S in 
humans in any world.  But by the same token nothing stops me from choosing to use 
“heat” that way, rather than rigidly.  And semantic intuition seems a plausible guide to 
how such choices have been made, either personally or in a public language with which 
one is competent. 
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On David Lewis’s account of  theoretical terms, however, the reference of  
theoretical terms is determined using descriptive criteria (Lewis, 1970).  According to 
Lewis, such terms refer to whatever plays a role specified by the relevant theory.  When 
used of  a non-actual world, they refer to whatever plays the relevant role in that world 
(1970, p. 435).  So—assuming with Lewis that what plays a particular role is contingent
—such terms are non-rigid.
Addressing these questions would require a large diversion.  Fortunately, the rigidity 
or otherwise of  terms like “molecular motion” need not be resolved for present 
purposes.  For rigidity is cheap; we can simply stipulate it.  As suggested by Kripke 
(1981, p. 149), a non-rigid term can be “rigidified”: replaced with a new term that rigidly 
designates the actual referent of  the non-rigid term.
So if  “molecular motion” is non-rigid, all we have to do is coin “r-motion” such 
that it refers rigidly to whatever plays the molecular motion role in the actual world.  
“Heat is r-motion” will then be an identity statement with each of  the properties Kripke 
claims for “heat is molecular motion”:
• It will be necessary if  true.19
• It will be true, since “molecular motion” and “r-motion” co-refer in the actual 
world by definition.  
• It will be a posteriori.  If  “heat is r-motion” were a priori, it would also be a priori 
that “heat” and “r-motion” co-refer in the actual world.  But then it would be a 
priori that “heat” and “molecular motion” actually co-referred; and so that “heat is 
molecular motion” was true.  Since “heat is molecular motion” is a posteriori, so is 
“heat is r-motion”. (This is as it should be: rigidification is far too cheap to give us 
an a priori shortcut to knowing what natural phenomena produce our sensations, or 
any other substantive scientific knowledge.)
• It will have the other target properties, whether on Kripke’s explanation for 
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19 Assuming that “heat” is also rigid.  If  there is any doubt on that score, the same rigidification procedure can 
be applied to coin “r-heat”.
them (as I will explain in the next section) or the one I prefer (discussed in part E).
So the Kripkean puzzle will arise for “heat is r-motion”.  And if  the puzzle cannot 
be solved for that statement, then it is false.  But then, because the original identity 
statement “heat is molecular motion” materially implies “heat is r-motion”, the original 
statement is false too.
2.3. A general observation on necessary identity and physicalism.
For these reasons, I can treat as correct Kripke’s claim that the terms in scientific identity 
statements designate rigidly.  But imagine that the identity theorist succeeded in showing 
that the relevant identity statements were contingent.  Would that help them?  It seems 
to me that that it would not.  It would show only that the wrong identity statement was 
being considered.  
The realisation physicalist claims that every phenomenon is identical to some 
physical-functional phenomenon.  That is not a claim about statements; it is an assertion 
that the relation of  identity holds.  If  that relation holds, it holds necessarily. But then a 
statement which asserts that very fact will hold necessarily.  Consider, by contrast, an 
identity statement “a = b” which is contingently true because a) the meaning of  “a” is 
given by a criterion of  the form ‘the F’, and b) b is contingently the unique bearer of  
property F.  The truth of  that statement is not enough for physicalism.  Even if  b is a 
physical phenomenon, we must still ask about the property F that makes it count as a.  Is 
F a physical-functional property?  If  “F” is not a physical-functional term, then the 
physicalist needs an identification of  the form “F = G”, where “G” is a physical-
functional property term.  And if  that statement is only contingently true, then the same 
question recurs.  
So physicalism needs necessary identity statements.  And if  the terms in necessary 
identity statements have no a priori connection, then they must be rigid designators.  I 
can see no other way their co-reference in all worlds could be secured.
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C. Kripke’s explanation of  the target properties
2.4. The QE/QI account
So a posteriori identity statements involving two rigid designators are (perhaps weakly) 
necessarily true if  they are true at all.  Kripke acknowledges that “the notion of  a 
posteriori necessary truth may still be somewhat puzzling” (1981, p. 140). He sometimes 
draws the contrast between necessity and a posteriori status by saying we could have 
discovered that a posteriori necessities are false even though, being true, they are true 
necessarily.  So, for example, given that gold is the element with atomic number 79, it is 
necessarily so; nonetheless we might have discovered (might, in principle, still discover) 
that it was not.  So “in this sense, gold could turn out not to have atomic number 
79” (1981, p. 123) (my emphasis).
But in truth even the possibility of  discovering that a statement is false is inconsistent 
with its being necessary.  As Kripke puts it into the mouth of  an imagined objector: “If  
Hesperus might have turned out not to be Phosphorus, then Hesperus might not have 
been Phosphorus” (1981, p. 141).
In response, Kripke concedes that no necessary statement could really have turned 
out to be false.  What we would have discovered if  our experiments had come out 
differently was that a different statement, one which is “qualitatively equivalent” to the 
necessary truth but nonetheless contingent, was false.  (Call this statement the “QE 
Statement”.)  So Kripke suggests that what might have been discovered is not “gold is 
not an element” but “there is a compound with all the properties originally known to 
hold of  gold” (1981, p. 143).
Kripke does not explain what he means by “qualitatively equivalent”.  Elsewhere, 
however, he uses “qualitatively” to mean “in respect of  properties”.  For example, at 
(1981, p. 44) he rejects the view that possible worlds must be specified “in a purely 
qualitative way”, by which he means using property terms but not names.  So, I take it, a 
“qualitatively equivalent” statement is one that is consistent with the original statement 
in its claims about properties.  
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(What if  the identity statement involves a property term?  When that term is 
replaced by a term for its reference-fixing condition, the property commitments of  the 
statement will change.  I think relaxing the notion of  “qualitatively equivalent” to include 
the resulting statement is harmless: it will still do the work Kripke asks of  a QE 
statement.)
Now, the scenario in which the QE statement turned out false would have been 
“qualitatively identical [to the actual world] with respect to all the evidence I had in 
advance” (1981, p. 142).  By “in advance”, Kripke presumably means in advance of  
making the relevant a posteriori discovery.  Call such a scenario the “QI Scenario”.  So the 
QE statement would be not only contingent, but epistemically open until we finally 
discovered the actual structure of  gold.  This, Kripke claims, explains our sense that the 
original necessity could have turned out to be false.
Kripke’s formulation of  the QI scenario in terms of  evidence implies a relation 
between the properties mentioned in the reference-fixing description and the properties 
by which we discern that the referent is present.  Now, these are different jobs, and there 
seems no reason to think we must use all our evidence to determine the reference of  
terms.  (For example, we might use “cause of  sensation S” to fix the reference of  
“heat”, even though we also know that, for example, heat causes fire.)  But we cannot 
use evidence we don’t know about, so “all the evidence we have in advance” will include 
at least the properties mentioned in the reference-fixing description.
This account obviously depends on there being a suitable QE statement and QI 
scenario.  It is not true in general that necessary truths have such analogues: “bachelors 
are unmarried” is not qualitatively equivalent to any contingent statement. 
In cases like “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, Kripke constructs the relevant scenario 
and statement as follows.  Assume that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” are both rigid 
designators whose reference is fixed by non-rigid descriptions, viz., the descriptions “the 
heavenly body in such-and-such position in the sky in the evening (morning)” (1981, p. 
143).  Now replace “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” in the statement with those 
descriptions, and the resulting statement is qualitatively equivalent to the original identity 
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statement: before discovering the identity, all the evidence we have is consistent with 
both.  But this QE statement is contingent.  That is, it could have been the case that the 
first heavenly body visible after sunset was not also the last heavenly body visible before 
sunrise.  And that situation would have been qualitatively indistinguishable from the 
actual one, with respect to the evidence we had in advance of  discovering the identity: 
there would have been lights in the same positions in the sky at the same times.  So the 
QE statement is a posteriori.
The same goes for “heat is molecular motion”: replace “heat” with the non-rigid 
description that fixes its reference—“The phenomenon that causes sensation S”—and 
the result is a QE statement that is false in a QI scenario in which S is caused by, for 
example, seeing the colour green.
I am now in a position to say why Kripke’s view allows a scientific term to be 
rigidified without loss, as promised in the last section. If  “heat is molecular motion” is 
contingent, there is a conceivable scenario in which heat genuinely fails to be molecular 
motion.  The scenario does not genuinely falsify “heat is r-motion”, of  course, but it will 
be a QI scenario for it.  So the QE/QI account will be available for “heat is r-motion”.
2.5. What does the QE/QI account explain?
Kripke initially describes the problem to which the QE/QI account responds as a puzzle 
about “the notion of  a posteriori necessary truth” (1981, p. 140).  This suggests that the 
QE/QI mechanism is explaining how such statements can be a posteriori even though 
they are necessarily true.  The trailer at the end of  Lecture II certainly suggests that this 
is going to be its role:
So two things are true: first, that we do not know a priori that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, and are in no position to find out the answer except empirically.  
Second, this is so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistinguishable 
from the evidence we have and determine the reference of  the two names by the 
positions of  two planets in the sky, without the planets being the same. (1981, p. 
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104)
But later, in the context of  psychophysical identity claims, the same mechanism is 
described as explaining the “apparent contingency” of  a posteriori necessities:
What was the strategy used above to handle the apparent contingency of  certain 
cases of  the necessary a posteriori?  The strategy was to argue that although the 
statement itself  is necessary, someone could, qualitatively speaking, be in the same 
epistemic situation as the original, and in such a situation a qualitatively analogous 
statement could be false. (1981, p. 150)
(Similarly, “illusion of  contingency” on the same page, and “certain obvious element of  
contingency” on p.154.)
Now being apparently contingent and being a posteriori are not the same thing.  A 
posteriori status is an epistemic matter; apparent contingency is a metaphysical status, or at 
least the appearance of  one.  And which of  the two is in play makes a difference to the 
argument against psychophysical identities:
A) If  the QE/QI account is an explanation of  a posteriori status, the implication of  
its failure to apply to psychophysical identity statements is that they cannot be true a 
posteriori; so if  they are true at all they must be a priori; and since they are not a priori, they 
are false.
B) If  the QE/QI account is an explanation of  apparent contingency, the argument 
would seem to be that psychophysical identity statements are false because they are 
contingent.  Apparent contingency is evidence of  contingency, the argument would 
continue, and in the case of  psychophysical identity statements the apparent contingency 
cannot be explained away on QE/QI grounds.  
C) The apparent-contingency argument might also be understood as a conceivability 
argument.  The identity statement appears possibly false because we can conceive of  a 
scenario in which it is false. Unless that scenario can be dismissed as a merely 
qualitatively equivalent one, in which something other than the identity statement itself  
is false, then the identity statement is possibly false.  And so, by the necessity of  identity, 
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it is false tout court.
Kripke has been interpreted all three ways.  So Brian Loar:
It seems fair to represent the next step in [Kripke’s] argument as follows. 'Heat' 
has a contingent higher-order mode of  presentation that connotes the property 
"feeling like this". That is what accounts for the a posteriori status of  the identity.  
(Loar, 1998, p. 600)
Contrast (Papineau, 2002, sections 3.3-3.6), who discusses the account as an explanation 
for the “appearance of  contingency” of  identity statements.  And for an extended 
treatment of  Kripke’s argument as one based on conceivability, see (Wright, 2002).
Which is right?  
Interpretation A) looks to be undermined by the description of  the QI/QE 
mechanism as applying to “some necessary a posteriori truths” (Kripke, 1981, p. 142) (my 
emphasis), and by the “certain cases” in the quote from p. 150 above.  That seems to 
imply that the QE/QI mechanism is explaining something other than their a posteriori 
status.  But one can also read those comments consistently with interpretation A): as an 
acknowledgement that the a posteriori status of  other necessary truths may be explained 
in different ways.
Textual interpretation of  Kripke can get one only so far, even setting aside the 
famously informal presentation of  the lectures, which might explain why the change 
between a posteriori status in Lecture II and “apparent contingency” in the discussion of  
psychophysical identities is neither announced or explained.  The important question is 
which features of  a posteriori necessary statements need explaining, and how they can be 
explained.  And of  course the a posteriori status, apparent contingency and counter-
conceivability of  necessary identity statements all need explaining.
Their a posteriori status needs explaining even once Kripke’s in-principle distinction 
between necessity and a priori status has been accepted.  The puzzle about a necessary a 
posteriori statement is why its necessity does not make a posteriori investigation redundant.  
The QE/QI mechanism seems to yield a plausible answer: because of  the way the 
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reference of  the terms in the identity statement is determined, there is a QE statement 
which could be false in a QI scenario.  The reason we do not know a priori that the 
identity statement is true is then that a) we do not know a priori that we are not in the QI 
scenario in which the QE statement is false and b) we have no a priori evidence for the 
original statement beyond our evidence for the QE statement.  The conceivability of  the 
QI scenario also explains why the identity statement is counter-conceivable.
The apparent contingency of  some necessary truths also needs explaining. Why 
does it seem that scientific identities might have been false, even once they are known to 
be true?  Here again the QE/QI mechanism suggests an answer: we imagine the QE 
statement’s being false in a QI scenario, and mistake ourselves to be imagining a scenario 
in which the original identity statement is false.
So it is no accident that Kripke appears to apply the QE/QI strategy to explain 
both a posteriori status and apparent contingency: it can explain both, along with counter-
conceivability.
  
2.6. How distinct are the target properties?
One might take the possible interpretations of  Kripke as independent arguments against 
physicalism, foreshadowing the distinct knowledge and conceivability arguments 
discussed in chapters 5 and 6.  Alternatively, and perhaps more charitably to Kripke, one 
might take all three as essentially the same argument.  The apparent contingency of  a 
statement is not a purely metaphysical matter.  Its contingency or otherwise is; but its 
apparent contingency is a matter of  our epistemic relation to its metaphysical status.  To 
say that a proposition appears contingent is just to say that it looks contingent to us.  
Now, an a priori statement will not appear contingent.  (In the case of  a complex a priori 
truth, we might not know immediately whether it is true or false—as in Kripke’s 
example of  an as-yet-unproven mathematical conjecture—but that is not to say it 
appears contingent.)  So apparent contingency implies a posteriori status.
A posteriori status does not seem to imply apparent contingency: some a posteriori 
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necessities (in particular, identity statements between proper names) do not appear 
contingent, at least once they are known to be true.  But it does imply that the statement 
is counter-conceivable in the “negative” sense, that is, that its negation is not a priori 
false.  (I take the term “negative conceivability” from Chalmers (2002, p. 149).)  In 
addition, the QI scenario explains why we might (wrongly) take the identity statement to 
be “positively” counter-conceivable, that is, why we think we can coherently imagine a 
scenario in which it is false.  And counter-conceivability will at least in general create an 
apparent possibility of  falsehood.
So the QE/QI strategy’s ability to explain all three target features is not an accident 
either, because they are intimately related.
D. The argument against psychophysical identities 
2.7. The rigidity of  “pain”
So far, so good, for necessary a posteriori identities.  The distinction between epistemic 
and metaphysical status opens up logical space for them; the QE/QI account can 
explain their a posteriori status, along with their counter-conceivability and apparent 
contingency.
Nonetheless, according to Kripke, there is still a problem for psychophysical 
identity statements.  Like “heat is molecular motion”, psychophysical identity statements 
like “pain is C-fibre stimulation” are necessary if  they are true at all; but the QE/QI 
account cannot be told for them, because neither term refers by description.
Two notes concerning “pain is C-fibre stimulation”.  First, like “heat is molecular 
motion”, Kripke’s example of  a psychophysical identity statement is not scientifically 
accurate.  In this case that is inevitable, however, since there are as yet no scientifically 
accepted identities between phenomenal and physical-functional properties.  So we must 
make do with a proxy.  Second, Kripke is speaking of  mental and physical states, 
whereas I am concerned with properties.  So to be clear: in what follows I am using 
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“pain” as a term for the phenomenal property that might also be called painfulness, and 
“C-fibre stimulation” as a term for a property that certain neural particulars share.
Kripke’s argument depends, first, on the terms in psychophysical identity 
statements being rigid.  As to “C-fibre stimulation” the same goes as went for 
“molecular motion”: it seems to be a rigid primary term for a property, but if  not, it can 
be rigidified without affecting the issues in play.
As to the rigidity of  “pain” there is a dispute, again with David Lewis on the other 
side.  Kripke finds that “pain” satisfies his intuitive test20 for rigidity: “it seems absurd to 
say that pain could have been some phenomenon other than the one that it is.” (1981, p. 
148)  
Lewis, by contrast, takes the view that “pain” refers non-rigidly to whatever plays a 
certain role in our mental and behavioural lives (the “pain role”) (Lewis, 1999a, p. 304).  
He asserts its non-rigidity based on his own appeal to semantic intuition: we would not 
say, of  a possible world in which the actual player of  the pain role was replaced by 
another, that no one was in pain in that world.
Now, the rigidification technique used for “molecular motion” in the previous 
section is not available here.  Rigidifying “pain” so that it refers to the property that 
actually plays the pain role will generate a necessary identity statement, to be sure.  But 
“pain” will then have its reference fixed by description and so, like “heat”, generate a 
QE/QI pair.
Lewis’s claim presupposes his view that “pain” is an analytically functional term.  
On that view, it is a priori that “pain is whatever plays the role p” (where “p” stands for a 
specification of  a certain functional role).  As mentioned in §1.14, my attitude to 
analytical functionalism is “would that it were so”.  Such a priori connections would 
vitiate most or all of  the arguments for phenomenal dualism.  However, we seem to be 
able to imagine someone feeling pain despite suffering none of  the typical causes and 
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20 Discussed in §2.2 above.  The test says a term ‘x’ is non-rigid if  (there is some reading on which) we accept “x 
might not have been x”, rigid otherwise.
without any of  the typical mental or behavioural responses.  And if  that is conceivable, 
then “pain is whatever plays the role p” is not a priori. 
That imagined scenario is, of  course, Lewis’s own “mad pain” case (Lewis, 1980).  
Lewis’s response is that the madman does have pain, because he has what plays the pain 
role in people generally, even though it does not play the pain role in him.  Now, there is 
no problem in principle with a functional term referring that way, to whatever typically 
plays a role in a certain population.  But it is not a plausible story about phenomenal 
terms.   The madman has pain, after all, just if  his toe-stubbing experiences have a 
certain subjective character.  So on Lewis’ view the madman feels that sensation because 
of  the role one of  his neural phenomena plays in other people.  That does not seem 
analytically true: we can coherently conceive of  someone feeling like that even if  they are 
alone in the world.  More than that, it seems positively bizarre to suggest that what toe-
stubbing is like for me depends on neural goings-on in other people’s heads.  The latter 
intuition should not be held sacred, but it is at least pretty good evidence that Lewis’s 
view is not analytic.
2.8.  The QE/QI story cannot be told
Having established that “pain” is rigid, the argument that the QE/QI account cannot 
apply to psychophysical identity statements is relatively straightforward. The QE/QI 
account depends on at least one of  the terms having its reference fixed by a description 
which picks out the referent by a property it bears only contingently.  That is how there 
can be a statement and a scenario which have the same commitments regarding the 
instantiation of  properties as the original statement, but in which the referent of  one of  
the terms differs.  For example, applied to scientific identities such as “heat is molecular 
motion”, the QI scenario is one in which the property by which we identify heat (that of 
causing sensation S) is present, but heat is not.  In that scenario the QE statement “the 
cause of  sensation S is molecular motion” is false.
This account cannot work for a psychophysical identity statement, Kripke argues, 
because neither term in a psychophysical identity statement has its reference fixed by 
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description.
Where “heat” refers to whatever produces a particular sensation in us, “pain” is a 
term for a sensation itself.  That sensation cannot be contingently associated with the 
referent of  “pain”: it is the referent.  If  C-fibre stimulation merely produced pain 
sensations, as heat produces sensation S, then it would not be identical to the pain, and 
the identity statement would be false.  For “pain” to work like “heat”, its reference 
would have to be fixed by a description of  some property contingently borne by pain.  
But surely it is not.
Perhaps “pain” does have its reference fixed by description, but a description which 
refers to the sensation itself ?   Since we can use a sensation as a criterion in fixing the 
reference of  “heat”, it is tempting to think we could use the sensation as a criterion for 
its own name.  Kripke seems to suggest the reference of  “pain” is picked out in such a 
way:
Pain, on the other hand, is not picked out by one of  its accidental properties; 
rather it is picked out by the property of  being pain itself, by its immediate 
phenomenological quality. (1981, p. 152)
There are problems with this sort of  claim, which will be discussed in more detail in part 
B of  chapter 3, when I come to the semantic stability argument.  The better view, I will 
argue, is that the reference of  “pain” is not fixed by description at all.  Nonetheless, pace 
Lewis, what does not seem plausible is that the referent of  “pain” is fixed by some other 
property contingently borne by pain.
And so, the argument runs, “pain is C-fibre stimulation” has no QI scenario or QE 
statement.  Any scenario which is qualitatively identical, with respect to all the evidence I 
have in advance, to one in which I feel pain is… one in which I feel pain.  (1981, pp. 
151-152)   And there is no QE statement, because there is nothing with which one can 
replace the term “pain” to generate a contingent statement that makes the same 
qualitative claims. (1981, pp. 152-153)
Before rebutting this argument in the final part of  the chapter, I will tie up a couple 
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of  loose ends.
First, a QE/QI pair could be generated if  the scientific side of  the psychophysical 
identity statement had its reference fixed by description.  But that would not help the 
physicalist.  Suppose that the reference of  “C-fibre stimulation” was fixed as whatever 
phenomenon played a certain theoretical role.  (Say also, contra Lewis, that it denoted 
that state rigidly.)  But then, at least once we discovered what plays that role, we could 
replace “C-fibre stimulation” with a primary term (as defined in §2.2(c) above) for that 
realiser.  Let “T” be that term.  Then “Pain is T” faces the Kripkean challenge without 
involving a reference-fixing description.  The point is that, as Papineau points out, that 
the Kripkean challenge does not depend on which psycho-physical term appears in the 
identity statement (Papineau, 2002, p. 78). 
Second, Kripke also gives an argument against token psychophysical identity 
statements: statements of  the form “A is B” where “A” is a name for a particular pain 
(i.e., a particular which bears the phenomenal property at issue) and “B” is a name for a 
particular with the physical-functional property purportedly identical to that phenomenal 
property.  If  such a statement is true, it is necessarily true.  But it seems possible that B 
could have existed without there being any pain, and therefore without A existing 
(Kripke, 1981, p. 146).
The token identity statement does not, however, entail that A/B has the properties 
that it does.  In particular, it is true of  worlds in which it does not bear the phenomenal 
property.  So the possibility of  B existing without pain is not, in fact, inconsistent with 
the necessary truth of  “A is B”.
Kripke’s response is to claim that phenomenal properties are essential to their 
bearers.  “Can any case of  essence be more obvious than the fact that being a pain is an 
essential property of  each pain?” (1981, p. 146). If  so, A cannot exist without the 
phenomenal property; if  B can, it is not identical to A.
Such appeals to individual essences are at best controversial.  One might object (as 
I do) to individual essences in general, or one might simply dissent from the specific 
claim about pain.  (I suspect that Kripke’s intuitions here might have been surreptitiously 
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strengthened by the use of  “pain” for both the token and the property.  My temptation 
to regard pain as an essential property seems to weaken when I name my headache 
“Henry” and ask myself  whether being a pain is essential to Henry.  Take that for what 
it’s worth.)  Or, as David Chalmers points out, one might claim that particular C-fibre 
stimulations are essentially C-fibre stimulations, too (Chalmers, 1996, p. 148).   If  so, 
then whether B can exist without pain comes down to whether the two properties are 
identical: that is, to type-identity.  This is also the result if  the token-identity question is 
asked, not about the bearers of  the properties, but about the states comprised by those 
bearers and the respective properties—to which it is more plausible that the properties 
are essential.
E. An alternative explanation: analytic independence
2.9. Analytic independence
The combination of  necessary truth and one or more of  the target properties certainly 
needs explaining.  I grant that Kripke’s QE/QI mechanism provides a satisfying 
explanation for certain such statements, including identity statements where one of  the 
terms has its reference fixed by description.  Now grant also that Kripke’s mechanism 
does not work for psychophysical identity statements; is there an alternative?
A rather simpler explanation is this: so long as two rigid terms are not analytically 
connected, an identity statement involving them will have the target properties.
As explained in §1.20(d) above, by “not analytically connected”, I mean that there is 
no connection between the terms’ meanings.  And by a term’s “meaning” I mean its 
narrow content—other representation(s) associated with it—not external phenomena 
such as its referent, or the relation between it and its referent.  
Strictly speaking, terms can be analytically independent even if  both of  them refer 
by description: all that is required is that the two associated descriptions do not overlap 
in content.  Nonetheless, like Papineau (2002), and other proponents of  the 
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“phenomenal-concept strategy” response to arguments for dualism,21 I take the analytic 
independence of  phenomenal terms and physical-functional terms to be explained by 
the fact that phenomenal terms refer “directly”—that is, not via an associated 
description, or other representational mode of  presentation.   Directly referring terms 
will be analytically independent of  each other, and of  descriptive terms (as long as the 
directly referring term does not figure in the descriptive term’s representational mode of 
presentation).  So if  analytic independence is enough to explain the target properties, 
descriptive reference-fixing is not required.
2.10. A test case: proper-name identities
Consider an identity statement involving two proper names: “Cicero is Tully”.  This 
statement is necessarily true (granting the various premises discussed above), and it is a 
posteriori.  But neither of  the terms refers by description.  (According to many, including 
Kripke himself  (1981, p. 95) and subscribers to causal theories of  proper-name 
reference.  A descriptivist about proper names presumably won’t find this example 
persuasive, but the general point about direct reference should be unaffected.)  So the 
statement’s a posteriori status cannot be explained by the possibility of  a world in which 
the terms’ reference-fixing descriptions denote different things.  But it doesn’t need to 
be: the absence of  any analytic connection between “Cicero” and “Tully” is quite 
enough to prevent the identity being deduced by a priori reflection.
“Cicero is Tully” is also at least negatively counter-conceivable.  Its negation, 
“Cicero is not Tully”, is not a formal contradiction, and because the two names are 
analytically independent it involves no analytic contradiction.  So the thought that “they” 
are two different people is not incoherent.  
Is “Cicero is Tully” positively counter-conceivable?  There is no genuine possible 
world in which Cicero is not Tully, so when we imagine that Cicero is not Tully we 
cannot be imagining such a possible world.  That’s fine; “heat is molecular motion” is 
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not counter-conceivable in that sense either (Kripke, 1981, pp. 131-132).  So what are we 
thinking of  when we entertain the thought that Cicero is not Tully?  Because “Cicero” 
and “Tully” refer directly, we cannot use the QE/QI mechanism to generate a suitable 
scenario from their associated descriptions.  At least, we can’t if the properties used to 
describe the QI scenario are restricted to reference-fixing properties.  But why should 
they be?
What is important about a QI scenario is that involves the same distribution of  
properties as the actual world, insofar as we are aware of  that distribution of  properties 
before making the a posteriori discovery of  the identity.  The properties of  heat that we 
are aware of  in advance obviously include the reference-fixing property (or we could 
hardly use it to fix reference).  So a QI scenario for “heat is molecular motion” must be 
one in which something causes that sensation.  And a QE statement will be committed 
to at least that distribution of  properties.
In the case of  “Cicero is Tully” there are no such qualitative commitments.  But 
that makes it easier, not harder, to construct qualitatively equivalent analogues.  We are 
free to use any properties we happen to associate separately with each name.  So we 
might think of  Cicero as a great Roman orator, and of  course as being named “Cicero”; 
and of  Tully as an adequate Roman poet named “Tully”, even though those descriptions 
neither give the names’ meaning nor fix their reference.  A scenario in which those 
properties are borne by different people is qualitatively equivalent to the actual world, 
insofar as we knew what the actual world was like before discovering that Cicero was 
Tully.  And it seems that this scenario describes what we are imagining the world to have 
been like when we imagine having discovered that Cicero was not Tully.
We can construct a QE statement the same way: “The Roman orator named 
‘Cicero’ is the Roman poet named ‘Tully’” will do fine.  That statement is qualitatively 
equivalent to the original identity statement, it is contingent, and it is false in the QI 
scenario.  I see no reason such a QE/QI pair could not give us the same misimpression 
of  positive conceivability as the QE/QI pair for “heat is molecular motion” or 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus”.
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Is “Cicero is Tully” apparently contingent?   Here the ground is trickier.  As 
Papineau notes, something strange happens to identity statements involving proper 
names when you learn their truth: they stop seeming contingent.  Before one learns that 
Cicero is Tully, it seems quite possible that he isn’t.  Once one learns that he is, however, 
one can no longer “make any good sense of  the possibility that Cicero might exist, but 
not Tully” (Papineau, 2002, p. 93).  (Note that this quote suggests that apparent positive 
counter-conceivability goes away along with apparent contingency.)
What is going on here?  The obvious thought is that reference-fixing properties 
remain salient after a posteriori identities are learned.  When we discovered that heat was 
molecular motion, we thereby discovered that the QI scenarios were not scenarios in 
which heat failed to be molecular motion.  We can still conceive of  the QI scenarios; 
“heat is molecular motion” is exactly as counter-conceivable as it was before.  But we no 
longer mistake ourselves to be genuinely imagining that heat is not molecular motion.  
Nonetheless, the associated description still influences how we think of  heat: we 
continue to think of  it as the phenomenon associated with a certain sensation.  If  we 
still think heat might not have been molecular motion, it is because the contingent 
relation between sensation S and molecular motion remains capable of  throwing off  our 
modal intuitions.  By contrast, in the case of  “Cicero and Tully”, no properties are 
salient in that way, so we more readily abandon our sense that things might have been 
otherwise.  We can still conceive of  there being a Roman orator called “Cicero” and a 
distinct Roman poet called “Tully”, but we no longer see that scenario as relevant.
This feature of  proper-name identity statements suggests that they never really 
seem contingent as such.  Rather, like mathematical equalities, they always seem necessary, 
but we can be unsure whether they are necessarily true or necessarily false.  (Unlike 
mathematical identities, their truth-value cannot be determined a priori even by an ideal 
reasoner.)  If  so, their apparent contingency doesn’t need explaining.  But of  course our 
apparent ability to imagine scenarios in which they are false still does.
At any rate, whether proper-name identity statements cease to appear contingent 
when known, or never seem contingent, there is an explanation of  their status which 
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does not involve descriptive reference-fixing.  But this explanation runs into problems 
with psychophysical identity statements, as we shall see next.
2.11. Analytic independence and psychophysical identity statements
Now what about “Pain is C-fibre stimulation”?  Assume again that both terms are rigid, 
and that “pain” refers directly (or at least that there is no analytic connection between it 
and “C-fibre stimulation”).  Then “Pain is C-fibre stimulation” will be, as required, a 
posteriori, negatively counter-conceivable, and (until its truth is learned) apparently 
contingent.
As to positive conceivability, the modified QE/QI account given above for “Cicero 
is Tully” cannot go through quite the same way for “pain is C-fibre stimulation”.  
Because “pain” (as I am using it) refers to a property, any qualitatively identical scenario 
for “pain is not C-fibre stimulation” has pain in it, and the QE statement must assert the 
presence of  pain.22  So we cannot use arbitrary properties associated with “pain” to 
construct the modified QE/QI pair.  But we can still construct one.  One of  the 
properties we associate with C-fibre stimulation is the (relational) property of  being 
detected on appropriate instruments in association with subjective reports of  pain, and 
vice versa.  And we can imagine a scenario in which that evidence was not present, and a 
statement such as “pain is reported when C-fibre stimulation is detected” is false.  That 
is not a situation in which “pain is C-fibre stimulation” is false, but once again, that is not 
required.  It is enough that the QI scenario represent what we are imagining when we 
imagine it turning out that pain was not C-fibre stimulation.23
Wright (2002, p. 415) objects to this sort of  response on the basis that one can 
conceive directly of  the absence of  C-fibre stimulation itself, not just of  the absence of  
laboratory evidence for it.  The conceiving faculty, he points out, is not restricted to 
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stimulation but no pain”.  But the existence of  pain is part of  the evidence we have in advance of  discovering 
the identity.  
23 A similar suggestion is made by Boyd (1980).
appearances.  This is true.  But positive conceivability is not a matter of  coherently 
conceiving of  the presence of  pain and the absence of  C-fibre stimulation: that is just 
negative conceivability, and it can be explained as above.  Positive conceivability involves 
the construction of  broader scenarios in which the identity is false.  It is that which, I 
claim, the properties evidentially associated with C-fibre stimulation appear to let us do.
Another difficulty is that, based on the account given above about apparent 
contingency, one would think that “pain is C-fibre stimulation” would not be apparently 
contingent: since “pain” does not pick out its referent by description, one would expect 
learning the identity to have the same effect as learning that “Cicero is Tully”. 
However, as Papineau argues, it still seems that “pain is C-fibre stimulation” might 
have been false (Papineau, 2002, p. 94).  For some reason the discovery that the QI 
scenarios are not genuine counter-scenarios does not affect our impressions of  
possibility.
There are several things to say here.  One is that no one genuinely believes that 
pain is really identical to C-fibre stimulation.  It is neurologically false: for example, another 
type of  nociceptor, called “A! fibres”, are involved in initial sharp pains.  To the best of  
my knowledge, no candidate for the physical-functional nature of  pain has been 
genuinely accepted.  Many people believe that pain will turn out to be identical to some 
physical-functional phenomenon; but to think that is not to accept a specific 
identification.  Until we take seriously some statement of  the form “pain is x”, it is not 
surprising that we are not convinced of  the necessity of  any such statement.  Perhaps 
any accepted identity would remain apparently contingent, or perhaps we will never 
accept one; but neither hypothesis can be used as data. 
The vulnerability of  proposals like “C-fibre stimulation” to falsification by 
particulars of  our neuro-biology suggests another reason to find them implausible: they 
are chauvinist.  C-fibres, a certain type of  unmyelinated nerve fibre, can be had only by 
beings whose nervous systems are constructed similarly to ours.    The thought that 
there might have been pains without C-fibre stimulation may stem from a conviction 
that Martians can feel pain, at least in principle, and so that C-fibre stimulation is at best 
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the realiser, in us, of  a broader functional property.
Nonetheless, one might anticipate that even if  an identity were genuinely accepted, 
the appearance of  contingency would remain.  As Papineau (Forthcoming, p. 18) points 
out, it also seems possible that pain might not have been identical to any of  our physical 
properties, a possibility that really would be inconsistent with physicalism.
Papineau  argues that in fact psychophysical identity statements appear not contingent 
but false (Papineau, 2007).  We intuitively disbelieve them: there is an intuition of  
distinctness which survives theoretical acceptance of  psychophysical identities.  We 
continue to think them possibly false because we continue, at some level, to think them 
actually false.
This is, I think, quite plausible.  Dualism about consciousness clearly has a strong 
intuitive appeal, and such an intuition might well survive scientific discoveries to the 
contrary.  Treating psychophysical identity statements as apparently false, rather than 
apparently contingent, also answers Stoljar’s point that statements of  distinctness—such as 
“phenomenal redness is not a number”—don’t seem problematic in the same way that 
psychophysical identity statements do (Stoljar, 2005).  If  analytic independence creates 
an appearance of  contingency for identities, it is hard to see how its contradiction could 
appear necessary.  If  the appearance is one of  distinctness, however, it is not surprising 
that statements of  distinctness seem unproblematic.
Such an intuition need not, however, govern philosophical investigation.  For 
example, the parties to the present dispute reject the still widespread intuition of  
substance dualism: that mental events go on in an immaterial mind or soul.  
Nonetheless, finding an explanation for the intuition would be desirable. 
It need not, of  course, be explained by the semantics of  phenomenal terms.  It 
might be inbuilt, as suggested by Paul Bloom (2005).  Or it might have its source in a 
stubborn conviction that people are special: set apart somehow from the grubby material 
world.   Nonetheless, it is worth considering whether a semantic explanation is available.  
Such an explanation need not exclude other kinds; the appeal of  dualism may be 
overdetermined.
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Papineau diagnoses the intuition as stemming from a peculiar feature of  our 
phenomenal concepts.  On his view, using a phenomenal concept involves tokening the 
phenomenal property it refers to, and therefore feels different from using any non-
phenomenal concept.  This difference in the subjective character of  thinking in 
phenomenal and physical-functional terms, Papineau claims, explains our conviction that 
we are thinking about distinct things.  Papineau’s diagnosis might be seen as a 
development of  Nagel’s suggestion that we imagine mental and physical states 
differently—in the former case, by recreating them (Nagel, 1974, p. 446 fn.11).  Similar 
suggestions have been made by Loar (1998, p. 605) and Hill & McLaughlin (1999, p. 
448).  
There is, I think, an alternative explanation for the sense of  distinctness, one which 
does not require adopting Papineau’s view of  phenomenal concepts, but instead can be 
derived from the considerations of  direct and indirect reference discussed above.  
Phenomenal terms refer directly, but physical-functional terms do not.  As 
discussed in §1.19, physical-functional terms are analytically connected with a 
description of  a functional role.24  For reasons that have already been mentioned in 
other contexts, those role descriptions are no help in constructing QE/QI pairs for 
psychophysical identity statements.  If  the physical-functional term refers to the 
functional phenomenon (rather than its realiser), then the role description gives its 
meaning rather than fixing its reference.  So any scenario in which the role-description is 
satisfied is a scenario in which the physical-functional property is genuinely present.   On 
the other hand, if  the term refers to the realiser, then we can replace it with a “primary” 
physical-functional term for the realiser (that is, one that does not pick it out by the role 
it plays).  That will generate a new psychophysical identity statement for which no QE/
QI pair can be generated. 
Nonetheless, the fact that physical-functional terms have a representational mode 
of  presentation and phenomenal terms do not seems quite capable of  generating an 
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the explicit or implicit definition of  that term in physical theory will do the same job.
appearance of  distinctness.  To be C-fibre stimulation, for example, is to be a complex 
arrangement of  nerves, their chemical components and their electrical potentials.  Pain 
appears to involve nothing like that.  That difference, it seems to me, provides plenty of  
material for an appearance of  distinctness between the two domains.  
In the proper-name case, by contrast, both terms refer directly, so there is no similar 
ground for an appearance of  distinctness.
2.12. Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the Kripkean argument against the identity thesis cannot be 
avoided by denying Kripke’s premises: a posteriori identity statements involving rigid 
designators are necessarily true if  they are true at all; and the relevant terms are rigid 
designators (or can be made so without loss).  However, Kripke’s explanation for their a 
posteriori status, along with their counter-conceivability and apparent contingency, is not 
the only one available.  It is sufficient, at least for a posteriori status and negative counter-
conceivability, that the two terms be analytically independent.  So the direct reference of  
phenomenal terms, which on Kripke’s view means psychophysical identity statements 
must be a priori if  true at all, in fact explains how they can be a posteriori.  
Kripke’s QE scenarios provide a plausible account of  why we might (wrongly) take 
such identity statements to be positively counter-conceivable; but analogous scenarios 
can be constructed for psychophysical identity statements too.   Their apparent 
contingency, at least before they are known, can be explained the same way.  If  they 
continue to appear possibly false once they are known, the explanation may be an 
intuition of  distinctness: an appearance of  falsehood rather than contingency.  The latter 
can be given various explanations, but the analytic independence of  phenomenal and 
physical-functional terms provides at least one.
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3. Objections to the analytic independence account
A. The objection from “representational coherence”
3.1. Introduction
In the last chapter I argued that analytic independence can explain how an identity 
statement involving two terms which (rigidly) co-refer can be necessarily true while also 
displaying the target properties: a posteriori status, counter-conceivability and apparent 
contingency.  Because analytic independence is consistent with direct reference, this 
account (unlike Kripke’s own) can explain the target features of  psychophysical identity 
statements even if  the phenomenal terms in them refer directly.
I see two main arguments against this view, both of  which might be seen as 
developments of  Kripke’s original argument.  The first is what Stephen White (2007) 
calls “the requirement of  representational coherence”, and is discussed in the next 
section.
The second argument, which I will discuss in part B of  this chapter, claims not 
only that the reference of  phenomenal terms is not fixed by description, but that their 
reference does not depend on a posteriori facts about the world at all.  Since both terms in 
a psychophysical identity statement refer independently of  a posteriori facts, the argument 
goes, their co-reference cannot depend on the results of  a posteriori investigation; but 
then the identity statement ought to be true a priori, if  it is true at all.
3.2. The requirement of  representational coherence.
White’s basic claim is that for any statement to be a posteriori, it must be “rationally 
disbelievable”: it must be possible for a rational person to believe the negation of  the 
statement.  In turn, he claims that rational disbelievability requires “representational 
coherence”.  That is, there must be “a way the rational disbeliever takes the world to be”. 
That way, moreover, must be a possible world.  That possible world, White says, gives 
the content of  the rational disbeliever’s belief  in the negation.
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White summarises the argument for representational coherence as follows:
What is required is an explanation of  how the subject who claims sincerely not to 
believe such an identity takes the world to be.  This is because the view that such 
identities have an a posteriori character entails that a subject could be fully rational 
while failing to believe or disbelieving them. Thus there must be a clear account25 
of  what the world would be like if  it were the way that such an uninformed or 
misinformed (but still fully rational) subject took it to be.  For suppose there were 
no such account, that every attempt to provide one led to incoherence.  Then the 
truth of  at least some of  the mental-physical identities would be a priori, and the 
proponent of  the phenomenal property approach to mental-physical identities 
would lack an explanation of  their alleged a posteriori character. (White, 2007, p. 
212)
At first glance, a requirement of  representational coherence might seem to pose a 
problem for all necessary a posteriori statements.  If  White is right, then for a statement to 
be a posteriori, someone who denies it must be representing a possible world.  But if  heat 
is the motion of  molecules, how does someone who believes something like “This plate 
is hot but its molecules aren’t moving” represent the world to be?  There is no world in 
which the disbeliever is right, so the requirement of  representational coherence cannot 
be satisfied by their representing such a world.
White argues that the disbeliever in a true identity statement can be saved from 
irrationality if  (and only if) there are two distinct “representational modes of  
presentation” of  its subject, each associated with one of  the terms in the identity 
statement (2007, p. 216).   (Representational modes of  presentation are introduced in 
§1.19 above.  Since the term will be used frequently in this part of  the chapter, and 
quickly becomes unwieldy with repetition, in what follows I will use White’s abbreviation 
“RMP”, along with his “NMP” for non-representational mode of  presentation.)  
According to White, the world the rational disbeliever is representing is one in which 
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“describab[le] in complete detail without contradiction (keeping the meanings of  our terms and the actual-world 
referents of  our rigid terms fixed)” (White, 2007, p. 225). As mentioned in §1.20, I agree with that view.
two distinct properties of  the referent—those represented by the RMPs—are 
instantiated by different phenomena.  So, for example, someone who believes that 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus” is false is representing a possible world in which the first star 
visible in the evening is not the same object as the last star visible in the morning.
But if  one of  the terms refers directly, and so has no RMP, no such world can be 
specified.   White accepts that one can construct ersatz scenarios using other properties 
associated with the term (as I suggested in the last chapter, and as Boyd (1980) argues).  
He claims, however, that such scenarios are insufficient to make disbelief  rational, 
because they do not give the content of  the disbeliever’s belief  (White, 2007, p. 236).
3.3. The property dualism argument
From the requirement of  representational coherence, the argument continues, property 
dualism follows.26  Consider once again “pain is C-fibre stimulation”.   Since that 
statement is not true a priori, accepting the requirement of  representational coherence 
leads to one of  two conclusions.  The first, of  course, is that the statement is false: that 
pain and C-fibre stimulation are not a priori identical because they are not identical.  The 
second is that, despite the appearances discussed in the last chapter, the referent of  
“pain” is picked out via an RMP, which stands for a property distinct from pain itself.
Now suppose the physicalist bites the bullet here, and claims that “pain” has an 
RMP.  What about the property that the RMP represents, the NMP: is it physical-
functional?  If  it is not, then physicalism is false.  (It may be true about pain, but it is 
false about pain’s mode of  presentation.)  But if  the property is physical-functional, 
White argues, that must be a priori.  If  it is not, there is an obvious threat of  regress: we 
need another set of  modes of  presentation to rationalise the belief  that pain’s NMP is 
not physical-functional (Block, 2007, p. 279).
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words are by no means Block’s.  It is given for information only; I am not here concerned with what lies 
downstream from the requirement of  representational coherence.  The argument apparently originates in an 
objection made by Max Black in discussion with Jack Smart.
But White also has a more direct argument that pain’s NMP cannot be a posteriori 
physical-functional.  For, he argues, NMPs can only explain rational disbelief  if  they are 
both: a) “thin”, which means there is nothing to them that is not understood by 
someone grasping the RMP; and b) a priori connected to the RMP.  Going into White’s 
arguments for a) and b) would take us too far afield, since they are beside the point if  
the requirement of  representational coherence is rejected.27  Which I will now do.  
3.4. Response to representational coherence
The response to representational coherence on behalf  of  analytic independence is fairly 
straightforward.  Grant, for the sake of  argument, that without the apparatus of  RMPs 
and NMPs, there is no possible world which gives content to a denial of  a 
psychophysical identity statement.  It does not follow that the disbeliever in a 
psychophysical identity statement lacks rationality.  To be fairly accused of  irrationality, 
the disbeliever would have to be able to deduce a priori that there was no such world.
But suppose that “pain” and “C-fibre stimulation” are analytically independent.  It 
follows that there is no way to determine, by reflection alone, that they co-refer.  This is 
true even though the inquirer’s reflective faculties are unimpaired.  The co-reference 
must be an empirical discovery, and therefore so is the identity.  This is, I take it, what 
the physicalist seeks to explain: our inability to deduce the physical-functional nature of  
pain by reflection alone, and our ability to disbelieve it without discerning a 
contradiction even on reflection.
Nothing White says contradicts this, as far as I can see.  His claim is that if  “pain” 
refers directly, there is no world which gives content to the disbeliever’s view.  But if  we 
cannot determine that pain is C-fibre stimulation by reflection alone, then the non-
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to another term, will be criticised in the second part of  this chapter, which deals with the semantic stability 
argument.
existence of  such a world also cannot be determined by reflection alone.28  (If  one knew 
a priori that there were no such worlds, one could straightforwardly infer the identity.)  So 
the disbeliever’s failure to notice that there is no such world cannot fairly be called 
irrationality.
How, then, does the disbeliever take the world to be?  They take it to be such that 
“pain is not C-fibre stimulation” is true!  That description does not match any possible 
world (though neither can any necessary falsehood); nor is there even a possible world 
which matches what the disbeliever has in mind.  But the disbeliever still represents the 
world using a coherent description, and no more should be required for rationality.
3.5. Against “rationality”
But suppose you disagree with me about what rationality requires, and think that failure 
to satisfy representational coherence makes the disbeliever irrational, even though that 
failure cannot be detected by reflection.  That issue, it seems to me, is a distraction.  
What matters is whether the physicalist can explain our epistemic situation with respect 
to phenomenal properties, the key feature of  which is our inability to deduce by 
reflection alone that pain is C-fibre stimulation.  Whether that inability is “irrational” is 
of  no moment, as long as it is consistent with physicalism.
So White’s argument faces a dilemma.  If  what it is for a belief  to be “irrational” is 
to fail to correspond to a possible world of  the kind White demands, then a true 
psychophysical identity statement could only be disbelieved irrationally.  But that would 
not make such statements a priori.  On the other hand, if  to be “irrational” is to be 
incoherent in a way that can be detected by reflection alone, then a statement which can 
only be disbelieved irrationally is indeed a priori.  But then there is no reason to think 
that disbelief  in psychophysical identity statements is irrational.
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28 Note that modal rationalism does not imply that the impossibility of  impossible worlds must be apparent on 
reflection.  As White says, descriptions of  possible worlds are constrained by the requirement of  “keeping the 
meanings of  ... the actual-world referents of  our rigid terms fixed”, and that is an a posteriori matter.  The 
coherence of  worlds in which psychophysical identity statements are false will be discussed further in chapter 6.
The result would be the same if  the requirement of  representational coherence 
were built directly into the notion of  a posteriori status.  A true psychophysical identity 
statement would then be “a priori”, but its truth could still not be discerned by reflection 
alone.  For the physicalist, that is just as good as a posteriori status.
3.6. The need for distinct non-representational modes of  presentation
The property dualism argument has, I believe, the following grain of  truth.  It is 
plausible that we must bear two distinct relations to a phenomenon, if  we are to have 
two terms for it that figure in an a posteriori identity statement.  For, at the least, that 
phenomenon must sometimes produce tokenings of  one term, and sometimes of  the 
other.  If  we had only one semantically relevant relation to the phenomenon, both terms 
would always be tokened at the same time.  It then is hard to see how the co-reference 
could fail to be apparent.
The need for distinct relations applies even to directly referring terms.  As (Evans, 
1982) pointed out, even demonstratives involve relations to their referents.  The a 
posteriori status of  “that ship [pointing out the left-hand window at a stern] is that ship 
[pointing out the right-hand window at a bow]” can only be explained by a difference in 
the pointer’s relations to the ship.
Now, strictly, it does not follow that two different properties of  the referent are 
involved.  For the relations between term and referent may be irreducible.  The 
paradigmatic irreducible relations are spatio-temporal relations, and these are what make 
the difference in Evans’s example.29  But causal relations may also be distinct by virtue of 
differences in context which do not require the existence of  distinct causing properties 
in the referent.  For example, “pain” may be tokened whenever certain neural events 
occur; “C-fibre stimulation” may be tokened only when those same neural activities 
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29 White (2007, p. 215) says “[…] our access to [C-fibre stimulation] is via an aspect of  it—just as is our access to 
the ship in the Evans case …” The use of  “aspect” in this context can be seen as blurring just the distinction I 
have in mind: “aspect” is nicely ambiguous between a property of  something and a direction from which it may 
be viewed.
happen in a specific context, namely inside a magnetic resonance image device.
Even if  the distinct NMPs are both properties of  the referent,30 the property dualist 
argument still does not go through.  There is no difficulty with a term having an NMP 
while referring directly, that is, without an RMP.31  On some causal theories of  proper 
names, for instance, the referent of  a name is not determined by a description of  the 
referent’s properties, but by a causal relation between the name and the referent.  Such 
names nonetheless refer directly, since they are not analytically associated with a 
description of  that causal relation (or of  any other property of  the referent).
It is true that, if  the two terms have different NMPs, their reference is determined 
by different properties of  the referent.  But the property dualism argument needs more 
than that: it needs to show that one of  the properties is non-physical.  As was outlined 
in §3.3, the argument for that depends on the phenomenal term having an RMP, as 
follows.  If  the NMP of  “pain” is physical-functional, the argument goes, it must be a 
priori that it is physical-functional, for two reasons: a) otherwise a regress of  modes of  
presentation is required to explain its a posteriori status; and b) (as White argues) the NMP 
is thin and a priori connected to the RMP.  But if  “pain” has no RMP, neither argument 
goes through.  In the case of  b) the reason is obvious: there is no RMP to be connected 
with the NMP, a priori or otherwise.  In the case of  a), the physical-functional nature of  
the NMP need not be a priori, since the NMP is not analytically connected to the original 
term.
This account is in a way the converse of  Block’s response (2007, p. 265ff), that co-
referring terms can have distinct RMPs while sharing a common NMP.32  Block claims 
that the distinct RMPs are enough to explain the rationality of  disbelief, and if  there is 
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30 In the case of  phenomenal terms, such non-representational modes of  presentation would be “second-order” 
properties of  properties.  As mentioned in §1.2, I have no quarrel with second-order properties.
31 As mentioned, White claims (e.g. at p. 218) that NMPs must be a priori connected with an RMP.  I read this as 
a substantive claim about what is required to explain rational disbelief, rather than as part of  the definition of  
“non-representational mode of  presentation”.  At any rate, all I am claiming is that a term’s reference can be 
determined by a property of  or relation to its referent, even where the term has no RMP.
32 Or in Block’s terms, “cognitive” and “metaphysical” modes of  presentation, respectively.
only one NMP, the property dualism argument fails.  White’s response (pp. 219-221) is 
that Block has no way of  explaining how the RMPs can have distinct content, absent 
distinct NMPs.  This problem does not arise, of  course, if  only one RMP is posited.
3.7. Conclusion
The requirement of  representational coherence presents no threat to the analytic 
independence account.  A posteriori identities involving directly referring, analytically 
independent, terms can be rationally disbelieved even though there is no possible world 
which matches what the disbeliever has in mind.  The absence of  such worlds is not 
knowable a priori, and so cannot be invoked to convict the disbeliever of  irrationality.  
Alternatively, if  “rationality” is interpreted so as to require the existence of  such a world, 
then the “irrationality” of  disbelief  cannot be detected by reflection alone, even by 
someone whose reflective capacities are unimpaired.  So the physicalist can concede that 
disbelief  in psychophysical identity statements is “irrational”, but still maintain that we 
cannot know a priori that they are true.
In short, the view that an identity statement involving directly referring terms must 
be knowable a priori contradicts the not-very-radical thought that a priori knowledge 
requires a priori connections between terms.  Co-reference is not enough, regardless of  
the mechanism of  reference.  Accordingly, direct reference will reduce the supply of  a 
priori knowledge, not increase it.
B. The semantic stability argument
3.8. Introduction
In chapter 2, I argued that identity statements could be a posteriori (as well as counter-
conceivable and apparently contingent) even if  their terms did not have their reference 
fixed by description, that is, according to a criterion which was a posteriori satisfied by 
their actual referent.
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Still, one might think, some a posteriori element in the way the terms’ reference is 
determined must be required to explain the a posteriori status of  the identity statement.  
Put the other way around: what if  the two terms’ reference not only is not determined 
by description in the way discussed by Kripke, but does not depend in any other way on 
how the world turns out to be?  If  their reference is entirely independent of  a posteriori 
facts, their co-reference ought to be knowable a priori.  After all, if  it were not, what facts 
would one investigate to discover it?  
Call terms whose reference is entirely independent of  a posteriori facts “semantically 
stable”.33  The outline of  the semantic stability argument is then as follows:
Major premise: identity statements involving two semantically stable terms are a 
priori if  they are true at all.
Minor premise: the terms in psychophysical identity statements are semantically 
stable.
Thereafter, the argument goes the same way as Kripke’s and White’s.  Given the major 
and minor premises, psychophysical identity statements must be a priori if  they are true 
at all.  But, since they are not a priori, they are false. 
Notice that nothing about the notion of  semantic stability implies that co-referring 
stable terms are analytically connected.  Their a priori co-reference comes from the a 
priori way each of  them is connected to their common referent, not from a connection 
between the terms.  If  the semantic stability argument succeeds, then, the dualist has an 
answer to the physicalist claim that analytic independence explains the a posteriori status 
of  psychophysical identities.
Papineau (2007, p. 129 fn. 14) attributes versions of  the argument to David 
Chalmers, Frank Jackson and George Bealer.  Certain other aspects of  Jackson’s and 
Chalmers’s arguments for dualism will be dealt with in chapters 4 through to 6.  Here I 
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33 I borrow the term from Papineau (2007).  Papineau ascribes the notion to George Bealer, though Bealer’s 
definition (at e.g (Bealer, 1996, p. 134) differs from the one I am using.  The corresponding term used in 
Chalmers’s argument is “epistemic rigidity”, but the precise meaning of  that term is tied to technical details of  
Chalmers’s two-dimensional semantic framework which I do not wish to presuppose.
will reject the claim that the terms in psychophysical identity statements are semantically 
stable.  I will do so by considering various suggestions as to how a term’s reference 
might be made stable, and arguing that none of  them are adequate to the job.
I will take the major premise as true by definition: that is, as a constraint on a 
sufficiently strong notion of  semantic stability.  If  two terms’ reference are in some 
sense independent of  the a posteriori facts, but their co-reference is still a posteriori, then 
their reference is not independent enough: a stronger notion of  semantic stability is 
required for the argument to go through.  This enables me to avoid exegetical questions 
about what “semantic stability” means, as well as some tricky questions about what it is 
to “know what a term refers to”: in both cases, it is the ability to detect co-reference a 
priori that matters.  It seems to me, however, that the reasons to deny the minor premise 
for psychophysical identity statements apply quite generally, so that the major premise is 
likely to be vacuously true.
3.9. Preliminaries
A few points before the main discussion begins.  First, as the summary above suggests, 
the semantic stability argument is typically taken as an attack on physicalist accounts of  
the a posteriori status of  psychophysical identity statements.34  But in fact the argument, if 
sound, makes trouble for the explanations I gave above for each of  the target features.
To recap briefly, a posteriori status and (negative) counter-conceivability were 
explained by the analytic independence of  the two terms in the identity statement.  
Apparent positive counter-conceivability was explained by the existence of  scenarios 
which are consistent with what we know before we learn the relevant identity—whether 
or not those scenarios are generated by replacing the term with its reference-fixing 
description.  Apparent contingency was explained either as the result of  (negative or 
apparent positive) counter-conceivability, or as apparent falsehood resulting from an 
intuition of  distinctness.
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34 Papineau (2007) discusses a semantic stability argument targeted at their apparent contingency, which will be 
considered in the last section of  this chapter.
If  identity statements involving semantically stable terms are a priori, then, by 
definition, they will not be negatively counter-conceivable.  And if  they are not 
negatively counter-conceivable, that rules out my explanation of  apparent positive 
counter-conceivability: there are no epistemically open scenarios in which an identity is 
false if  it is a priori true.   Finally, it is hard to see how an appearance of  either 
contingency or distinctness could survive a priori identity.  (Leaving aside contingent a 
priori truths, which are not at issue here.)  But since the problems with both counter-
conceivability and apparent contingency stem from the incompatibility of  semantic 
stability and a posteriori status, that is what I will focus on.
Second, the issues surrounding semantic stability are often explored35 in two-
dimensional fashion, by talking about how terms behave in different worlds “considered 
as actual”.  To consider a possible world W1 as actual is simply to consider what would 
be the case if  we discovered the actual world were like W1, or (equivalently for present 
purposes) if  the reference of  terms was fixed by the facts in W1 rather than the actual 
world.  On this approach, a term is semantically stable just if  its reference is the same 
regardless of  which world is considered as actual  (Kallestrup, 2008, p. 1270).  I mention 
this only to set it aside for now; I find the two-dimensional framework a sometimes-
helpful aid to analysis, but for present purposes it does not add anything to the Kripkean 
distinction between the determination of  a term’s reference in the actual world and its 
rigidity or otherwise when used of  other worlds.
Third, the notion of  semantic stability assumes a speaker who understands the 
relevant term (Kallestrup, 2008, p. 1270).  The acquisition of  terms can be an a posteriori 
matter.  What matters is whether psychophysical identity statements are a priori to a 
subject who understands them.
Finally, the argument here concerns reference to phenomena within the intended 
scope of  physicalism, that is, to particulars which are either contingent or causal, and to 
the types they fall under.  If  there are particulars which are both necessary and acausal, 
such as Platonic numbers, then it is plausible that our reference to them is stable, 
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35 Notably by Chalmers: for example (2010).
assuming that reference to them can be achieved at all.
3.10. Looking for semantic stability I—eliminating instability
How might a term’s reference be independent of  a posteriori facts?  A natural way to 
approach the question is to look at the various ways a term’s reference can depend on the 
facts, and consider whether terms that lack those dependencies would be stable.  In this 
section I examine three such potential sources of  stability, and argue that all are 
inadequate.
a) Rigidity
Take the definite description “the last heavenly body visible in the morning sky”.  It 
refers non-rigidly.   When the description is applied to a possible world in which Venus 
doesn’t exist, for example, it will pick out a different object (or even no object at all, if  
no stars or planets are visible).  So its reference in counterfactual contexts depends on 
the facts in other possible worlds.  This dependence can be removed by rigidifying the 
description, so that in modal contexts it refers to the actual last-visible body—that is, to 
Venus.
As has already been seen, however, rigidity is not enough to make identities a priori 
in the absence of  analytic connection.  It is a posteriori that the last body visible in the 
morning is the first body visible in the evening.  If  the two descriptions are rigidified, the 
resulting statement—“the actual last body visible in the morning sky is the actual first 
body visible in the evening sky”—is still a posteriori. 
What goes for a definite description goes also for terms whose reference is fixed by 
a definite description.  “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is a posteriori, even though both terms 
are rigid.
So rigidity is not enough for semantic stability.  The term’s actual reference must 
also be independent of  the a posteriori facts about the actual world.   And “the last 
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heavenly body visible in the morning sky” is not independent of  such facts: it is a 
posteriori that Venus exists, that there is a sky, and so on.
b) Analyticity
There is a sense in which the actual reference of  a descriptive term does not depend on 
the facts.  “The last body visible in the morning sky” might have turned out to refer to 
Venus or to some other body, depending on what we had discovered about the solar 
system; but whatever the a posteriori facts, it would have referred to the last body visible 
in the morning sky (if  it referred at all).  The same is true for terms whose meaning is 
given by an associated description.   
This is, I suspect, what lies behind the intuition Papineau appeals to when he says 
that the reference of  physical concepts like electron and H2O does not seem to depend 
on the actual facts (Papineau, 2007, p. 129).  Such terms will always refer to entities 
meeting the same theoretical description, regardless of  which world is considered as 
actual.  (For whatever reason, the possibility—mentioned in §2.2(c)—that something 
else could have played the electron role does not interfere with this intuition.)
But this sort of  independence from the facts isn’t enough.  First, it does not make 
identity statements between such terms a priori.  “The last body visible in the morning is 
the first body visible in the evening” is a posteriori.  And there can be a posteriori 
identifications involving two scientific terms, such as the identification of  hydrogen ions 
with protons.
Second, what it does make a priori are statements relating descriptive terms to their 
associated descriptions.   (This, I think, is what is going on in Papineau’s example 
“electrons are negatively charged”: it is a priori and necessary just if  “negative charge” 
and “electron” are inter-defined.)  But such a priori truths are straightforwardly analytic, 
which means they are not counter-examples to the claim that a priori identity statements 
involve analytic connections.
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
76
c) Direct reference
In the examples so far, instability has come from the a posteriori application of  
descriptions.  But of  course the claim about phenomenal terms has been that they do 
not refer via such descriptions, or other representational modes of  presentation.  A 
natural thought is that such terms will be semantically stable, because their reference 
cannot depend on the a posteriori satisfaction of  their representational mode of  
presentation by the referent. 
But they are not.  We have seen already that directly referring terms can figure in a 
posteriori identity statements.  As Papineau points out, Kripke himself  gives an example: 
“Cicero is Tully” is a posteriori, even though proper names do not refer by description 
(Papineau, 2007, p. 130).
Such identities are a posteriori because, even though the meaning of  “Cicero” does 
not involve a description satisfied a posteriori by Cicero, its reference nonetheless depends 
on a posteriori facts.  For example, on the causal account sketched (though not fully 
endorsed) by Kripke, “Cicero” refers to whoever is at the other end of  a certain sort of  
causal chain from utterances of  the name; and where such a chain leads is an a posteriori 
matter.
This is not a local difficulty for proper names, or for causal accounts of  reference.  
It also applies to demonstrative terms, whose reference is determined by what appears in 
the relevant context: that too is an a posteriori matter.  More generally, there must be some 
connection between a directly referring term and its referent which explains the 
reference relation.  To say that is to assume only that the reference relation is not a brute 
or basic feature of  the world.  When a term refers directly, this connection is not 
specified by the term’s representational mode of  presentation; so it will be an a posteriori 
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fact about the world unless something very special is going on.36
So semantic stability requires something more than direct reference.  But 
descriptive reference was already found wanting.  That means semantic stability must 
have a source distinct from the types of  reference we have so far considered.  What 
might it be?  In the next three sections I consider some alternative possibilities.  (Since 
this will require more detailed discussion, each possible source gets its own section.)
3.11. Looking for semantic stability II—“stabilification”
In the discussion of  rigidity in §2.2, recourse was had to the technique of  
“rigidification”, whereby a term could be made rigid simply by stipulating that it have 
constant reference in modal contexts.  Might a similar technique be used to make 
unstable terms stable?
No.  Rigidity can be stipulated because it is, in the end, a matter of  how we choose 
to use the term in counterfactual contexts.  One cannot, however, stipulate that a term’s 
reference in the actual world is independent of  a posteriori facts.  That is a fact about how 
reference works in the world, one beyond our powers of  decision.  
One might try to stipulate that “Stable-Cicero” refers to what “Cicero” actually 
refers to, regardless of  how the actual facts turn out.  But that would be pointless, since 
it would just be mimicking the behaviour of  “Cicero”.  Or one could stipulate that 
“Stable-Cicero” refers to what “Cicero” actually actually refers to—i.e., what “Cicero” 
refers to when the actual world is considered as actual—regardless of  which world is 
considered as actual.  But that is no better: how things are in the actual actual world is 
still a posteriori.  
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36 As mentioned in part A of  this chapter, White (2007, p. 223)) suggests there must always be an a priori 
connection between a term’s representational mode of  presentation and its non-representational mode of  
presentation, where, recall, the non-representational mode of  presentation is a property.  If  that is meant literally, 
then it is vulnerable to the objections in this part.  On the other hand, White suggests that such an a priori 
connection is simply one that depends “on no empirical or a posteriori beliefs of  the subjects”.  On that basis 
his a priori connection looks just like direct reference, and does not imply independence of  a posteriori facts tout 
court.
It’s worth noting that if  one could stipulate stability, it would be very cheap—too 
cheap to be a plausible threat to physicalism.  A posteriori identity statements between 
stable terms (“Stable-Cicero is Stable-Tully”) would be as easy to generate as a posteriori 
necessities involving rigidified terms.
3.12. Looking for semantic stability III—intimate descriptions
Another possibility is that stable terms do pick out their referents via a representational 
mode of  presentation, but one which is intimately associated with the referent in a way 
that ensures that the term will have the same referent however the a posteriori facts turn 
out.  Two versions of  this approach can be found in the literature: the representational 
mode of  presentation might specify the very quality to which the term refers (call this 
the “identity flavour”); or it might specify a property of  the referent which is (distinct 
from but) essential to it (call this this “essentialist” flavour).
The identity flavour can be recognised in references to phenomenal properties 
serving as their “own modes of  presentation”.  Joe Levine takes this view, and attributes 
it to Loar (Levine, 2007, p. 159).37  It is unclear, however, whether Loar himself  takes 
this approach.   In section 5 of  (1998), he argues that it would be consistent with 
physicalism for phenomenal properties to be their own modes of  presentation.  As I 
read him, however, he does not explicitly endorse the view.
The essentialist flavour can be found in, for example, Nida-Rümelin’s “phenomenal 
essentialism”.  For Nida-Rümelin, to have a phenomenal concept is to “grasp” a 
phenomenal property, where to grasp a property is to “understand what having that 
property essentially consists in” (Nida-Rümelin, 2007, p. 307). Papineau also attributes to 
the anti-physicalist the thought that “semantic stability goes hand in hand with 
knowledge of  real essences” (Papineau, 2007, p. 131).
Kripke himself  seems to have taken the essentialist approach.  He says:  “Pain, on 
the other hand, is not picked out by one of  its accidental properties; rather it is picked 
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37 White (Forthcoming, text to fn. 19) also attributes this view to Loar.
out by the property of  being pain itself, by its immediate phenomenological quality.  
Thus pain, unlike heat, is not only rigidly designated by ‘pain’ but the reference of  the 
designator is determined by an essential property of  the referent.” (Kripke, 1981, pp. 152-153) 
(my emphasis).  The first sentence of  that quote might suggest the identity flavour, but 
the two sentences can be reconciled by treating Kripke as distinguishing pain itself  from 
the property of  being pain.  (This could be because Kripke is treating pain as a 
phenomenal state or event, characterised by a phenomenal property.  Alternatively, 
Kripke might be invoking his view, discussed above, that being a pain is an essential 
property of  particular pains.)
a) Intimate descriptions—identity flavour
It is clear enough how the identity flavour might yield semantic stability.  If  a term picks 
out a property using the criterion of  being that property, rather than having it, then it is 
guaranteed to refer to that property.
This approach, however, quickly collapses into triviality.  On Kripke’s account, 
remember, “heat” refers to whatever satisfies the description “the phenomenon that 
causes sensation S”. On the present approach, the descriptive condition for “S”—
dropping “the phenomenon that causes”—would be “sensation S”.  But this is of  no 
help in determining what “S” refers to or how it does so.  In particular, it is of  no help 
in explaining the putative semantic stability of  “S”.  To be sure, on this account “S” will 
refer to what “S” refers to, however the world turns out.  But that is just analytic 
triviality.  What is required is the non-trivial result that “S” refers to the same thing 
however the world turns out.  But that is not guaranteed unless “S” (on the right-hand 
side) is already semantically stable.  And the stability of  “S” is what was to be explained.
Such a mode of  presentation would be, in fact, entirely redundant.  As Papineau 
points out, the mode of  presentation of  a property phi cannot be “the property which is 
property phi” unless “we already have the ability to think about the phenomenal property 
phi”.  And if  that’s true “we don’t need to construct some further mode of  presentation 
to enable us to think about it” (Papineau, 2002, p. 104).
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Triviality can be avoided if  a different term for the referent is used in place of  “S” 
in the reference-determining description. This is of  little help, however: the defined term 
is still only as stable as the synonym used to define it.  If  the second term were not 
stable, then its referent would vary according to how the a posteriori facts turned out.  But 
then, since ex hypothesi the referent of  the second term determines the reference of  the 
first term, the first term would be unstable in exactly the same way.  How is the stability 
of  the second term explained?  To explain the synonym’s stability the same way—its 
reference being fixed by another term for the referent—would require an endless series 
of  distinct synonyms.  And even if  such an endless series were available, we would still 
be no further forward in understanding how semantic stability gets off  the ground.  
Perhaps a particular stable term could inherit its stability from a stable synonym in this 
way.  But some other type of  explanation is needed for the synonym’s stability, on pain 
of  regress.
b) Intimate descriptions—essentialist flavour
The essentialist flavour has “pain” pick out its referent not by the referent itself, but by a 
property which, necessarily, the referent and only the referent possesses.  The idea is that 
using such a property as the criterion ensures that the term will pick out the same 
referent however the world turns out.  Its reference would vary only if  different things 
possess the property in different worlds.  But by hypothesis, such variation is impossible.
Note that for this to work, the criterial property must both be necessarily possessed 
by the actual referent, and necessarily not be possessed by anything else.  Since “essential 
property” is often used for properties which are possessed necessarily but not 
exclusively, I will speak of  “characterising” properties.
There is a wrinkle if  one believes, with Kripke, that de re necessity can be a posteriori.  
For then a characterising property might have that status a posteriori—as, for example, it 
is a posteriori that having the structure H2O characterises water.  In that case, the term’s 
reference will have an a posteriori element.  I think the essentialist has a response, 
however.  Consider “whater”, which means “the stuff  characterised by the chemical 
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structure H2O”.  Whether we turn out to be on Earth or Twin Earth, “whater” will refer 
to whatever has the structure H2O, and I take it that (as long as “H2O” is stable) for the 
essentialist that makes it the same stuff.
This approach avoids the triviality problem discussed above.38  It does, however, 
depend on there being such characterising properties.  More specifically, when applied to 
terms for phenomenal properties, it depends on such properties themselves having 
characterising higher-order properties—quiddities.  However, I will set these concerns 
aside, for even granting phenomenal quiddities the essentialist approach is no better off  
than the identity flavour.
That is because, as with the identity flavour, the original term cannot be stable 
unless its representational mode of  presentation is stable.  This is true regardless of  
whether the representational mode of  presentation specifies the referent property itself  
or a quiddity thereof.  And as before, using the same mechanism again to explain the 
stability of  the representational mode of  presentation would require an endless series of 
characterising properties and terms for them.  Now, if  properties generally have 
quiddities, then presumably it follows that quiddities—being properties themselves—
also have quiddities, and so on.  (Though that reasoning might equally be taken as an 
argument against accepting quiddities in the first place.)  But it seems rather more 
implausible that our linguistic or conceptual resources include an infinite number of  
terms for such properties, all of  which are actually deployed to fix the reference of  a 
term such as “pain”.
Most importantly, even if  the necessary infinite series were available, we would still 
be no further forward in explaining how semantic stability gets going in the first place.  
Again, it’s possible that a particular stable term might inherit stability from a term for a 
characterising property of  its referent.  But such inheritance can’t go back forever; 
somebody had to make the money.
The general moral from the discussion of  both flavours is that semantic stability 
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termed simply “being pain”.
can’t be explained by descriptive reference, however intimate the link between the 
referent and the reference-fixing condition, because the stability of  the original term 
depends on the term for the condition also being stable.  Something more is needed.
3.13. Looking for semantic stability IV—(non-descriptive) intimate connections
So semantically stability does come from having a term for the referent, or for its 
characterising property, appear in a term’s representational mode of  presentation.  
Perhaps semantic stability arises where the referent itself, rather than a representation of  
it, is involved in fixing the reference of  the term?  This section explores two possibilities 
along this line.  I will argue that these proposals do not yield semantic stability, at least 
not for both terms in a psychophysical identity statement.
As a preliminary, note that in general it would make little sense to suggest that the 
connection between term and referent could be a formal or analytic one.  Referents are 
things, not terms; they neither figure in formal connections, nor have meanings that 
could figure in analytic connections.  So the intimate connection between the term and 
its referent must have some other nature.
That said, there are views on which phenomenal properties are representational 
properties.  On such a view one might count phenomenal properties39 as terms, and 
allow them to have analytic connections.  In particular, one might claim that phenomenal 
terms “quote” phenomenal properties, so that it is analytic that “pain” refers to pain just 
as it is that ‘ “fish” ’ refers to “fish”.  This view can be taken as a version of  the 
constitutivist view discussed in (b) below; the same responses apply.
It is hardly implausible that referents can play a causal or other non-analytic role in 
the determination of  reference.  The problem is that if  that role is not formal or 
analytic, it suffers from the converse difficulty to that facing analytic accounts.  It can 
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themselves.  But I do not wish to rely too heavily on that nicety, since one could reformulate the claim for 
phenomenal states.
establish intimate links between term and referent that are non-trivial; but those 
connections will not be a priori ones, so as to make psychophysical identity statements a 
priori.  Consider Loar’s “recognitional” account of  phenomenal concepts (1998).40  On 
Loar’s account, a phenomenal concept refers to the phenomenal property which triggers 
the subject’s dispositions to token the phenomenal concept.  Here the referent is playing 
a central role in fixing reference—but this does not make identity statements involving 
such terms a priori.  As Loar points out, one can have two distinct recognitional concepts 
with the same referent and be unable to connect them a priori.  One might recognise a 
certain species of  fish on a dive and on a plate, for example, and yet not realise they are 
the same species. 
a) Intimate connections—individuating terms by their referent 
But what if  one adds the plausible thought that recognitional terms are individuated 
according to their referent—so that recognitional terms for different things count as 
different terms?  This will make the referent essential to the term.   (Although since, as 
just mentioned, it is possible for distinct recognitional terms to have the same referent, 
the referent will not characterise the term.)
I see no reason to resist this individuation thesis, so I’ll grant it for the sake of  
argument.  It makes the link between a particular recognitional term and its referent 
robust in the following sense: however the reference-fixing facts come out, that very 
term will always have the same referent.  For example, there is no world in which a term 
that is in fact a recognitional concept of  rabbits refers to goats.  Importantly for present 
purposes, that is true of  worlds considered as actual as well as worlds considered as 
counterfactual.  As with “whater”, however the a posteriori facts come out, that term can 
refer only to rabbits.
So here at last is semantic stability, at least of  a sort.  Does this make identity 
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different considerations apply in chapter 8.  For purposes of  the present discussion there is no need to treat the 
two differently.
statements between such terms a priori?  No.  Nothing about individuating terms by their 
referent would make us any more able to identify eaten fish with swimming fish.  
Consider, again, proper names.  One might take the view that if  the causal chain leading 
back from utterances of  “Cicero” terminated instead in Cato, “Cicero” would count as a 
different name: a homonym for our name “Cicero”.41  But individuating proper names 
that way does not make “Cicero is Tully” any more a priori.
At this point it becomes difficult to maintain my charitable approach to the  the 
major premise of  the semantic stability argument.  For it seems fair to say that terms 
individuated this way refer to the same thing however the a posteriori facts turn out; but 
identity statements involving them are a posteriori nonetheless.  Still, the major premise 
was plausible enough to at least require an explanation of  what has gone wrong.  Here is 
mine.
The QE/QI account for the sentence “Cicero is Tully” (discussed in §2.10 above) 
still applies, even if  proper names are individuated by reference.  One can imagine a 
situation in which the various properties one associates with “Cicero” and with “Tully” 
are not co-instantiated in a single individual.  One can, moreover, imagine a situation in 
which the causal chains leading back from one’s token utterances of  “Cicero” and 
“Tully” do not converge on a single individual.
Again, these are not scenarios in which Cicero is not Tully.  Moreover, if  proper 
names are individuated by reference, they are not even scenarios in which the names 
“Cicero” and “Tully” do not co-refer.  Rather, they are situations in which one’s 
utterances are not of  those names, but instead are utterances of  different (homonymic) 
names, which do not co-refer.  Nonetheless, these are genuine scenarios which cannot be 
ruled out a priori based only on competence with the words “Cicero” and “Tully”.  If  
which name is involved in an utterance depends on its reference, and its reference 
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depends on a posteriori facts, then it is a posteriori which name I am uttering.42  
Accordingly, a sentence like “Cicero is Tully” will be a posteriori.
The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for the concepts Cicero and Tully and a (token) 
belief  that Cicero is Tully.  In this context the argument has the somewhat odd 
consequence that it can be a posteriori to me which concept I am using.  But if  you do not 
like that idea, you will presumably also not like externalist individuation criterion for 
concepts, in which case this route to semantic stability is blocked.
So I could preserve the major premise of  the semantic stability argument by saying 
that a term is semantically stable only if  its reference does not depend on a posteriori facts 
and we know a priori which term we are using.  Next, I consider a proposal to make 
phenomenal concepts semantically stable in just this sense.
b) Intimate connections—constitution
Several philosophers have argued that at least some of  our phenomenal concepts are 
partly constituted in some fashion by phenomenal properties.43  I leave aside for now the 
specific details and merits of  those proposals, and consider only whether this approach 
can provide a sufficiently strong kind of  semantic stability.  (Some other issues 
concerning these accounts will be considered in chapters 7 and 8.) 
Like the recognitional view, the constitutive account makes it plausible that 
phenomenal concepts are individuated by their referents.  Papineau explicitly makes this 
suggestion for his account of  phenomenal concepts (2007, p. 131).  The quotational 
metaphor deployed by an earlier time-slice of  Papineau (2002) makes this sort of  claim 
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the possibility of  rational doubt about identity statements involving two phenomenal terms (such as Hawthorne’s 
(2007) “dancing qualia” case).  Levin suggests that someone who disbelieves such identity statements is making a 
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43 See (Chalmers, 2003b), (Papineau, 2002), (Papineau, 2007), (Balog, Forthcoming).  Here the distinction 
between concepts and linguistic terms becomes material; no one has been brave enough to suggest that 
phenomenal terms in spoken or written language could be partly made of  qualia.
particularly plausible: it is easy to believe that quotations of  different words count as 
different quotations.  
As before, however, individuation by reference by itself  does not make co-
reference a priori.  But the constitutive approach has a couple of  additional features 
which might help.
First, one might claim that, with constitutive concepts, a difference in reference is 
both sufficient and necessary for difference of  concept.  Consider quotation again.  If  one 
quotes exactly the same words twice, one has uttered the same quotation twice.  That is, 
the two token quotations are tokens of  a single quotation-type.  If  this account holds for 
constitutive concepts, then the two terms in a true identity statement are, by virtue of  
co-referring, tokens of  the same concept. And so, the claim would conclude, it is a priori 
that they co-refer.
Second, one might argue that our peculiarly intimate epistemic access to qualia44 
carries across to concepts which are partly constituted by phenomenal properties.  If, as 
some such theorists suggest, tokening such a concept involves undergoing an experience 
of  the relevant sort (or a faint copy of  it),45 then arguably we could not fail to notice if  
two such concepts were constituted by the same phenomenal property.
Both suggestions can be disputed.  The first assumes that such concepts do not 
differ in their non-phenomenal components in a way that matters to individuation.  This 
may be true if  their non-phenomenal components are mere dumb frames, like quotation 
marks, but that is disputed.  See, e.g., (Papineau, 2007, p. 125).  In any event, if  identity 
statements involving such concepts are to be a priori, we need to be able to detect their 
co-reference a priori, or the very fact that we are using the same concept twice will be a 
posteriori.   The quotation metaphor may mislead here: two quotations can easily be 
compared, but it may be that we cannot inspect the components of  our concepts the 
way we see words on a page.
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Which brings us to the second point: the suggestion that we can indeed inspect the 
components of  our concepts, when they are qualia.  Strong claims are often made for 
our abilities to detect and classify phenomenal properties,46 but it does not seem 
impossible that the relation between two instantiations of  the same phenomenal 
property could be obscured, by differences in context of  tokening or even cognitive 
partitioning.  Moreover, since classifying phenomenal properties arguably involves 
bringing them under concepts, there is a circularity problem in saying we identify our 
concepts by identifying the phenomenal properties that constitute them.  Finally, one 
might quibble about whether such identifications are properly a priori, since they rely on 
examining our experience.
But regardless of  the merits of  these objections, there is a fatal problem for the 
constitutivist approach to the semantic stability argument: it has to be told about both 
terms in a psychophysical identity statement.  If  one term’s reference depends on a 
posteriori facts but the other’s does not, then whether the terms co-refer depends on a 
posteriori facts.  So an identity statement involving them will be a posteriori. 
And there is no reason to think our physical-functional concepts are constituted by 
the very properties they refer to.  Obviously only concepts whose referents are located in 
the right place (roughly, inside our heads) are candidates for being so constituted.  Even 
then, there is no reason to think that a neural concept like C-fibre stimulation is 
constituted by the very neural phenomenon it refers to.  On the contrary, there is a very 
good reason to think it isn’t.  Whether or not C-fibre stimulation is pain, it is at least a 
neural correlate of  pain.  (Nothing in the arguments against psychophysical identities 
rules out lawlike correlations between neural and phenomenal properties, which in fact 
seem to be plentiful.)  So if  our concept C-fibre stimulation were constituted by C-
fibre stimulation, then we would feel pain when we tokened it.  And that would make 
our epistemic situation very different. 
Since the physical-functional terms in psychophysical identity statements aren’t 
constituted by their referents, and since none of  the other attempted explanations of  
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semantic stability succeed, they are unstable.  And so the semantic stability argument 
fails.
It’s worth stressing that the semantic instability of  physical-functional terms is not 
intended to replace the earlier explanations of  the target features of  psychophysical 
identity statements.  In particular, the claim is not that “pain is C-fibre stimulation” is a 
posteriori because we don’t know what “C-fibre stimulation” refers to; or that when I 
conceive of  pain without C-fibre stimulation I am conceiving of  a scenario in which “C-
fibre stimulation” refers to something different.   On the contrary, we know what “C-
fibre stimulation” refers to as well as we know the reference of  any term; and when I 
conceive of  such scenarios I conceive of  C-fibre stimulation itself.
The claim is rather that “C-fibre stimulation” does not have an a priori connection 
to its referent, of  the very special kind needed to perform an otherwise impossible trick: 
discerning a priori that it co-refers with another term, even in the absence of  any analytic 
connection between the two.
3.14. Conclusion
None of  the ways in which a term’s reference might seem to avoid dependence on a 
posteriori facts does the job: making psychophysical identity statements a priori, even in the 
absence of  an analytic connection between phenomenal and physical-functional terms.  
Removing the obvious sources of  such dependence is not enough: both rigid and 
directly referring terms can figure in a posteriori identities.  Nor can stability be created by 
tying the term to an intimate description of  the referent—the identity and essentialist 
approaches; or even to the referent itself—the individuation-by-reference and 
constitutive approaches.   The last approach might, arguably, make phenomenal terms 
stable, but it cannot be applied to physical-functional terms.  
I conclude, then, that the minor premise of  the semantic stability argument is false: 
it is not the case that both terms in psychophysical identity statements are semantically 
stable.  It follows that the major premise does not apply: psychophysical identity 
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statements do not have to be a priori to be true at all.  They can be empirical, scientific, a 
posteriori discoveries.
3.15. Afterword: Papineau and apparent contingency
Papineau (2007), (Forthcoming) argues that semantic stability is consistent with 
psychophysical identity statements being a posteriori, but not with their being apparently 
contingent.  He accepts that the terms in such identities are semantically stable, and 
takes the conclusion as further support for his view that psychophysical identity 
statements appear false, rather than contingent.  
Now the strong notion of  semantic stability discussed above poses no problems 
for psychophysical identity statements, because the terms in them are not semantically 
stable in that sense.  But Papineau is taking “semantic stability” in a different sense, one 
which is consistent with a posteriori identities, and claiming that stability even in that sense 
is inconsistent with apparent contingency.
His argument goes like this.  For a statement to be apparently contingent, he says, it 
must seem actually true but possibly false.  If  one believes the psychophysical identity 
statement, one believes that the two terms co-refer.  But if  both terms are semantically 
stable (and rigid) one will believe that there are no worlds—considered either as actual or 
counterfactual—in which they do not co-refer.  “If  a claim can be understood as actually 
true yet possibly false, then some of  the concepts involved must shift 
reference” (Papineau, 2007, p. 133).  And stable terms, by definition, cannot shift 
reference.  So psychophysical identity statements cannot seem contingent.
What is going on here?  One response is simply that Papineau is shifting between 
two sense of  semantic stability.  By saying that semantically stable terms cannot “shift 
reference”—that they refer to the same thing in all worlds considered as actual—he is 
saying they are stable in the strong sense.  But his claim that psychophysical identity 
statements are a posteriori assumes that they are stable in at most some weaker sense.
A more charitable reading is that Papineau’s weaker sense of  stability amounts to 
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not having reference fixed via an unstable description.   This is consistent with his 
concession, noted in §3.10(b) above, that scientific terms are stable.  This interpretation 
is supported by his claim that it is not possible to “read” or “construe” phenomenal 
terms as referring differently according to the facts, suggesting that what is missing is an 
element of  meaning, such as a representational mode of  presentation.  And his example 
of  such reading is construing “Hesperus” as “the heavenly body that appears in the 
morning [sic]”, which is a case of  descriptive reference (Papineau, 2007, p. 133).
If  this is his claim, then the response is that non-descriptive terms can still shift 
reference.  Had the a posteriori facts linking “Cicero” to its referent, for example, come 
out differently, “Cicero” would have referred differently.  (See §3.10(b).)   
This is not to reject Papineau’s conclusion.  As discussed in chapter 2, his view that 
psychophysical identity statements appear false rather than contingent is an attractive 
solution to the problem of  apparent contingency.  Certainly it is at least plausible that 
people are intuitively dualist.  But we are not forced to think so to avoid the semantic 
stability argument.
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4. Physicalist supervenience and the a priori entailment thesis
A. The a priori entailment thesis
4.1. Introduction
In the last two chapters I argued that the a posteriori status of  psychophysical identity 
statements does not threaten physicalism.  But there is another class of  necessary 
statements to which physicalism is committed which pose a harder problem.  These are 
statements of  physicalist supervenience: statements which assert of  some high-level fact 
that it is implied by the actual facts of  physics.
In this chapter I argue that such supervenience statements must be a priori if  
physicalism is true.   After outlining the “a priori entailment thesis” (“APET” for short) 
in this part A, I explain in part B why I think it should be accepted.  In part C I explain 
how its truth can be reconciled with physicalism.  
My argument for the APET, unlike that given in its most prominent defence 
(Chalmers & Jackson, 2001), does not involve claiming that there are analytic 
connections between the vocabulary of  physics and other terms.  This allows 
supervenience statements to be a priori even when the terms in the consequent are, like 
phenomenal terms, analytically independent of  the physical-functional terms in the 
antecedent.  Analytic connections are not required, I argue, because (if  physicalism is 
true) knowledge of  physics tells us about the physical-functional reference of  
phenomenal terms, and hence which physical-functional terms they co-refer with.
In the next three chapters, 5, 6 and 7, I will argue that the possibility of  a priori 
implication from physics to phenomenal truths explains how the apparently insuperable 
epistemic “gaps” between the physical-functional and phenomenal domains can be 
bridged.  On the other hand, the absence of  such analytic connections explains why the 
“gaps” appear insuperable, and why bridging them is genuinely hard.  
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4.2. Supervenience statements
Physicalism, recall, is committed to supervenience: to the facts of  physics metaphysically 
fixing the other facts.  The “other” facts are those not described by physics but which 
fall within the intended scope of  physicalism specified in §1.7 above: i.e.,  facts involving 
contingent and/or causal phenomena.  Let “P” stand for a statement of  all the actual 
facts of  physics, and “R” for a statement of  another, supervening, fact.  Then, if  
physicalism is true, “P ! R” is a metaphysically necessary truth.  Statements of  the form 
“P ! R” will be called “global supervenience statements”.
In the cases of  interest for physicalism about consciousness, the consequent will be 
a phenomenal statement.  So let “Q” stand for an arbitrary phenomenal truth.  
Physicalism, then, is committed to the claim that psychophysical supervenience 
statements of  the form “P ! Q” are necessarily true, as a special case of  global 
supervenience statements.  (These assignments for “P”, “Q” and “R” will be used for the 
rest of  the thesis.)
Some clarifications.  First, note that P states the actual facts of  physics; it is not a 
description of  them such as “the actual facts of  physics”.  It is accordingly very, very, 
long—a fact that will be picked up shortly. 
Second, I will stipulate that all terms in P are rigid.  (Any non-rigid terms can be 
rigidified in the usual way.)  For simplicity, I will make the same stipulation about the 
terms in R or Q, though in fact it does not matter whether they are rigid, for reasons that 
will emerge from the discussion.
Third, as discussed in chapter 1, physicalism claims only that the other facts are the 
same in minimal physical duplicates of  our world: those in which there are no non-
physical phenomena.  Physicalism about biology does not rule out the existence of  
ectoplasmic animals in other possible worlds.  To reflect this, the antecedent of  
supervenience statements must include a “that’s all” clause asserting the absence of  non-
physical phenomena.  This is often given a separate label T, on the basis that it is not a 
statement made by physics itself  (see, e.g., Chalmers & Jackson (2001)), but rather an 
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assertion of  physicalism.   Global supervenience statements then have the form “(P & 
T) ! R”).  It may be that T is redundant—physics has no apparent aversion to universal 
quantifiers—but if  so, no harm is done by including it.  In any event, it is worth drawing 
special attention to T, since, unlike the (other) facts of  physics, its truth in the actual 
world is in question. 
If  the physicalist accepts that there are some facts that are not fixed by physics (as 
Melnyk and I exclude facts involving necessary and acausal particulars, and others 
exclude moral or aesthetic facts), those must be excluded from the consequent.  Finally, 
an interesting issue is raised by indexical statements.  As will be discussed in more detail 
in the next chapter, John Perry has argued that phenomenal truths are indexical in 
nature, and that indexical truths cannot be deduced from the (objective) truths of  
physics.  On Perry’s view, Q is not implied by P, but it is implied by the conjunction of  P 
and I, where I is a statement of  the world’s indexical “centre”, the location of  the 
subject.  Since neither side takes indexicals to be an additional ontological category, 
physicalists generally have no problem with including I in the antecedent of  global 
supervenience statements, to make “(P & I) ! R”—though some think I is redundant.  
Dualists for their part think adding I has no effect on the status of  the implication 
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 161).  So including I in the antecedent best reflects the point of  
contention.
In full, then, a global supervenience statement has the form “(P & T & I) ! R”.  
For simplicity, however, I will simply use P, on the understanding that T and I are 
included if  necessary.
4.3. The a priori entailment thesis
So “P ! R” is metaphysically necessary.  Is it also a priori?  If  it is not, then it is yet 
another a posteriori necessity which needs explaining—whether on the Kripkean account 
or in some other way.  
If  “P ! R” is a priori, on the other hand, then the rather startling result is that all 
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the other facts can be deduced a priori from physics. This implication is what is known as 
the a priori entailment thesis:
APET: if  physicalism is true, then a complete statement of  the facts of  physics a 
priori implies statements of  the supervening facts.
If  the APET is true, and physicalism about consciousness is too, then phenomenal 
statements can be deduced a priori from physics—along with the facts of  chemistry, 
biology and every other physical domain.  
The APET is initially quite implausible, and not just in its application to 
phenomenal facts.  For starters, one might reasonably question whether P can figure in a 
priori deductions at all.  Certainly no actual human could believe P, and writing it down 
would require more paper than there is matter in the universe.  P states, for example, all 
the facts about each electron, including (to the extent it has one) its location.  Any map 
here is going to be larger than the terrain.  P may even be infinitely long.   At the very 
least, a hefty dose of  idealisation is required to speak of  deducing anything from P.
I will assume that the required idealisation is legitimate, so that it makes sense to 
talk about the a priori status of  “P ! R”.  Otherwise—if  P is too big even to be 
entertained even by an ideal knower—then no inferences can be drawn from it, a priori 
or otherwise.  But if  the APET is false for that reason, its falsehood would have no 
ontological implications.   “P ! R” would be neither a priori nor a posteriori, but simply 
unknowable.
That point aside, a couple of  clarifications may help mitigate the APET’s initial 
implausibility.  First, it is a thesis about the epistemic status of  an implication.  It does not 
say that the consequent of  the implication (R or Q) is an a priori truth.  On the contrary: 
deducing the consequent requires possession of  the enormous body of  a posteriori 
information stated by the antecedent.  Unlike the dualist arguments considered 
previously, the APET does not commit physicalism to the claim that phenomenal 
knowledge can be derived merely by understanding and reflecting on physical and 
phenomenal terms.
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Second, the APET involves no appeal to substantive a priori knowledge, to a way of 
knowing that is neither empirical nor logical.  The claim is simply that the antecedent of  
a supervenience statement contains all the information needed to derive its consequent.  
For the physicalist, remember, anyone who knows the antecedent knows all there is to 
know about how the world is arranged, at the fundamental level on which everything 
else depends.  To borrow a metaphor from Lewis (1999a, p. 294), they know the colour 
of  every cell in the world’s mosaic.  The APET claims only that someone who can see 
every spot of  paint should be able to see the whole picture.
4.4. The APET and the epistemic gap arguments
The “epistemic gap” arguments are a series of  arguments for dualism about phenomenal 
properties, each of  which appeals to an epistemic (in a broad sense) disconnection 
between the facts of  physics and the phenomenal facts.  
• The knowledge argument points to the alleged impossibility of  deducing 
phenomenal facts from physical knowledge, as revealed by Frank Jackson’s “Mary 
the colour scientist” thought experiment (Jackson, 1982).  Mary knows all the 
physical facts about human colour vision, but has never been allowed to see 
colours; when she is finally given a rose, the story goes, she learns for the first time 
what it is like to see red, which all her physical knowledge could not tell her.
• The conceivability argument points to the conceivability of  scenarios in which 
the actual physical facts co-exist with non-actual phenomenal facts.  We can, for 
example, allegedly conceive of  a “zombie” scenario: one which is physically 
identical to ours, but in which no one has phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers, 
2010).
• Finally, the explanatory gap argument claims that no amount of  physical 
knowledge can give us explanations of  phenomenal facts (Levine, 1983).
Such epistemic gaps are inconsistent with physicalism only if they entail ontological 
gaps.  Each of  the epistemic gap arguments, therefore, requires a premise that allows 
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ontological gaps to be inferred from epistemic gaps, and so commits physicalism to 
epistemic connections between domains as well as ontological ones.  
The knowledge argument depends straightforwardly on the claim that if  
physicalism is true, phenomenal truths should be derivable a priori from physical truths.  
If  not, Mary’s inability to do so would pose no problem.  The same is true, slightly less 
directly, of  the conceivability argument.  A zombie scenario is an instance of  “P & ~Q”, 
where Q is the phenomenal truth that “someone is phenomenally conscious”.   If  “P ! 
Q” is a priori, then the zombie scenario is a priori false, and so inconceivable.  Finally, as 
will be discussed in chapter 7, the type of  physical explanation demanded by the 
explanatory gap argument involves physical truths implying phenomenal truths a priori.
The APET, defended in the next section, commits physicalism to just the sort of  
epistemic connections on which the gap arguments depend.  In each case, if  the relevant 
epistemic gap exists, the consequent of  the APET is false: global supervenience 
statements are not a priori.  And so, if  the gap exists and the APET is true, physicalism is 
false.47
One response the physicalist might try is to deny that the epistemic gaps are 
genuine hurdles: to claim that phenomenal statements can, in fact, be straightforwardly 
deduced from physical ones.  This response produces “type-A” physicalism (see §1.16 
above), an example of  which is the “analytic functionalism” of  David Lewis (1980).
On the other hand, if  the APET is false—if  the physicalist can consistently claim 
that global supervenience statements are a posteriori—none of  the epistemic gap 
arguments threaten physicalism.  Denying the APET is, unsurprisingly, a common 
physicalist response to the epistemic gap arguments.  This response leads to “type-B” 
physicalism, which accepts that the epistemic gaps are real, but denies that they refute 
physicalism.
The third option, like the first, accepts the APET, and denies that the epistemic 
gaps are real.  Like the second option, however, “type-C” physicalism accepts that the 
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47 There is a useful explication of  this common feature of  the three arguments in (Chalmers, 2003a, p. 104ff).
intuitions behind them have some merit: the epistemic gaps reflect real epistemic 
hurdles, which we cannot overcome by conceptual analysis.  On one variant of  this view, 
overcoming them may even be beyond our capabilities: (McGinn, 1989).  
The relation between the APET and the epistemic gap arguments will be discussed 
further in the chapters on each of  the arguments.  For now let me just note that a couple 
of  apparent alternatives to the APET for licensing the move from epistemic to 
ontological gaps are not, in fact, alternatives.  First, if  phenomenal facts supervene on 
local subsets of  the physical facts, the epistemic gap arguments could take as a premise 
that those local supervenience relations should be a priori.  But such a premise will be 
strictly stronger than the APET, and will be false if  the APET is.  Similarly, phenomenal 
facts plausibly supervene on facts at a higher level than physics (biology, perhaps), so the 
epistemic gap arguments might claim that those relations should be a priori.  But for 
physicalism to be true those higher-level facts in turn must, ultimately, supervene on 
physics, and the question of  the epistemic status of  their supervenience arises in the 
same way.
B. In defence of  the APET
4.5. Introduction
I accept the APET.  Somewhat reluctantly: if  there were a way to avoid it at an 
acceptable metaphysical cost, I would.  It is a startlingly implausible doctrine which 
threatens the (to me) very unstartling and plausible doctrine of  physicalism.  
In this part of  the chapter I explain why I think the APET must, nonetheless, be 
accepted.  The defence here is not water-tight: some of  the argument (notably the 
rejection of  strong a posteriori necessities) is handed off  to dualists with whom it is 
common ground.  My focus will be on showing how those shared premises lead to the 
APET.  In the next section I discuss an influential defence of  the APET, that of  David 
Chalmers and Frank Jackson, which asserts that there are analytic connections between 
terms for fundamental phenomena and terms for supervening phenomena.  That sort of 
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defence of  the APET will cause problems for physicalism about consciousness, if  
phenomenal terms refer directly.  So in the following section, §4.7, I defend the APET in 
a way that does not appeal to analytic connections, and so is compatible with direct 
reference and analytic independence.
After that, in part C, I explain how physicalism can provide the a priori implications 
demanded by the APET, despite the analytic independence of  phenomenal and physical-
functional terms.
4.6. Chalmers and Jackson’s defence of  the APET
Why would someone think physicalism entailed a priori connections between physics and 
the other facts?  Physicalism does not claim any such connection: it is an ontological 
thesis, not an epistemic one.  As long as all the other facts are metaphysically fixed by the 
facts of  physics—as long as metaphysical supervenience is true—physicalism does not 
care whether they can be deduced a priori from physics, or have to be investigated a 
posteriori by autonomous special sciences.
Kripke, of  course, reminded us that metaphysical and epistemological categories 
are distinct.  There are statements, such as “heat is molecular motion”, that are both 
necessary and a posteriori. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering why Kripke’s cases were 
so surprising. To say that a statement is necessarily true is to say (in possible worlds talk) 
that there is no possible world in which it is false.  And to say it is a posteriori is to say that 
learning whether it is true requires looking at how the world is.  But if  the statement is 
true in every possible world, how could what you see out the window make a difference?  
Why is any a posteriori investigation not redundant?  Conversely, if  a statement can only 
be known a posteriori, then before the investigation is done there must be some possible 
results of  the investigation which would make it false (if  there are none, the 
investigation is indeed redundant).  But then why is the statement not false in possible 
worlds in which those results are obtained?  In short, a statement’s metaphysical and 
epistemic statuses seem closely connected, albeit strictly distinct.  Statements whose 
modal and epistemic statuses diverge—a posteriori necessities and a priori contingencies—
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are curious beasts which need explaining.
A point from Frank Jackson (1998, p. 82) shows why Kripke’s account cannot be 
applied to global supervenience statements.  In Kripke’s cases, a posteriori necessities 
result from the dependence of  reference on a posteriori facts.  A term like “water” refers 
to whatever actually fits an associated reference-fixing description in the context in 
which users of  “water” find themselves.  But Jackson points out that once the context is 
known, the reference can be ascertained.  So if  knowledge about the context is added to 
the analytic understanding of  “water”, the implication to “water is H2O” is a priori. 
By extension, the facts of  physics fix the context.  So once they are known, the a 
posteriori element in “water is H2O” is dealt with, and the implication from the facts of  
physics to “water is H2O” is a priori.
There are a number of  ways one could respond to this argument.  One could 
question whether knowledge of  physics tells us the facts about reference.  Or one could 
look for an alternative to the Kripkean account of  a posteriori necessities.  One might 
even deny that any explanation is available, and claim that supervenience statements are 
brute or “strong” a posteriori necessities.  Each of  these replies will be discussed, and 
rejected, in the next section.  But first I will discuss Chalmers’s and Jackson’s response to 
the challenge from the absence of  analytic connections in general: not just between 
physics and phenomenal terms, but between physics and domains about which 
physicalism is less problematic, such as biology.
Critics taking this line, notably Block & Stalnaker (1999, pp. 14-16), argue that a 
priori entailment requires an implausibly large supply of  conceptual truth.  Successful 
conceptual analyses of  any kind are somewhere between rare and mythical, never mind 
analyses that translate biological terms into the vocabulary of  fundamental physics.  
Even Jackson’s account, which gives a role to non-analytic information about context, 
requires that terms not only have associated reference-fixing descriptions, but ones 
which can be further analysed into the vocabulary of  physics.  Without such a 
translation, a description which uses high-level terms like “lake” and “potable” is no 
help.
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And if  conceptual links to physics are generally unavailable, even for non-
phenomenal terms, then either the APET proves too much—it becomes a problem for 
physicalism in general, not just about phenomenal properties—or it proves nothing at 
all, because a priori entailment is not required for physicalism.  Block and Stalnaker take 
the latter view.
Chalmers and Jackson respond that inferring the supervening facts from the facts 
of  physics does not require full-blown conceptual analysis.  All it requires is the ability to 
tell a priori, given a suitable description of  a scenario, whether a term applies to that 
scenario.  That does not require knowledge of  the necessary conditions for the term’s 
application; and while it requires that we know a sufficient condition when we see it, we 
do not need to be able to spell out all the sufficient conditions in advance.
What gives us the necessary ability, Chalmers and Jackson claim, is that our 
concepts are associated a priori with “application conditionals”.  Given an actual or 
hypothetical scenario described in physical terms (not including terms expressing the 
concept itself, or synonyms thereof), these application conditionals allow us to identify 
the concept’s extension in the scenario: to determine whether and to what it applies.
As examples of  such a priori application conditionals, Chalmers and Jackson point 
to terms like “knowledge” and “water”.  In evaluating Gettier cases we infer from a 
“knowledge”-free description of  the world whether someone in that scenario knows 
something.  Similarly, in Twin Earth cases, a “water”-free description of  the location and 
behaviour of  H2O (or XYZ) molecules allows us to infer that water is H2O (or XYZ) 
and thence where the water is in the scenario.  Gettier cases, in particular, highlight the 
contrast between application conditionals and full-blown conceptual analyses: the force 
of  Gettier’s examples depends on our being able to tell whether someone has knowledge 
in a hypothetical scenario, but his effect on hopes for conceptual analysis of  
“knowledge” has been severe.
Chalmers and Jackson then claim that the combination of  P—the complete 
statement of  the facts of  physics—and a complete statement of  the phenomenal facts 
contains enough information to describe the world in ways that trigger the application 
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conditionals of  all other concepts.  The phenomenal statement gives us the information 
about perceptual appearances we use to judge the application of  terms in ordinary 
situations.  P then gives us the information needed to answer non-perceptual questions 
(such as whether that yellow metal is gold, that liquid water, or that animal alive), as well 
as to rule out sceptical hypotheses in which our senses are deceived about the external 
world.
Note that the appeal to a statement of  phenomenal facts is unexceptionable: 
Jackson and Chalmers deliberately leave open whether the phenomenal facts supervene 
on the physical facts.  In effect, they argue for a generalised version of  the APET to the 
effect that everything is a priori implied by a statement of  the fundamental facts, whatever 
they are.  If  that generalised APET is true, and the phenomenal facts are not 
fundamental but supervene on physics, then the phenomenal information will simply be 
redundant.  
So Chalmers and Jackson give a positive argument for a priori entailment: they seek 
to show that P and phenomenal information together give the investigator enough 
information to deduce the ordinary facts, given the a priori application conditionals 
associated with our concepts.  This is fine, indeed plausible, as far as it goes.
But there are two things this positive argument does not establish.  First, showing 
that many of  our concepts have a priori application conditionals—and from there that a 
priori implications from the fundamental facts are widely available—does not establish 
that all of  them do.  
Chalmers and Jackson do suggest that such application conditionals are a “general 
feature” of  our concepts (2001, p. 323), one which is possessed by “many or most” 
concepts.  But they do not give much of  an argument to that effect, except to suggest 
that if  a description of  a scenario fails to yield a judgement about a concept’s 
application, the description can be supplemented by further empirical information until 
it does (p. 325).  Yet this is precisely what direct reference denies.
Moreover, Chalmers and Jackson acknowledge that there exist some “primitive” 
concepts lacking non-trivial application conditionals.  They even—50% dualist as they 
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now are—suggest that consciousness might be among them.  That is, after all, required for 
the next step in the dualist argument, the absence of  a priori implications from physics to 
the phenomenal facts.  But Chalmers and Jackson do not give any reason to think such 
terms must refer to non-physical phenomena.  (Their other examples—time, space and 
cause—suggest that the referent must be metaphysically fundamental.  But they do not 
argue for that either.)
Chalmers and Jackson do address one case of  direct reference, arguing that their 
account applies to Kripkean proper names.  They point to Kripke’s own Gödel/Schmidt 
thought experiment as an example of  invoking a priori application conditionals about the 
reference of  such names (p. 326).  But the Gödel/Schmidt scenario is a counter-example 
to a putative descriptive reference-fixer (viz., “‘Gödel’ refers to whoever proved the 
incompleteness of  arithmetic”).  That we can show such a candidate description to be 
inadequate a priori does not show that the correct mechanism of  reference is available a 
priori to anyone who understands the name.  In any event, even if  proper names do have 
a priori application conditionals, phenomenal concepts still might not.
Second, the positive argument does not establish that physicalism (or any doctrine 
that some facts are fundamental) is committed to terms having such application 
conditionals.  The positive argument seeks only to show how a priori entailment could be 
feasible, not that a priori entailment of  that particular form is required for physicalism.  
Chalmers and Jackson argue elsewhere that physicalism requires a priori entailment—
(2001, p. 357), referring the reader to (Chalmers, 1999).  But nothing they say establishes 
that a priori entailment could not proceed in a different way, one that does not depend on 
either application conditionals or full-blown conceptual analysis.
The ground is therefore open for a defence of  the APET that does not depend on 
any analytic connections between high-level terms and the vocabulary of  physics, and so 
is consistent with direct reference.  That is what I now propose to give. 
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4.7. A direct-reference-friendly defence of  the APET
The challenge for the physicalist who denies the APET is to provide an explanation for 
the necessary a posteriori status of  “P ! R”.  In this section I explain why each candidate 
explanation for that a posteriori status is unacceptable.  I conclude that “P ! R” must be a 
priori if  it is necessary—that is, that the APET is true.
The crucial feature of  this defence is that it does not appeal to analytic connections 
between physical and phenomenal terms.  So I should clarify that I do not reject such 
connections generally.   In particular, it seems to be common ground that functional terms 
have the right sort of  analytic connections.  Functional terms are analytically associated 
with a certain role (as mentioned in §1.19(b) above).  Once one knows what plays that 
role and where, one can deduce the extension of  the functional term a priori.48  To the 
extent the role is specified in the language of  physics, we can deduce the term’s 
extension from the facts of  physics.  If  the role is specified using other functional terms, 
the original term can be connected to physics if  the causal roles associated with the new 
terms are specified in the language of  physics.  (This can be iterated.)  So analytic 
connections to such functional terms are as good as connections to the vocabulary of  
physics.  Accordingly I will continue to speak indifferently of  physical-functional terms.
a) The Kripkean account
As elsewhere, it is tempting to co-opt Kripke’s original explanation of  the necessary a 
posteriori: to say that the implications from physics to other statements, and in particular 
phenomenal statements, are a posteriori, despite their metaphysical necessity, because the 
latter involve terms whose reference depends on a posteriori facts.
I believe that this invocation of  Kripke fails—and for reasons that have nothing to 
do with the alleged semantic stability of  phenomenal terms, which was supposed to 
make psychophysical identity statements a priori.  Invoking Kripke fails even for the 
implication from the facts of  physics to non-phenomenal domains, whose facts are 
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48 See, to this or similar effect, (Block & Stalnaker, 1999, p. 2) and (Jackson, 1982, p. 127).
stated using uncontroversially unstable terms like “water”.
The problem for the Kripkean explanation is, as Jackson notes, that the facts of  
physics fix the facts that determine reference (Jackson, 1998, p. 82).  The facts of  physics fix, 
for example, the causal relations between the names we use and their bearers; and they 
fix both that H2O behaves chemically as a substance must in order to be the watery 
stuff, and that it is behaving that way around here, in the rivers, clouds and taps with 
which we are acquainted.  (The “around here” is an example of  why I, standing for a 
statement of  the world’s indexical centre, must be included in the antecedent of  
supervenience statements, if  it is not implied by P.)  As long as the mechanism of  
reference is a matter of  contingent or causal facts within the scope of  physicalism, 
physicalism implies that the facts of  physics determine both what it is and how it 
applies.49  This is true even if  the term’s reference is physically disjunctive (as “jade” 
refers to two different kinds of  rock), or even vague.  If  there are genuinely vague terms 
(as opposed to ones whose reference is determinate but epistemically hidden), then 
physicalism implies that the facts of  physics fix the extent and degree of  vagueness.  See 
(Chalmers, 1996, p. 77).  There are of  course genuine and knotty problems surrounding 
vagueness, but they are not, I think, problems for ontological monism.  A certain 
thickness and distribution of  hair may or may not count as baldness, but the physical 
nature of  hair and scalp is not particularly in question; nor does anyone think the facts 
about baldness could be different without a difference in the facts about hair.
Jackson uses the physical context to supplement reference-fixing descriptions 
revealed by conceptual analysis (or at least by reflection on application conditionals).  On 
Jackson’s account, for example, we know a priori that “water” refers to the odourless, 
tasteless, potable liquid that falls from the sky, runs in rivers and fills the lakes.  
Knowledge of  the physical context then tells us what liquid actually satisfies that 
description around here.  My suggestion is that the conceptual analysis part of  Jackson’s 
account is not essential: if  physicalism is true, the facts of  physics fix reference 
regardless of  whether conceptual analyses—or even a priori application conditionals—
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49 This is why, as I mentioned in §4.1, it doesn’t matter if  such terms are non-rigid.  Because P specifies their reference, it 
will be constant across worlds of  which P is true.
are available.  For what it’s worth, I take this to be a generalisation of  Jackson’s account 
rather than a disagreement in principle.  (I am not claiming that Jackson would agree.)
Of  course, physicalism about reference establishes only that the facts of  physics 
metaphysically fix the facts that determine reference.  One might still object, to either my 
account or Jackson’s, that they do so only a posteriori.  Even if  the facts of  physics fix 
H2O’s presence in the lakes, for example, we still cannot deduce that water is H2O from 
the facts of  physics unless the connection is a priori.  And the connection looks as a 
posteriori as ever: terms like “potable” and “lake” neither appear in, nor are obviously 
analysable into, the vocabulary of  physics (Byrne, 1999, p. 368).
This objection amounts to appealing to a second a posteriori necessity—the 
implication from the facts of  physics to the facts about reference—to explain the first 
one.  And that requires an explanation for the divergent modal and epistemic statuses of 
the second necessary truth.  If  the Kripkean account is to explain the a posteriori status of 
the original necessity, it must be deployed again here.  To continue the example, the a 
posteriori status of  “H2O is the watery stuff  that fills the lakes” must be explained by the 
dependence of  terms such as “lake” on a posteriori facts.  But of  course, if  physicalism is 
true, the facts of  physics fix those facts, too.  And so a third a posteriori necessity is 
required.  And so on.
Such a chain could legitimately continue for some time.  The reference of  some 
high-level term might, for example, be fixed via facts in domains progressively closer to 
physics.  The reference of  a psychological term might be fixed by a posteriori biological 
facts, which are described in terms whose reference is fixed by chemical facts, which in 
turn are described in terms whose reference in turn depends on facts of  physics.  But it 
cannot go on forever.   Eventually reference has to be fixed!  
More precisely, the chain can continue only as long as what fixes reference is the 
satisfaction of  some description.  Where reference is direct, the reference-fixing facts do 
not involve new terms whose reference would need to be fixed.  To be sure, in order to 
perform the a priori inference, one has to represent the reference-fixing facts, and one 
might do so using terms whose reference is fixed Kripke-fashion: but that would be 
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one’s own fault.  Nothing in principle prevents one representing them in explicitly 
physical-functional terms.  (Given that realisation physicalism is true of  them, and one is 
the sort of  superhuman who knows P.)  So an endless chain of  reference-fixing facts 
implies an endless chain of  terms and associated descriptions.  Even if  language were 
big enough, such an endless chain would never actually get around to fixing reference.
If  the terminal reference-fixing description is expressed in physical-functional 
terms then, by working back up the chain, the original statement can be inferred a priori 
from the facts of  physics.  If  the chain terminates in a description in other terms, then 
the a posteriori status of  the necessary connection between the facts it describes and the 
facts of  physics—and so of  the original entailment—is not explainable by the Kripkean 
account.  Either way, a posteriori reference-fixing cannot explain the alleged a posteriori 
status of  “P ! R”.
b) Non-Kripkean explanations
Could anything else explain it?  If  there were an alternative explanation, I would be more 
than happy, but I cannot see one.  Obviously the elements of  meaning that are knowable 
a priori—narrow content, analytic connections to other concepts, what have you—will 
not help; and we have just seen that the explanation does not lie in the a posteriori facts 
about reference.  If  the explanation involves the statement’s semantic features at all, it 
must involve something else.  But what else is there?  And it does seem the explanation 
has to be semantic.  If  a statement’s actual truth depends on a posteriori facts, then those 
facts had better make a difference to the statement’s truth conditions as well, or else the 
statement’s truth would also depend modally on those facts, and it would be contingent.  
For example, whether “water is H2O” is true in the actual world depends on the 
chemical structure of  the liquid in the actual lakes.  But the statement is necessary 
because what’s in the actual lakes also determines its truth conditions: since the actual 
liquid is H2O, “water” refers rigidly to H2O, so the statement is true of  all other worlds.  
If  its truth conditions were unaffected by the actual facts, then what is in the lakes would 
be relevant to its application to every possible world, and it would be false of  XYZ-
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worlds.
In any event, the argument about the Kripkean account can be generalised.  The 
Kripkean account tells us what we’re missing—it points us to the contingent a posteriori fact 
F on which the truth of  the necessary statement depends.  If  a putative non-Kripkean 
explanation also points us to such an F, then the question of  F’s a posteriori connection to 
P arises the same way.  If  it does not point us to such an F, then we have a mystery: the 
statement is a posteriori but does not depend on any contingent a posteriori facts.  The 
basic puzzle about the necessary a posteriori, that of  how looking at the world could be 
involved in learning the truth of  a statement that is true however the world is, remains 
unanswered.
This is where, I think, the view expressed by Dowell (2008) goes wrong (or perhaps 
just does not go far enough).  Dowell’s defence of  type-C physicalism resembles in some 
respects the one given here, although as it happens I encountered it after developing my 
own.  Dowell argues, as I do, that a posteriori facts about how reference is fixed can play a 
role in explaining the modal and epistemic status of  physicalist supervenience, even in 
the absence of  analysis.  Where we diverge is her claim that empirical knowledge about 
reference can be, in effect, added to the antecedent of  the a priori implication, so that 
although a) there is no a priori implication from P alone to the supervening facts, b) there 
is an a priori implication from P plus knowledge of  reference (Dowell, 2008, p. 107). 
The problem then is that those empirical facts about reference are such a missing 
fact F.  If  they are (as the physicalist should say) metaphysically fixed by the facts of  
physics, but the connection is only a posteriori, as Dowell claims, then their supervenience 
is a brute a posteriori necessity, and Dowell’s position amounts to a version of  type-B 
physicalism.  If  P implies the facts about reference a priori, on the other hand, then the 
implication from P to R is entirely a priori and the additional information about reference 
is, strictly, redundant.
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c) Brute necessities
Might there be no explanation of  the a posteriori status of  “P ! R”?  Could the 
implication from P to R simply be a brute necessity, one whose modal status is entirely 
independent of  its logical and semantic properties?  Chalmers argues that the type-B 
physicalist must take this line, and so accept what Chalmers calls “strong” necessities 
linking physics and phenomenal consciousness.  The notion of  a “strong” necessity is an 
explication of  brute necessity using Chalmers’s two-dimensional semantic framework: a 
strong necessity is a statement which is necessarily true whichever world is treated as the 
actual one, and so however the actual world fixes the reference of  the terms which 
appear in it—but which is nonetheless a posteriori.  Some Type-B physicalists have indeed 
argued that there are strong necessities, including (but not necessarily limited to) 
psychophysical connections.  See, for example (Kallestrup, 2006) and (Levine, 2001, p. 
55).
If  brute or strong necessities exist, their a posteriori status is easy to explain.  But 
their necessity is harder.
In Kripkean cases, the divergence between metaphysical and epistemic statuses has 
a semantic origin, and so does not imply an underlying distinction between epistemic 
and metaphysical possibility.  As Kripke says, anything which could have turned out to be 
the case could have been the case (1981, p. 141): to be a possible discovery is to be a 
possible truth.  Since “heat is molecular motion” is necessarily true, we could not have 
discovered that it was false, even though it is a posteriori.  What we could have discovered 
was that sensation S was caused by exposure to a fluid.  Thanks to the semantics of  
“heat”, if  we had discovered that we would have said (and truly) that “heat is a fluid”.  
But that does not mean we would have discovered that heat was a fluid, since in that 
scenario we aren’t using “heat” to refer to heat.  When the semantics of  “heat” are 
properly accounted for, the epistemic possibilities are the same as the metaphysical ones.
The “two-dimensional” framework can be seen as restoring the connection 
between a priori status and necessity for propositions, as opposed to statements.  On this 
view, a statement such as “heat is molecular motion” is ambiguous between a range of  
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propositions, depending on what “heat” turns out to refer to.  Each of  the propositions 
it might express is either necessarily and a priori true, or necessarily and a priori false. The 
ambiguity in “heat” can be resolved only a posteriori, so the meta-proposition that [the 
statement “heat is molecular motion” expresses a true proposition] is a posteriori; but it is 
also contingent.  See, e.g., (Lewis, 1999a, p. 296) and (Jackson, 1998, p. 67ff).
Strong necessities, by contrast, do involve a fundamental divide between epistemic 
and metaphysical possibility: if  there are brute necessities, then some coherently 
completely describable (and thus logically possible and conceivable) worlds are 
metaphysically impossible.  Like Chalmers, I find that idea unpalatable because it is 
inconsistent with the modal-rationalist view that possibility just is consistent 
describability (see §1.20).  In context, rejecting strong necessities is a concession to the 
dualist, so I will not go further into the arguments against them and for modal 
rationalism.  But I take it as a benefit of  accepting the APET that one avoids either 
accepting strong psychophysical necessities or having to find a way around them.
C. A priori entailment without analytic connections
4.8. How it works
For those reasons, I accept the APET.  But notice that nothing in the argument 
depended on analytic connections between the vocabulary of  physics and other terms, 
whether full-blown conceptual analyses or humble application conditionals.  The 
argument applies equally to directly referring terms, which lack any such analytic 
connections: P specifies the facts that directly determine their reference, just as it 
specifies which substance satisfies the description associated with “water”.  This is true 
whatever the mechanism of  direct reference.  It is true for Loar’s (1998) recognitional 
concepts and Yablo’s (2002) response-dependent and response-enabled concepts: P 
specifies what produces the relevant response in the observer.  It is true for Papineau’s 
quotational or use-to-mention concepts (2002), (2007) and for Balog’s (1999) 
constitutive concepts: P specifies which neural tokens are quoted by, tokened along with, 
or form part of  the relevant concept.  (For more on these and other accounts of  
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phenomenal concepts, see chapter 8.)
To be sure, in the case of  “water” some of  the information we use to ascertain 
reference comes from associated descriptions, leaving only a partial role for the context-
determining facts.  With directly referring terms, by contrast, all the reference-fixing 
information comes from P; there is no help from the term’s analytic associations.  But 
this does not seem objectionable in principle.  Indeed, I would argue, even in “water” 
cases P contains all the necessary information.  The facts of  physics determine the 
reference-fixing facts even if  they involve descriptions.  That is not to say that physics 
fixes analytic truths, of  course.  It fixes the meanings of  terms, individuated 
orthographically; the analytic relations between them then follow logically.
Is this account consistent with the argument in chapters 2 and 3, that the analytic 
independence of  phenomenal terms explained the a posteriori status of  psychophysical 
identity statements?  If  a priori knowledge depends on analytic connections, one might 
fairly ask, how can there be an a priori inference whose conclusion involves “pain” and 
whose antecedent contains only physical-functional terms, unless “pain” has an analytic 
connection to physical-functional terms?
The answer is simple: disquotation.  As argued in §4.7, P gives us a priori the facts 
about the reference of  terms, including “pain” and “C-fibre stimulation”.  This, of  
course, is the knowledge one does not have when  considering psychophysical identity 
statements in isolation.  Now, imagine P tells us that “pain” and “C-fibre stimulation” 
co-refer.  To get from that to “pain is C-fibre stimulation”, we need only disquote. 
And disquotation is an a priori procedure.  “ ‘Pain’ refers to pain” is a priori, if  
“pain” refers to anything; similarly with “ ‘C-fibre stimulation’ refers to C-fibre 
stimulation”.  To be sure, as Chalmers points out, it is a posteriori that a term refers at all 
(2010, p. 176)  But if  P tells you what a term refers to, it tells you that it refers.  Given 
that information, disquotation is a purely formal procedure, requiring only an 
understanding of  quotation marks. 
This is a good place to repeat that physicalism is not committed to the a priori 
implications being substantive or informative.   It’s also worth stressing that what P 
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allows us to infer is co-reference between physical-functional and physical-functional 
terms.   It is tempting to say that P “tells us what phenomenal terms refer to,” but that 
raises tricky questions about what it is to know what a term refers to.  What P gives us is, 
at least, a physical-functional description that specifies the referent of  a phenomenal 
term: that is, a co-referring physical-functional description.  Knowledge of  such co-
reference gives us psychophysical identities, and, given those, deducing phenomenal 
truths from physical knowledge is straightforward.
4.9. The benefits
The result is to eliminate what seems to me to be the other major source of  scepticism 
about the APET: the thought that it requires a highly implausible semantic reduction of  
all terms to the vocabulary of  physics.  Both proponents and critics50 of  the APET have 
taken it that conceptual analysis into physical-functional terms is required to establish an 
a priori connection to the facts of  physics.  Avoiding this requirement is an advantage not 
just because, as critics such as Block and Stalnaker point out, successful conceptual 
analyses never quite happen.  It also avoids a commitment to ascriptivism, the thesis that 
we always know a priori what the reference-fixing conditions for our terms are.  
Ascriptivism may be plausible for “water”, but in the case of  proper names it ascribes an 
implausible knowledge of  Kripke and Putnam to the folk.51
Most importantly, the direct-reference-friendly version of  the APET yields a reply 
to Chalmers’s objection to Type-C physicalism (2003a).  Chalmers claims that that 
physical-functional descriptions of  the world can only convey its structural and dynamic 
nature.  But since phenomenal concepts do not describe their referents in structural-
dynamic terms, they cannot be analytically connected to physical-functional terms.  As 
he says (p. 122):
The basic problem with any type-C materialist strategy is that epistemic 
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51 For a general discussion of, and rejection of, ascriptivism, see (Levine, 2001, section 2.7).
implication from A to B requires some sort of  conceptual hook by virtue of  which 
the condition described in A can satisfy the conceptual requirements for the truth 
of  B.  When a physical account implies truths about life, for example, it does so in 
virtue of  implying information about the macroscopic functioning of  physical 
systems, of  the sort required for life: here, broadly functional notions provide the 
conceptual hook. But in the case of  consciousness, no such conceptual hook is 
available, given the structural-dynamic character of  physical concepts, and the 
quite different character of  the concept of  consciousness.
But the upshot of  the direct-reference-friendly APET is precisely that no such 
“conceptual hook” is needed.  P supplies the information required to determine the 
physical-functional reference of  phenomenal concepts, without needing to invoke 
physical-functional (or any other) content of  such concepts.  (Chalmers also claims, by 
way of  forcing the Type-C physicalist into a dilemma, that providing such a conceptual 
hook would collapse the position into Type-A physicalism.  By rejecting the need for 
such hooks I avoid that horn too.)
Chalmers’s objection here points to what I take to be the basic fallacy committed 
by those wielding the APET against physicalism.  There are two premises in play: 
1) If  physicalism is true, physics a priori implies everything else.
2) A priori implication requires that terms in the consequent have analytic 
connections to terms in the antecedent.
Therefore 3) Physicalism requires such analytic connections.
And from there the lack of  such analytic connections to phenomenal terms shows that 
physicalism about consciousness is false.
The first premise is the initially surprising one.  (Though I have argued it should 
not be that surprising, once one reflects upon how much information is contained in the 
antecedent.)  
By contrast, the second premise is quite plausible, and both sides take it for 
granted.  Block and Stalnaker combine it with their skepticism about the supply of  
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
114
conceptual truth to reject premise 1).  Jackson and Chalmers also take it for granted.  
Jackson:
Serious metaphysics requires us to address when matters described in one 
vocabulary are made true by matters described in another.  But how could we 
possibly address this question in the absence of  a consideration of  when it is right 
to describe matters in the terms of  the various vocabularies?  And to do that is to 
reflect on which possible cases fall under which descriptions.  And to do that is to 
do conceptual analysis. (Jackson, 1998, p. 41)
And Chalmers: 
For consciousness to be entailed by a set of  physical facts, one would need some 
kind of  analysis of  the notion of  consciousness—the kind of  analysis whose 
satisfaction physical facts could imply—and there is no such analysis to be had.  
(Chalmers, 1996, p. 104)
But the claim that physicalism is committed to all terms having analytic 
connections to the vocabulary of  fundamental physics is, in its way, as surprising as the 
APET.  As far as physicalism’s express commitments go, terms need have no analytic 
connections at all—our representers can be as rich or poor in analytic connections as we 
like.  And I can see no analogue of  the problem of  strong necessities which could force 
physicalism to endorse a claim about analytic connections.  If  direct reference is 
impossible, it will be for reasons unrelated to the number of  basic ontological kinds.
Now the second premise is almost true: in ordinary cases, a priori implications do 
involve analytic connections.  But only almost.  The answer to Jackson’s “how else?” 
question is: by investigating the reference of  terms whose application to scenarios 
described in the other vocabulary is not given to us analytically. 
The assumption in the second premise, it seems to me, underlies the family of  
epistemic gap arguments against physicalism that turn on the APET.  And it is false.
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4.10. Addendum: what if  physicalism about reference is false?
The defence of  the APET in this chapter relies on physicalism about reference.  The 
crucial claim that P specifies how the reference of  terms is determined assumes that the 
reference of  terms, ultimately, supervenes on physics.
As mentioned in §1.7, I assume physicalism about intentionality.  If  intentionality is 
non-physical, however, then the position is analogous to that with respect to indexicality 
(see §4.1 above).  There is still a meaningful dispute about whether consciousness 
supervenes on the combination of  physics and intentionality, or whether it is 
metaphysically independent of  both.
To see the dialectical situation, one can add “A”,52 standing for a statement of  the 
intentional facts, to the antecedent of  supervenience statements, so that in full they have 
the form “(P & T & I & A) ! R”.  If  this implication is necessarily true, then the 
argument that it is a priori will go through even if  intentionality is non-physical.
Is it necessary?  The (general) physicalist, of  course, will say that adding A has 
made no difference.  The non-physicalist about intentionality, however, might go either 
way.  If  they say that the implication is necessary, then they line up with the physicalist  
against the phenomenal dualist who claims that consciousness does not supervene on 
intentionality either.  See, for example, Chalmers’s discussion of  representationalism in 
(2003a, p. 111).  If  they say the implication is not necessary, then they line up with the 
dualist.  
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
116
52 “A” for “aboutness”.
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5. The knowledge argument
A. Introduction
The knowledge argument might not be the ur-gap argument—that honour probably 
goes to Descartes (1641)—but it was the first to become prominent in the 
contemporary debate.  It dates to (Jackson, 1982), which introduced us to Mary, a 
scientist who learns everything physical science can teach about human colour vision, 
despite spending her entire life confined to a black and white environment.  Her 
investigations complete, Mary’s captors finally allow her to see a red rose; at which point, 
Jackson intuits, she would exclaim “aha! So that’s what it’s like to see red!”  
It seems that Mary learns something when she sees the rose, something she couldn’t 
have known before.   That intuition is the first premise of  the knowledge argument.  
The other premise is that Mary can’t learn anything if  physicalism is true.  She already 
knew all the physical information about seeing red: so if  physicalism were true, she 
would have nothing left to learn.  By learning something, therefore, she disproves 
physicalism.  (For summaries of  the argument in roughly these terms see, e.g., (Alter, 
2007, p. 4) and (Hill, 2009, p. 40).)
In this chapter, I first show how the knowledge argument presupposes the APET, 
and that granting the APET makes the second premise of  the argument true.  Mary can’t 
learn phenomenal information when she sees the rose—that is, information about 
phenomenal properties expressed in propositional form—if  physicalism is true.  In part 
C I consider, and reject, some alternative proposals about what Mary might learn that 
would be consistent with physicalism.  In part D I argue that the direct-reference-
friendly account of  the APET shows how Mary could deduce phenomenal information, 
if  physicalism is true.  In the final part, E, I suggest reasons that deduction intuitively 
seems impossible.
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B. The knowledge argument and the APET
5.1. Clarifying the argument
One might think that the argument just sketched has no need for the APET.  It is 
stipulated that Mary has all the physical information, so anything she learns must be non-
physical.  On that reasoning, it doesn’t matter whether what she learns could, in 
principle, have been deduced a priori from what she knew before.
But understood that way, as Chalmers (2010, p. 192) points out, the argument 
would beg the question.  A physicalist about phenomenal properties could reply as 
follows.  “Since the phenomenal properties of  experience are physical properties, no one 
who lacks knowledge about them knows all the physical information about experience.  
Your argument assumes that someone could have all the physical information about 
experience while being ignorant of  the phenomenal, which is exactly what is in 
question.”
To avoid circularity, Mary cannot be explicitly given “all the physical information”, 
in the sense of  all information whose truth is consistent with ontological monism.  (I 
will call information that is physical in this ontological sense “ontologically physical”, 
borrowing a term from (Horgan, 1984).53)  Mary’s knowledge base must be specified in 
some other way. 
On the other hand, the knowledge argument does not go through unless Mary 
knows the full Monty: only if  she knows all the ontologically physical information does 
her learning something new disprove physicalism.  So the argument must establish that 
what Mary is explicitly given either includes, or allows her to deduce, all the other 
physical information.  It is here that the APET will come into play. 
Jackson’s own formulation is not circular.   He defines “physical information” as 
information delivered by the physical, chemical and biological sciences (1982, p. 127).  
This definition avoids the circularity problem, because restricting Mary’s knowledge base 
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not clear whether Horgan counts supervening phenomena as “physical” for this purpose.  I do.
to the deliveries of  particular sciences leaves open the possibility that she might gain 
information which—though not delivered by those sciences—still concerns only 
physical-functional phenomena. 
Jackson also includes in “physical information”—and so gives Mary—information 
that “automatically comes along with” information delivered by those sciences, citing 
information about functional roles as an example.  It is natural to interpret him as 
meaning information deducible a priori from those sciences, though Jackson does not use 
the term “a priori”.  (Mary predates Jackson’s explicit defences of  the APET discussed in 
the last chapter.)  In order to isolate the role of  the APET in the argument, I will first 
assume Mary gets only the information explicitly delivered by the sciences, and then 
consider what she ought to be able to infer from that a priori.
If  Mary knows all that the physical, chemical and biological sciences deliver, she 
has what Horgan calls the “explicitly” physical information: information which is 
couched in the vocabulary of  those sciences, and which describes the phenomena that 
play a role in their theories.  But, again, physicalism is not threatened unless she knows 
all the ontologically physical information.  So Jackson must show that having been given 
the explicitly physical information, Mary would know all the ontologically physical 
information.
It is not obvious that she would.  It seems quite possible that the ontologically 
physical information outruns the explicitly physical information.  It might do so in two 
different ways.
First, it might describe new facts: facts involving phenomena (particulars, 
properties, relations and so on) which are not described by those sciences.  Such facts 
are consistent with physicalism, as long as the additional phenomena supervene on 
phenomena described by physics.  Note that exactly this occurs between the sciences 
Jackson mentions.  If  physicalism about chemistry is true, for example, then chemical 
information is ontologically physical, even though it is not expressed in the vocabulary 
of  fundamental physics.  In the same way, phenomenal information might be 
ontologically physical despite not being described by any of  the physical sciences 
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(Flanagan, 1992).  If  physicalist supervenience obtains within the sciences, there seems 
no obvious reason it must stop at biology. 
Alternatively, ontologically physical information could outrun the explicitly physical 
information even without describing new facts.  It could redescribe in different terms the 
facts described by the physical sciences.  What Mary gains when she learns that “seeing 
red is like this” might be a new way of  talking about a property already described by the 
sciences she knows.  Since knowledge attributions are intensional contexts, there is no 
reason to think Mary could deduce one description from the other.  (She could, if  true 
psychophysical identities must be a priori; but I have argued in chapters 2 and 3 that they 
can be a posteriori.)
So the knowledge argument needs to rule out two possibilities: that Mary learns a 
new, but nonetheless physical-functional, fact; and that she learns a new way of  
describing a fact she already knew in scientific terms.
5.2. The role of  the APET
How could can those possibilities be ruled out?  One might try arguing that the explicitly 
physical information just is the ontologically physical information.  But this seems a 
hopeless strategy.  Even if  it could be established that there were no physical-functional 
facts not described by physics, chemistry and biology, the possibility of  redescription 
would remain.
The alternative is that the explicitly physical information implies all the ontologically 
physical information a priori.  If  it does, and if  phenomenal information is ontologically 
physical, then Mary could not learn any such information from seeing roses, since she 
would already have been able to work it out. 
For Jackson’s argument to work, then, it must be possible to deduce all the other 
ontologically physical information a priori from the explicitly physical information.  So 
here is a role for the APET in the knowledge argument.  If  the APET is true, all the 
ontologically physical information can be derived a priori from the explicitly physical 
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information that Mary is given.  Given the APET, if  what Mary learns is ontologically 
physical information, Mary would already have been able to deduce it.  So if  she gains 
any genuinely new information, it is not ontologically physical, and physicalism is false.
This is true regardless of  whether Mary’s new information describes a new fact, or 
redescribes a fact she already knew.  Let “M” stand for a statement of  Mary’s new 
information:
• If  M describes a new fact, then for that fact to be physicalistically acceptable it 
must supervene on the facts of  physics.  If  so, the implication from P, the 
statement of  all the facts of  physics, to M is a necessary truth.  But then the APET 
means that implication must be a priori.
• If  M redescribes a fact Mary already knew, the position is no different.  That 
fact is physical by stipulation, and so supervenes on the facts of  physics.  And then, 
by the APET, any statement of  that fact is deducible a priori from P, if  physicalism 
is true.  The difference between M and Mary’s old description of  the same fact is 
immaterial: the argument for the APET did not depend on which terms were used 
to express supervening facts.  If  M redescribes a fact of  physics itself, rather than a 
supervening fact, the effect of  the APET would be the same: P would tell Mary 
about the reference of  the terms in M, even if  they happened to refer to 
phenomena described by P itself  in other terms.
One result is that, despite the emphasis placed on this question by some 
physicalists,54 it does not much matter whether Mary’s new information describes new 
facts or redescribes facts she already knew.  Either way, if  the APET is true, her learning 
it is inconsistent with physicalism.
To be sure, physicalism cannot be falsified unless Mary learns a new fact.  Any 
redescription of  a fact she already knows will be ontologically physical information, 
since the fact it describes is a physical one by stipulation.  The point is that if  the APET 
is true, the physicalist cannot rescue the intuition that Mary learns something by claiming 
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she learns a redescription.  If  Mary learns anything, it has to be a new fact.  Conversely, if 
the APET is false, the physicalist can happily allow Mary to learn new facts, not just 
redescriptions.  Those new facts must supervene on the facts of  physics, but without the 
APET, the knowledge argument gives no reason to think they do not.
The view that physicalism can cope with Mary learning redescriptions assumes that 
Mary would know all the physical facts, but under only some of  their possible 
descriptions.  How would she get into that position?  It seems to me the idea is this.  She 
is given P, and has the ability to deduce whatever follows from P a priori.  But if  a priori 
deduction requires analytic connections, then Mary can deduce new physical facts only 
under descriptions involving physical-functional terms.  Other terms—including directly 
referring phenomenal terms—need not be analytically connected to any terms in P, so 
their physical reference remains something Mary can discover a posteriori.55
This, it seems to me, is the standard position of  Type-B physicalism,56 and it 
underlies the conventional approach to the phenomenal-concept strategy to be discussed 
in chapter 8.  But it ignores Mary’s ability to make a priori deductions even in the absence 
of  analytic connections, given the knowledge about reference she can glean from P.
5.3. Does Mary know P?
The knowledge Jackson gives Mary is not quite the same as the antecedent of  global 
supervenience statements: she knows both more and less than P.  On the one hand, she 
knows everything revealed by all the physical sciences, not physics alone.  But no matter; 
if  the APET is true and physicalism is true of  those sciences, the extra information is 
redundant.
On the other hand, Mary is given only the physical information about human 
colour vision, not all of  physics.  So even if  the APET is true, Mary must be given a lot  
more information before it becomes impossible for anything physical to surprise her.
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But there is no reason in principle why the knowledge Mary gets through her black-
and-white monitors should be limited to physical information about the human visual 
cortex, or any other subset of  P.  Indeed, subsequent descriptions of  Mary’s situation, 
including Jackson’s own, have tended to explicitly give her all the physical information 
(Jackson, 1986).  The intuition that she would learn something on seeing the rose seems 
unaffected.
P, and Jackson’s “physical information”, are not the only ways Mary’s knowledge 
base might be specified. But the account will be the same for any non-circular 
specification that includes, or can be extended to include, P.  At the limit, Mary can 
simply be given all the ontologically physical information that can be gained without 
seeing colours for oneself, or all the ontologically physical information which can be 
expressed without using phenomenal terms.  Neither formulation presupposes 
physicalism: perhaps the “without” clauses exclude some information, perhaps they do 
not.  And neither eliminates the intuition that she would learn something. 
On the other hand, if  Mary’s information does not include P, then the knowledge 
argument needs an alternative to the APET to justify the claim that  she ought to be able 
to deduce phenomenal information.  As far as I can see, there are no such alternatives.  
Any alternative would, at least, have to explain why the connection between phenomenal 
information and the knowledge Mary starts with couldn’t be a posteriori.  The claim that 
psychophysical identities must be a priori would do the job, but it has already been 
rejected.  Otherwise, what Mary is given must either a) be analytically connected to 
phenomenal information or b) include information about the physical-functional 
reference of  phenomenal terms.   The first option presupposes that such analytic 
connections exist, and so amounts to type-A physicalism.  (See §1.16.)  The second 
option gives her what I need for my own account to go through.
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C. What could Mary learn?
5.4. Responses to the knowledge argument
I conclude that if  the APET is true, Mary cannot learn any new information about 
phenomena that supervene on those described by physics.  Given that, the physicalist 
has three options:
• They can claim that Mary would not learn anything: she could deduce phenomenal 
information before she saw the rose.  With one qualification related to her 
acquisition of  phenomenal terms, this is my view, which I defend in part D of  this 
chapter.  
• They can deny the APET.  For the reasons given in chapter 4, I reject this 
approach. 
• Finally, they can claim that Mary would learn something which falls outside the 
scope of  the APET, but which is still consistent with physicalism.  In this part C I 
deal with this third option.
I count four views that meet this description.  The first is that Mary gains new concepts of 
phenomenal properties when she sees the rose.  The second is that Mary learns about 
extra fundamental facts, which do not supervene on the facts described by physics but 
which nevertheless count as “physical”.   The third is that she gains not information at 
all but abilities—knowledge-how rather than knowledge-that.  The last is that she learns 
indexical information, which, although it cannot be deduced from physics, is acceptable 
to the physicalist.  In this part, I explain why I think none of  these views offer an 
adequate response to the knowledge argument.
5.5. The “missing concept” reply
Some have claimed that before Mary sees the rose she would have no concept of  
phenomenal redness, because phenomenal concepts are experience-dependent.57  And 
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so she would not even be able to formulate thoughts about phenomenal redness, much 
less deduce them from physics.  If  this is right, Mary cannot deduce what it’s like to see 
red until she sees the rose.
I think this suggestion is quite plausible.  And it can be accepted consistently with 
the APET.  The APET is a doctrine about the epistemic relations between statements: it 
says nothing about how we come to be able to formulate those statements, and in 
particular about how we acquire the ability to use the terms involved in them.  
Several stories about phenomenal concepts, offered by both physicalists and 
dualists, offer explanations of  why phenomenal concepts could not be acquired without 
having experiences of  the relevant kind.  This is clearest on “constitutive” accounts such 
as (Balog, Forthcoming), (Papineau, 2002) or (Chalmers, 2003b), on which phenomenal 
concepts are partly constituted by phenomenal properties.  One cannot formulate such a 
concept until one possesses the property.  (The implausibility of  constitutive accounts of 
linguistic terms illustrates why this response is typically given in terms of  concepts rather 
than of  terms generally.  These and other accounts of  phenomenal concepts are 
discussed in more detail in chapter 8.) 
On the other hand, Mary has superhuman knowledge and reasoning power: could 
she perhaps construct phenomenal concepts?  I do not think she could.  To be sure, if  
phenomenal properties are physical-functional properties, Mary can synthesise concepts 
that refer to them.  She can inspect the phenomena of  physics, and coin labels for the 
various roles she sees them play.  But any concept synthesised that way will be a physical-
functional concept: it will have, by virtue of  its construction, an analytically associated 
physical-functional description.  And, as I have argued, phenomenal concepts refer 
directly, or at least lack any such connections to physical-functional concepts.  Just as 
directly referring concepts cannot be analysed into physical-functional concepts, they 
cannot be constructed out of  them.
Similarly, Mary could have wistful concepts of  phenomenal properties as, say, the 
subjective characters of  other people’s experience of  roses.  But such concepts also refer 
via description.  Finally, Mary could know about other people’s phenomenal concepts: 
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
126
she would know which systems in others’ brains realise concepts of  phenomenal 
properties, and which of  those concepts refer directly.  She would, accordingly, have 
concepts that represent other people’s directly referring phenomenal concepts.  But that 
is still not to have a directly referring concept herself.
So the premise of  the missing-concept reply looks plausible.  Nonetheless, the 
reply fails as a response to the knowledge argument, regardless of  whether its premise is 
true.  For once Mary acquires phenomenal concepts, however she does so, the APET 
implies that she can deduce phenomenal information from physical-functional 
information; and that is just as counter-intuitive as the claim that she learns nothing 
when she sees the rose.58
Post-rose Mary does not need to deduce what it’s like to see red from P.  But 
according to the APET she could.  Perhaps she would go through the deduction, just to 
integrate her new knowledge into her overall picture of  the world.  (Mary is nothing if  
not intellectually curious.)  And even if  she doesn’t bother, her new knowledge has, in 
principle, an a priori justification.  She can also make new inferences from P using her 
newly acquired phenomenal concept.  She can deduce whether other experiences would 
feel the same way, from the similarities or differences in their neuro-physical 
consequences.  And not by mere induction about phenomenal-physical correlations: she 
can rule out a priori the metaphysical possibility that the relevant physical-functional 
property could be associated with different phenomenal properties.  So she can rule out 
the possibility of  qualia “dancing” (Hawthorne, 2007), randomly changing their 
correlations with physical stimuli.  Moreover, she can determine the phenomenal facts 
about other people: she could deduce what it was like for her captors to see the rose.  
She could, accordingly, deduce a priori whether they are phenomenally inverted relative to 
her.  And, for that matter, she would know that they are not “zombies”, whose 
experiences have no subjective character at all.59  The same goes for beings of  arbitrarily 
different physical or functional structure from us.  So Mary can solve Block’s “harder” 
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58 This point is due to Stoljar (2005, p. 486).
59 See chapter 6, on the conceivability argument.
problem of  consciousness, that of  identifying phenomenal properties in beings 
dissimilar from us (Block, 2002).   See (Loar, 1998, section 6) for an explicit argument 
for this response to the harder problem.
I conclude that the missing-concept reply cannot answer the knowledge argument 
by itself.  It may explain our intuitive reaction to Jackson’s original case, but the APET 
commits physicalism to further claims about Mary’s post-rose knowledge that are just as 
counter-intuitive.  At any rate, they still need to be explained.    
5.6. Extra fundamental facts
This view holds that phenomenal facts are a class of  fundamental physical facts, distinct 
from those described by physics, but physical nonetheless.  Stoljar, for example, has 
argued that phenomenal properties are (combinations of) the properties which serve as 
the categorical grounds of  the dispositional properties discussed by the physical sciences 
(Stoljar, 2001).60  He argues that physics does not tell us about such categorical grounds.  
But since they are aspects of  the intrinsic nature of  paradigmatically physical objects, 
they nonetheless count as physical.
Such views are not threatened if  Mary learns something when she sees the rose.  If 
the phenomenal facts do not supervene on the facts of  physics, the APET does not 
require that they be deducible from physics a priori.  It is not clear that Stoljar is right to 
call this picture “physicalist”: it might instead be regarded as a form of  neutral monism 
(Chalmers, 2003a, p. 121) or even of  dualism.  Whatever its classification, however, any 
position which makes phenomenal properties an independent part of  the furniture of  
the universe forfeits the ontological and explanatory attractions of  physicalism (see 
§1.10).
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60 In (2006, p. 122), Stoljar endorses a more “abstract” view that phenomenal properties reduce to something we’re 
ignorant of  despite our knowledge of  physics, the precise nature of  which is unspecified—although categorical 
bases remain a candidate.
5.7. The “ability” hypothesis
This view, associated with David Lewis (1999b)and Laurence Nemirov (2007) holds that 
Mary learns what it’s like to see red, but does not thereby learn anything propositional.  
Rather she acquires new abilities: to imagine, remember and recognise colours.  Since 
abilities are not the sort of  thing that Mary could “deduce” from her physical 
knowledge, her acquiring them when she sees the rose would be unproblematic for the 
physicalist.  It seems common ground that experience does confer such abilities.  The 
question is whether that is all Mary would gain.  
One of  Lewis’s arguments for the ability hypothesis is that Mary’s learning 
something propositional would be inconsistent with physicalism (Lewis, 1999b, p. 277).  
While that argument is an instance of  a worthwhile schema—in general, expanding 
ontology counts against a view—it is not of  much help in the present context.  It also 
does not favour Lewis’s view over type-C physicalism.  (Lewis’s claim rests not on the 
APET, but on his extensionalist view of  information: in his view, learning a new 
description of  a known fact does not rule out any additional possibilities and so does 
not count as new information.)
There are independent reasons to think that abilities are not sufficient for knowing 
what it’s like.  For abilities can be had without being exercised: someone who has the 
ability to imagine red, but has never actually done so, does not know what it’s like to see 
red (Conee, 1994).  Similarly, the Nemirov-Lewis abilities are not necessary for knowing 
what it’s like: someone who is seeing red but lacks the ability to imaginatively recreate the 
experience still knows what it is like at the moment they see it (Alter, 1998). And as Loar 
points out, one can do things with phenomenal terms one cannot do with expressions of 
recognition.  One can use them hypothetically in modus ponens (an analogue of  the Frege-
Geach problem for non-cognitivism in meta-ethics); and one can apply them to other 
people.  For these reasons, I do not regard the ability hypothesis as promising.
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5.8. Indexical information
Alter (1998) suggests that it is implicit in the setup of  the Mary case that while in the 
black-and-white environment she learns only facts that can be communicated discursively, 
via lectures on her TV monitor.  Alter argues that these facts may not exhaust the 
physical facts.  In fact, Jackson did not originally specify that Mary learns from lectures; 
it is consistent with his original description of  her situation that she also learns from 
televised dissections, or even learns interactively by remotely directing keyhole surgery.  
It is true that he says in a follow-up paper that Mary learns from books and lectures 
(Jackson, 1986, p. 291).  But this seems inessential: all that matters is that she not see 
colours. 
Nonetheless, it is true that Mary gains only information that is learnable through 
third-person observation rather than from personal experience of  colour.  She might, 
therefore, lack indexical or de se information.  There is good reason to think such 
information is not deducible from third-person information: see (Lewis, 1979), (Perry, 
1979). Since physics is expressed in the third person, it follows that indexical 
information is not deducible from physics.  Nonetheless, having knowledge about who 
and where one is does not seem inconsistent with physicalism.  Indeed, it is plausible 
that such knowledge is merely a way of  redescribing the third-person facts: it seems to 
introduce no properties, relations or entities that do not also have third-person 
descriptions.
Perry (2001) argues that indexical knowledge is precisely what Mary gains when she 
sees the rose.  This information could not have been derived from her knowledge of  
physics, but it involves no non-physical phenomena.  
The difficulty this response faces is that giving Mary indexical knowledge does not 
seem to affect the intuition that she would learn something when she saw the rose.  An 
example based on (Lewis, 1999b) makes the point nicely. The day before Mary gets hold 
of  the rose, she might use her detailed knowledge of  the physical world to predict that a 
rose is about to be delivered, and thus that she will shortly see red.  That gives her an 
impeccably indexical, de se belief  about her very own phenomenal redness; but she still 
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has to wait until the next day to learn what seeing red is like.
The reason indexical information cannot help, I think, is this.  If  you know all the 
non-indexical facts but not the indexical ones, what you don’t know is your location in 
the world: where and perhaps when you are.  While there are an infinite number of  
indexical statements which turn on that information, they can all be inferred from the 
non-indexical facts together with your spatio-temporal location.  Who you are—which 
of  the people referred to in a complete third-person description of  the world is you—
can be inferred from “I am at location x” together with “[name] is at location x”.  After 
that it’s easy: “My brother is a bachelor”, for example, follows from “Adrian Boutel’s 
brother is a bachelor” and “I am Adrian Boutel”.
But Mary does not learn her identity and location when she sees the rose.  For one 
thing, nothing about the setup suggests she doesn’t know those things already.  But even 
stipulating that she doesn’t, you would hardly remedy that kind of  ignorance by showing 
her a rose.
Conversely, explicitly telling her who she is wouldn’t help with her ignorance of  the 
phenomenal.  It would simply restore the situation to the one described by Jackson, in 
which the knowledge gap yawns as big as ever.  One’s location seems, if  anything, less 
relevant to what it’s like to see red than which electromagnetic wavelengths roses reflect.  
Adding indexical information to the antecedent of  physicalist supervenience statements, 
as suggested in §4.2 above, does not make Mary’s inference seem any easier.
It’s true that Mary gains some new indexical knowledge when she sees the rose: she 
learns, for instance, that she is seeing red now.  But, as Lewis points out, that is new 
knowledge not because she’s learned who is seeing red, but because it was previously false 
(1999b, p. 268).  And as Lewis also points out, that sort of  learning hardly explains her 
acquiring phenomenal knowledge.  One can learn any tensed first-person indexical 
statement that way, including those which are not about experience at all.  No one 
thinks, for example, that learning from a road sign that one is 34 miles from London 
gives one information about a new kind of  experience.
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5.9. Conclusion
Each of  the possible explanations of  Mary’s new knowledge considered in this part fails.  
The suggestion that she gains new concepts might explain why Mary learns something 
when she sees the rose, but it leaves other, equally puzzling, aspects of  her post-rose 
knowledge unexplained.  The suggestion that she learns extra fundamental facts, though 
strictly consistent with physicalism, ought to be unpalatable to the physicalist.   
Phenomenal knowledge is propositional, not just knowledge-how.  And giving Mary 
indexical information does not change our intuition that she would learn something 
when she saw the rose.
None of  this to say that Mary would not gain new concepts or new abilities, or that 
phenomenal knowledge is not indexical.  All those suggestions are quite plausible.  But 
they do not answer the knowledge argument.
D. How Mary works it out
5.10. Introduction
The story so far.  Given that the APET is true, physicalism entails that Mary would not 
learn any new information about phenomena that supervene on physics (part B of  this 
chapter).  Nor should the physicalist say she learns something else, whether a different 
kind of  physicalistically acceptable information or something that isn’t information at all 
(part C).  So one premise of  the knowledge argument, that Mary would not learn 
anything if  physicalism is true, should be accepted.
The other premise of  the knowledge argument is the intuition that she would learn 
something when she saw the rose.  She would learn some information M that is 
expressible only in phenomenal terms (“what it’s like to...”), and which could not be 
deduced from her physical knowledge.  In the next two parts, I contest this premise.  In 
this part D, I show how the APET allows Mary to deduce phenomenal information.  In 
the next part, E, I offer some explanations of  why the premise is so intuitive.
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5.11. Denying the intuition
The claim that Mary would learn something is strongly supported by intuition.  We all 
know some physical, chemical and biological information, and that knowledge doesn’t 
seem to shed any light on what it’s like to see red.  Knowing all such information, and all 
its a priori consequences, seems to be just knowing more of  the same, and therefore no 
more help in deducing phenomenal information.
Still, one might wonder whether we really have an insight into Mary’s situation.  
Giving Mary knowledge of  P requires idealising her capacity for knowledge (see §4.3).  
And the claim that if  phenomenal information is physical, she can deduce it, entails that 
her reasoning capacity is idealised as well: it is only true if  she can draw all available a 
priori inferences from what she knows.  The result is that Mary is no longer one of  the 
“normal people”: she is vastly smarter, and knows vastly more, than any actual human.  
Someone like her would be much less familiar to us than Fred, her companion in 
(Jackson, 1982), who is no kind of  genius but sees an extra colour.  Perhaps, simply 
because she is so superhuman, our views about what she can and can’t work out for 
herself  are completely off  base (Dennett, 1991), (Dennett, 2007, p. 17).
But while the possibility that intuitions can lead us astray must be acknowledged, 
noting it only gets the physicalist so far.   Reasserting that thought experiments are 
fallible does not give us any clue how Mary would go about performing the impossible-
seeming inference.  In what follows, I give my argument that the intuition is wrong.
5.12. How Mary does it
The argument for the direct-reference-friendly APET shows how the phenomenal facts 
can be deduced from the facts of  physics, by appeal to the facts about the reference of  
phenomenal terms.  So let us suppose that Mary reasons in just that way: by using her 
knowledge of  P to deduce the co-reference of  phenomenal and physical-functional 
terms, and using that to deduce psychophysical identity and supervenience statements, 
and thence phenomenal information, including M, the information she supposedly gains 
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when she sees the rose.
That inference, though of  course humanly impossible, is logically quite 
straightforward.  The hard bit involves Mary’s confessedly superhuman knowledge of, 
and ability to reason about, physical-functional information.  The supposedly impossible 
move from physical-functional to phenomenal turns out to be relatively easy, requiring 
nothing more difficult than disquoting statements of  co-reference to get identity 
statements.
This account, as I see it, yields a clear and straightforward explanation of  how, if  
physicalism is true, someone in Mary’s position could deduce the phenomenal facts.  The 
deduction involves neither intuitively impossible steps nor knowledge outside P.  Since 
the knowledge argument depends on the intuition that no such deduction is possible, I 
take it that this account, if  correct, refutes that argument.  And it does so in type-C 
fashion: Mary’s deduction is complicated by, but possible despite, the analytic 
independence of  phenomenal terms from physical-functional vocabulary. 
Of  course, this account of  how Mary deduces the phenomenal facts depends on 
physicalism being true about phenomenal properties.  If  it is not, phenomenal terms don’t 
have physical-functional referents for her to deduce.  Is this begging the question?  No.  
Such a priori inferences were only ever going to be possible if  physicalism is true.  What 
this account shows is how, if  physicalism is true, Mary can deduce phenomenal 
information.  Not just that she can do it if  physicalism is true—that’s the APET—but 
how.  And that’s all that is needed to rebut the knowledge argument.  I don’t need to go 
on to show how Mary could deduce phenomenal information if  physicalism was false.  
She can’t deduce it if  physicalism is false.  
So the account I am giving does not establish that phenomenal properties are 
physical-functional.  But that’s as it should be.  The account isn’t intended as a positive 
argument for physicalism.  Its role is only to undercut the knowledge argument for 
dualism.   Positive support for physicalism comes from elsewhere.  (See part B of  
chapter 1.)
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E. Explaining the intuition
5.13. Introduction
But surely it can’t be so easy?  What about the immediate, powerful intuition that the 
deduction I am crediting Mary with is impossible?   In this last part of  the chapter I 
offer some explanations for this intuition.  First, I look at three reasons one might doubt 
Mary could deduce phenomenal information.  I argue that they are bad reasons, but their 
plausibility may still help explain our intuitive reaction.  Then I suggest that there is a 
natural tendency, when considering Mary’s situation, to focus on the physical-functional 
facts on which phenomenal properties would supervene, to the exclusion of  other 
physical-functional facts—including the crucial facts about the reference of  phenomenal 
terms.
These explanations of  the intuition do not compete—intuitions can be 
overdetermined.  And there may be others.  In particular, the suggestions canvassed in 
part C, though unsuccessful in explaining the knowledge gap, might still contribute to 
our intuitive reaction.
5.14. Reasons to doubt Mary can work it out
a) It’s not propositional after all
One source of  doubt that Mary could deduce phenomenal facts may be the idea that 
phenomenal knowledge cannot be captured by a phenomenal statement such as M, one 
which describes a fact using phenomenal terms.  Rather, what Mary gains is a kind of  
non-propositional knowledge about what it’s like to see red, often labeled 
“acquaintance”.   (Unlike the Nemirov-Lewis abilities discussed above, knowledge by 
acquaintance is not supposed to be knowledge-how.)  This suggestion will be taken up in 
chapter 8, dealing with a related objection to the phenomenal-concept strategy.  But for 
now I will observe that this view of  what Mary learns is quite friendly to physicalism, for 
the same reason the ability hypothesis is.   If  what Mary learns is not propositional, she 
can’t be expected to deduce it, a priori or otherwise, from P or anything else.  So it is no 
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problem for physicalism if  she learns it when she sees a rose.  See (Conee, 1994) for an 
argument to this effect.
b) The analytic-connection assumption
If  you assume that a priori implication requires analytic connections, there is a 
straightforward argument that Mary cannot deduce phenomenal information.  No 
amount of  knowledge of  physics can remedy the absence of  a “conceptual hook” 
linking phenomenal terms to physical-functional ones.
As the quotes from Chalmers and from Jackson at the end of  the discussion of  the 
APET (§4.9 above) illustrate, when people do make explicit statements about why 
deductions like Mary’s are impossible, they tend to appeal to analytic independence.  The 
assumption also seems implicit in many other responses to Mary, including Jackson’s 
own claim that “it is very hard to believe that [Mary’s] lack of  knowledge could be 
remedied merely by her explicitly following through enough logical consequences of  her 
vast physical knowledge” (Jackson, 1986, p. 292).  The appeal of  the analytic-connection 
assumption is not limited to dualists; type-B physicalists cite it too.  Loar, for example, 
argues that Mary learns something precisely because phenomenal concepts and physical-
functional concepts are “conceptually independent” (Loar, 1998, p. 600). 
But (as Dennett stresses) we don’t know what Mary knows.  Nor are we perfect 
reasoners like her.  Our predictions about what she can infer must therefore appeal to 
general features of  the implications; and the lack of  analytic connections is the obvious 
candidate.
Intuitively, moreover, analytic independence plausibly explains why physical-
functional information appears irrelevant to phenomenal information, like photography 
to digestion.  If  we aren’t disposed to judge information irrelevant when there is no 
overlap in content, when would we be?  So it seems quite likely that the analytic-
connection assumption is at work in both intuitive and reasoned responses to Mary.  
Nonetheless, the account above explains why analytic connections are not, in fact, 
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required.
c) Intuition of  distinctness
Another reason one might think Mary’s inference impossible is simple scepticism that 
phenomenal terms could refer to physical-functional properties.  Such scepticism might 
be an effect of  what Papineau calls the “intuition of  distinctness”, a native dualist 
intuition that phenomenal properties are not physical-functional properties.  Or it might 
be an after-effect of  the original intuitive reaction to Mary.  In any event, since such 
dualism is the conclusion of  the knowledge argument, it would be circular to invoke it to 
defend against a suggested method of  bridging the gap.
5.15. Local supervenience statements
I suggest that the most important reason we are convinced Mary cannot make the 
deduction is that we are, for quite natural reasons, looking in the wrong place for the 
information she needs.
What the APET makes a priori are global supervenience statements, implications in 
which the antecedent is a complete statement of  the supervenience base.  But the 
“global” is important.  The APET leaves local supervenience statements, relating a 
phenomenal fact to the particular lower-level facts on which it supervenes, a posteriori.  
This is because, like psychophysical identity statements, such local supervenience 
statements do not contain the needed information about the reference of  phenomenal 
terms.  So Mary cannot infer the phenomenal facts a priori from knowledge about 
phenomenal properties themselves, or knowledge of  how they supervene on physical 
phenomena.  She needs to know some further facts, about phenomenal terms and the 
relations that connect them to phenomenal properties.
But when we think about Mary’s physical knowledge, we naturally think of  her 
understanding of  human colour vision.  This is hardly unreasonable: we can’t think of  
everything she knows, and even if  we could we’d have to disregard most of  it (about, 
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say, planet formation) as irrelevant.  Focusing on her knowledge of  colour vision seems 
an obvious triage.  And we are helped in this direction: descriptions of  Mary’s 
knowledge in the literature, when they go beyond generalities about her having all the 
physical information, tend to point the reader to her knowledge of  human optical 
processes.  Chalmers, for example, summarises Mary’s knowledge as “everything there is 
to know about the neural processes involved in visual information processing, about the 
physics of  optical processes, and about the physical makeup of  objects in the 
environment” (Chalmers, 1996, p. 103). Alter gives Mary “everything in the completed 
science of  color vision” (Alter, 2007, p. 4). Nemirov gives Mary “everything science can 
ever teach about colour vision” (Nemirov, 2007).  And so on.
Yet knowledge of  colour vision, including knowledge of  its phenomenal properties 
(expressed in physical-functional terms) and the neural phenomena on which they 
supervene, is not enough.  To perform the deduction, Mary still needs to know that they 
are the properties to which phenomenal terms refer—and that is a fact about the terms 
which cannot be learned by looking at the properties alone.  Here analytic independence 
frustrates her.  If, as Kripke suggests, “water”, is associated with a description of  the 
watery role, one can learn that water is H2O (or perhaps more naturally, that H2O is 
water) by learning the physical-functional facts about H2O and noticing that it satisfies 
the watery role.  By contrast, physical-functional knowledge about phenomenal 
properties cannot play the same role in learning the reference of  phenomenal concepts.  
Mary cannot infer from her knowledge of  physics that some physical-functional 
property behaves in the right way to count as phenomenal redness.  For all she knows a 
priori, there is no such right way to behave.
For the same reason, knowledge of  the intrinsic nature of  phenomenal concepts, 
including the neuro-physiological nature of  their realisers, won’t do the trick either.   
What Mary needs is information about the reference-fixing relations between 
phenomenal terms and phenomenal properties.
Because local supervenience statements are a posteriori, Mary cannot deduce 
phenomenal facts from the facts on which they supervene and to which they are 
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physically reducible.  Knowing all those facts about human colour vision leaves it an 
open question whether and which phenomenal terms apply.  Mary, of  course, has more 
knowledge than that—but her extra knowledge seems, to we mortals, intuitively 
irrelevant.
In fairness, Jackson may have given his original Mary the relevant knowledge.  
While she “specialises in the neurophysiology of  vision”, he also gives her knowledge of 
what happens to cause terms like “red” and “blue” to be uttered (1982, p. 130).  That 
sort of  information might, if  an appropriate causal account of  reference holds, give 
Mary the knowledge of  reference she needs to perform the deduction.  But Jackson’s 
description is in terms which suggest knowledge of  neuro-physical and biomechanical 
processes; he does not mention semantics.  In any event nothing more is made of  the 
point, and it does not reappear in (Jackson, 1986).
I have a further suggestion as to why we might be reluctant to ascribe Mary the 
relevant semantic knowledge: it seems too close to what she is being asked to infer.  
Mary obviously cannot be expressly given information about the physical-functional 
nature of  phenomenal properties: whether such information exists is just what’s in 
question.  But ascribing to her the knowledge that “what it’s like to see red” co-refers 
with a particular physical-functional term seems just as bad.  She could hardly know that 
and not figure out the identity!  So, I suspect, we do not imagine her knowing the 
physical-functional reference of  phenomenal terms, and thereby deprive her of  the 
premise she needs to deduce phenomenal information. 
Of  course Mary does know about the co-reference, if  physicalism is true.  And there 
is no circularity in ascribing her that knowledge, as long as the ascription is conditional 
in the same way: Mary knows the physical-functional reference of  phenomenal concepts 
if  phenomenal properties are physical-functional properties.  The ascription has to be 
conditional because if  dualism is true, knowledge of  the reference of  phenomenal 
concepts is non-physical knowledge, and  Mary can’t have any of  that.  So Mary cannot 
simply be given knowledge of  the reference of  phenomenal concepts, without regard to 
the truth of  physicalism.  But that conditional ascription is all that is needed to explain 
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how, if  physicalism is true, Mary could deduce the phenomenal facts.
5.16. Beyond intuitions—why Mary’s deduction really is hard
I suspect these considerations are together sufficient to explain our intuitive reaction to 
Mary.  But whatever the source of  our intuitions, analytic independence marks a real 
epistemic difference between psychophysical supervenience statements and those to 
which the “water” model applies.  If  phenomenal terms are analytically independent, 
local psychophysical supervenience statements are a posteriori, and phenomenal 
statements cannot be deduced from P via conceptual analysis of  their phenomenal 
terms.  There are no Lewis-style analyticities such as “pain is the property which causally 
mediates bodily damage and avoidance behaviour”.  Rather, phenomenal statements 
have to be deduced from empirical premises about reference.
This does not just make things more difficult for Mary.  It also affects our own 
research strategies.  On the one hand, we cannot use conceptual analysis to help us 
locate the physical-functional bases of  phenomenal properties, as we could if, e.g., 
analytic functionalism were true.  As Jackson argues, conceptual analysis is a great help in 
knowing what we’re looking for in any physicalist investigation (1998, p. 30).  Conversely, 
finding some physical-functional role associated with pain will always leave an “open 
question” about whether the phenomenon which plays that role is pain, or merely 
correlated with it.  We cannot say that playing that role is what we mean by “pain”, the 
way being the transparent, potable, etc. liquid around here is what we mean by “water”, 
so that there is no sensible question about whether what plays that role is pain.  This 
problem will be discussed further in chapter 7, concerning the explanatory gap 
argument. 
In fact, from our point of  view rather than Mary’s, without analytic connections the 
a priori deducibility of  phenomenal information from physics makes very little difference 
at all.  One would hardly expect the APET to provide a shortcut to phenomenal 
knowledge (humanly impossible antecedent and all), but one might think it would 
provide, in principle, an alternative line of  inquiry.  But given the unavailability of  
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conceptual analysis, discovering the physical-functional nature of  phenomenal properties 
involves the same investigation whether the APET is true or false.  Either way, we must 
find the physical-functional basis of  phenomenal properties in purely empirical ways.  
All the APET gives us is the option of  pursuing the same empirical inquiries by first 
learning all of  fundamental physics.
5.17. Conclusion
To sum up: the direct-reference friendly account of  the APET shows how Mary could 
deduce the phenomenal facts, without appeal to implausible physical-functional analyses 
of  phenomenal terms. That inference intuitively seems impossible because of  the (real) 
analytic independence of  phenomenal terms, together with the (false) assumption that 
analytic connections are required for a priori implication, and the natural inclination to 
look to local supervenience bases.  Analytic independence creates a genuine epistemic 
distinction between phenomenal knowledge and other kinds of  knowledge, which the 
knowledge argument highlights, but it does not make a priori implication impossible.  
This view of  Mary’s situation has all the virtues of  type-B physicalism—its acceptance 
of  analytic independence and its explanation of  why inferring phenomenal facts is 
peculiarly difficult—without the vice of  accepting brute necessities.
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6. The conceivability argument
A. Introduction
The conceivability argument, associated primarily with David Chalmers (1996, 2010), 
targets physicalist supervenience directly.  It aims to show that facts of  physics do not 
fix the phenomenal facts, by establishing that there are possible worlds in which the 
phenomenal facts are different from those in our world, while the physical facts remain 
the same.  If  such worlds are possible, then physicalist supervenience fails, and with it 
physicalism.
The argument seeks to show that worlds are possible by appealing to their 
conceivability.  We can, so it is said, conceive of  scenarios involving the same physical facts 
as the actual world, but in which the phenomenal facts are different.61  
These scenarios typically involve “zombies”—beings who are physically just like us, 
but who have no phenomenal properties—or “inverts”—beings physically just like us, 
but whose phenomenal properties are different from ours.  In general, zombies and 
inverts raise the same issues.  I will talk about zombies unless distinguishing the two is 
necessary.  The conceivability of  such scenarios is said to show that they are coherent, 
and so that they describe possible worlds.
My strategy in this chapter replicates that of  the previous one.  I argue in part B 
that the APET explains why the central intuition—here, that zombie scenarios are 
conceivable—poses a problem for physicalism, while at the same time explaining why 
that intuition goes wrong if  physicalism is true (part C).  In part D I offer an explanation 
of  why it seems that such scenarios are conceivable, thanks to (i) the analytic 
independence of  phenomenal terms from physical-functional terms, (ii) our practical 
inability to conceive of  all the facts of  physics, and (iii) our tendency to focus on local  
zombie scenarios—such as our own zombie twins—which are genuinely (if  still not 
practically) conceivable.  Again, this type-C response has the virtues of  the type-B 
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61 As mentioned in §1.19(a) above, I take a “scenarios” here as linguistic items: statements describing 
(purportedly) possible states of  affairs.  If  a state of  affairs is described using multiple statements, they can be 
treated as conjoined.
response (primarily the rejection of  implausible analytic connections) without needing to 
claim that “zombies are impossible” is a brute necessity.
B. From conceivability to possibility
6.1. The route via the APET
The claim that we can conceive of  scenarios involving zombies is intuitively very 
plausible (Chalmers, 1996, p. 96).  A few philosophers have questioned it—for example 
Robert Kirk (2008).  But the view is shared by type-B physicalists, who accept that 
zombie scenarios are conceivable, but deny that they are possible.
The conceivability of  such creatures is not, on its face, inconsistent with 
physicalism.  Physicalism claims that worlds which are physically identical to, but 
phenomenally different from, our own are impossible.  But it does not explicitly claim 
that our imaginations are limited by what is metaphysically possible.  If  the conceivability 
argument is to refute physicalism, then, its proponents must show that the conceivability 
of  zombies entails their possibility.   This is the step denied by type-B physicalists, and it 
is what much of  the debate has focused on.
As with the knowledge argument, however, the required bridge between epistemic 
and modal status can be supplied by the APET, given a few clarifications of  the 
scenarios and of  the notion of  conceivability in play.
6.2. Revealing the role of  the APET
a) Clarifying zombie scenarios
First, describing zombies as “physically” just like us raises the same issue of  potential 
circularity as ascribing to Mary all the “physical” information (§5.1).  If  phenomenal 
properties are physical properties of  humans, then unconscious beings are not physically 
identical to humans.   Defining a zombie as “physically” identical to a conscious human 
then begs the question against physicalism.
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This problem is avoided if  zombies are defined as being like us in respect of  
phenomena described by physics.  Chalmers describes my zombie twin as “molecule for 
molecule identical to me […] identical in all the low-level physical properties postulated 
by a completed physics”; Kirk calls it a “particle-for-particle duplicate” (Chalmers, 1996, 
p. 94), (Kirk, 2005, p. 3).
As Chalmers notes, zombies so described will also be just like us in respect of  
everything which supervenes on those fundamental components.  So they will be 
chemically and biologically just like us.  Chalmers claims they will even be behaviourally 
and functionally the same as us.  But, as required, the definition leaves open the question 
of  whether such beings would be like us phenomenally.
Second, two kinds of  zombie scenario need to be distinguished: global zombie 
scenarios, which describe a complete physical duplicate of  our world; and local scenarios, 
which describe something less than that.  A local zombie scenario might, for example, 
describe a particular zombie and the phenomena of  physics on which the zombie 
supervenes. 
Only global zombie scenarios are relevant to the status of  physicalism.  As 
explained in §1.8 (and as discussed in the previous chapter), physicalism is not 
committed to local supervenience.  So a local zombie scenario, in which only a subset of 
the facts of  physics are the same as the actual facts, will not provide a counter-example 
to physicalism even if  the scenario is possible.  A global zombie scenario, by contrast, 
would provide such a potential counterexample.  A global zombie scenario describes all 
the facts of  physics, and so is an instance of  “P & ~Q”, where once again P is a 
statement of  all the actual facts of  physics and Q is an arbitrary phenomenal truth.  If  
there is a possible world of  which “P & ~Q” is true, then the global supervenience 
statement “P ! Q” is not necessary, and physicalism is false.
It’s worth stressing that global zombie scenarios must replicate all the actual facts of 
physics.  That includes the facts at all times: past and future as well as the present 
moment.  That is why zombies must share our behaviour, described physical-
functionally, as well as our momentary physical states.  It also raises a troubling (for the 
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dualist) implication that phenomenal properties are physical-functionally epiphenomenal, 
since their removal makes no difference to future physical-functional facts.  See 
(Shoemaker, 1975).
It’s also worth stressing that global zombie scenarios replicate the actual facts of  
physics.  A completely described, purely physical scenario whose inhabitants lack 
phenomenal properties is not a global zombie scenario—unless its physical facts are our 
physical facts.  Otherwise it does not provide a counterexample to physicalist 
supervenience.
Now, we ordinary mortals can’t conceive of  P— we haven’t finished physics yet 
and anyway it’s far too long—so idealisation is again required.  The conceiver must not 
only have superhuman knowledge and imaginative capacity, they must also be ideally 
rational: able to discern any inconsistencies in a scenario, no matter how subtle or 
obscure.  Such an ideal conceiver would, for example, never have found Frege’s Basic 
Law V conceivable, even though its paradoxical implications escaped Frege himself.
If  such idealisation is illegitimate, it is not possible to conceive of  a global zombie 
scenario, and the APET cannot support the conceivability argument.  Even conceiving 
of  a particle-by-particle duplicate of  a single human would seem to be beyond our actual 
powers, however, so without some degree of  idealisation no zombie scenarios are 
conceivable at all—and the conceivability argument cannot get off  the ground.
 
b) Clarifying conceivability
Now, since global zombie scenarios are instances of  “P & ~Q”, the APET implies that if 
physicalism is true, they are false a priori.  Would that also make them inconceivable?  
Yes.  Setting aside the contingent a priori, which I return to in part C, a scenario which is 
a priori false cannot be coherently imagined: an ideally rational conceiver would be unable 
to imagine it true.  
This connection between a priori status and conceivability is common ground. 
Chalmers calls a scenario which can be ruled out by a priori reasoning “negatively” 
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inconceivable (2010, p. 144).  Conversely, scenarios that cannot be so ruled out are 
negatively conceivable.  Such scenarios might be a priori true or just a posteriori.
Chalmers distinguishes negative conceivability from “positive” conceivability, which 
is the intuitively more familiar, but philosophically more obscure, notion of  imagining that 
a statement is true.  What exactly positive conceiving involves is not clear.  Chalmers 
discusses the notion at length in (Chalmers, 2002), but does not claim to be able to 
replace the intuitive notion of  imagining with a rigorous account.  At least, however, 
positive conceivability requires that it be possible to fill in arbitrary details of  the 
scenario, without either generating an inconsistency or discovering, on reflection, that 
the state of  affairs was initially misdescribed (p. 153).
The distinction between negative and positive conceivability is relevant if  one 
thinks that zombies are negatively conceivable but not positively conceivable  (For 
example, Eric Marcus (2004) suggests that we can negatively, but not positively, conceive 
of  the absence of  consciousness.)  Chalmers ultimately concludes that positive and 
negative conceivability are extensionally equivalent, and I tend to agree.  But even if  they 
are not, it is at least clear no scenario which is negatively inconceivable will be positively 
conceivable.  As Chalmers says, “If  [scenario] S can be ruled out a priori, then no 
coherent imagined situation will verify S” (2010, p. 148).  So if, as I argue, the APET 
makes global zombie scenarios negatively inconceivable, there is no need to address the 
less tractable question of  whether they are positively conceivable.
The need for idealisation in global zombie scenarios opens up the possibility that 
they might be only apparently or prima facie conceivable.  It might be, that is, that the 
reason global zombie scenarios are inconsistent is beyond the ken of  we ordinary 
knowers and reasoners, so that the scenarios look conceivable to us.  In part D of  this 
chapter I argue that that is indeed the position, and that this helps explain the intuition 
of  conceivability.  
Given those clarifications, the APET licences the move from the conceivability of  
global zombie scenarios to the possibility of  zombie worlds.  Physicalism is committed 
to “P ! Q” being a necessary truth, and so to the impossibility of  zombie worlds.  The 
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APET means “P ! Q” must also be a priori; but if  it is, then global zombie scenarios are 
inconceivable.  By modus tollens, if  global zombie scenarios are conceivable, physicalism is 
false. 
6.3. Chalmers’s two-dimensional route from conceivability to possibility
Chalmers, by contrast, gets from conceivability to possibility a different way.  He appeals 
to modal rationalism for the point that every coherently conceivable scenario 
corresponds to a possible world (2010, p. 184ff).  He deals with Kripkean a posteriori 
necessities, which might be thought to provide counter-examples, by distinguishing two 
types of  conceivability and possibility, using the two-dimensional framework.  A posteriori 
necessities are counter-conceivable and possible in the “primary” sense, but neither 
counter-conceivable nor possible in the “secondary” sense.  The two senses are spelled 
out, using Chalmers’s version of  the two-dimensional framework, as follows.
• A scenario is primarily conceivable if  it can be conceived of  as actual: that is, as 
a true description of  the actual world.  An important consequence of  conceiving a 
scenario in this way is that terms used in it, including rigid terms, can refer to things 
other than their actual referents.  So, for example, “water is XYZ” is primarily 
conceivable, because the a posteriori facts that fix the reference of  “water” can be 
varied by, say, conceiving of  Twin Earth as the actual world.
• A scenario is secondarily conceivable if  it is conceivable as a counterfactual, as a 
description of  how the world might have been but isn’t.  In secondary conceiving 
the reference of  any rigid terms is fixed, as usual, according to the facts in the 
actual world.  So “water is XYZ” is not secondarily conceivable.  
There is then a notion of  possibility corresponding to each notion of  
conceivability:
• A scenario is primarily possible if  there is a possible world which is described 
by the scenario conceived of  as actual.
• A scenario is secondarily possible if  there is a possible world which is 
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described by the scenario conceived of  as counterfactual.  
On this view, modal rationalism claims that every primarily conceivable scenario is 
primarily possible, and every secondarily conceivable scenario is secondarily possible.  
Since neither primary possibility nor primary conceivability depend on a posteriori facts 
about reference, Chalmers claims, they are both a priori matters.  On the other hand both 
secondary possibility and secondary conceivability can be a posteriori (Chalmers, 2010, p. 
145ff). 
This framework allows Chalmers to believe in both modal rationalism and a 
posteriori necessities.  But there is still work to be done.  The type-B physicalist claims that 
impossibility of  zombies is a posteriori.  So he can allow that they are primarily possible.  
To rule out type-B physicalism, Chalmers needs a way to get from the primary 
conceivability of  zombie scenarios to their secondary possibility.
Chalmers’s answer is to claim that if  “P & ~Q” is primarily conceivable then it is 
also secondarily conceivable, and so secondarily possible.  He claims that the physical 
terms in P and the phenomenal terms in Q are “epistemically rigid”: their reference does 
not depend on a posteriori facts about the actual world.  So it makes no difference 
whether P and Q are conceived of  as actual or counterfactual.
Now epistemic rigidity is a species of  semantic stability, and the reasons given in 
chapter 3 for denying that phenomenal terms are semantically stable apply to epistemic 
rigidity as well.  But for scenarios which include P, Chalmers need not rely on epistemic 
rigidity.62  As discussed in chapter 4, according to the type-C physicalist, P fixes all the 
reference-fixing facts.  And for the reasons given in that chapter, it does so a priori.  So 
for global scenarios the distinction between primary and secondary conceivability 
collapses.  “P & water is XYZ” is not even primarily conceivable, because P fixes the 
reference of  “water” as H2O.  Similarly, according to the APET-friendly physicalist, for 
“P & ~Q”: any a posteriori facts on which the reference of  phenomenal terms in Q 
depends are specified by P.  So the APET-friendly physicalist, at least, cannot deny that 
if  global zombie scenarios are conceivable, they are possible.
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62 As Chalmers himself  recognises at (2010, p. 153), though for somewhat different reasons.
C. The inconceivability of  zombies
So, because I accept the APET, I accept that if  global zombie scenarios are conceivable, 
they are possible.  To defend physicalism, therefore, I must argue that zombies are 
inconceivable.  How is that to be done, in the face of  their apparent conceivability?
The explanation of  the inconceivability of  zombies, like that of  how Mary deduces 
the phenomenal facts, straightforwardly follows the argument for the direct-reference 
friendly APET.  The conjunction “P & ~Q” is inconceivable because, if  physicalism is 
true, P tells us about the reference of  terms, including the physical-functional reference 
of  the phenomenal terms in Q.  Given that information, one can deduce a 
psychophysical identity statement for each phenomenal term in Q.  (I take it Mary would 
have a physical-functional term for each of  the physical-functional phenomena she 
knows about; if  not, she can coin one.)  And the truth of  such identity statements is 
inconsistent with there being differences in the phenomenal facts without differences in 
the physical-functional facts.
For example, let Q be “someone feels pain”.  Knowing P allows you to deduce that 
the phenomenal term “pain” and the physical-functional term “C-fibre stimulation” co-
refer.  From that, it follows that “pain is C-fibre stimulation” is true.  Finally, P tells you 
that there is some C-fibre stimulation.  Given all that, conceiving of  “P & ~Q” requires 
that one conceive of  the self-contradictory conjunction “pain is C-fibre stimulation and 
there is C-fibre stimulation but no pain”.
Thus, global zombie scenarios are negatively inconceivable, if  physicalism is true.  
Again, that conditional claim is all I need to establish, for the reasons given in the 
discussion of  the knowledge argument (see §5.12).  
This, I think, discharges the burden Chalmers (1996, p. 96) places on “those who 
claim that a given description is logically impossible”—the duty to give “some idea of  
where the contradiction lies, whether explicit or implicit.”  I will not quibble with that 
assignment of  the burden of  proof.  To be sure, the overall burden is on Chalmers here, 
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since it is his premise whose truth is in question.  But, as he notes, proving that 
something is coherent is difficult.  And one might in fairness grant that the apparent 
conceivability of  zombies is enough to create a presumption that they are genuinely 
conceivable.
At any rate, whether or not the burden is properly on the physicalist, it is better to 
discharge it than argue about where it lies.  And I take it that the argument in the 
previous section has done just that, by showing how the APET makes global zombie 
scenarios incoherent, if  physicalism is true.
Now, it does so in type-C fashion, without appealing to analytic connections 
between phenomenal terms and physical-functional terms.  So it does not satisfy 
Chalmers’s suggestion that the physicalist needs to show the inconsistency in zombie 
scenarios via an “analysis of  the terms in question” (1996, p. 96).  That request I take as 
a manifestation of  the analytic-connection assumption, and so politely decline.
A couple of  supplementary points may be helpful.  First, regarding the contingent 
a priori.  If  Kripke is right that such a beast exists, then a scenario which is a priori false 
might nonetheless be possible.  (“The metre stick is two metres long” would be an 
example.)  Might global zombie scenarios have that status?  If  so, it would be bad news 
for physicalism.
As far as I know, no dualist has argued that that zombie scenarios are possible 
despite being a priori false of  the actual world.  But if  they did, the type-C physicalist has 
a response.  Assuming the Kripkean account of  the contingent a priori, such a scenario 
would be true in worlds where the facts which (in the actual world) fix the reference of  
rigid terms are different.  And according to the physicalist, P fixes all the reference-fixing 
facts.  (If  it does not, then we need another argument for zombie scenarios being a priori 
false.)   It follows that P is false of  any world in which the reference-fixing facts are 
different, which means that world is not a counterexample to physicalist supervenience.
And one further clarification.  It may seem, from the stress I placed on the notion 
that zombie scenarios must contain the actual facts of  physics, that the problem with 
zombie worlds is extrinsic—something to do with their relation to the actual world.  But 
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not so: at least on my account, global zombie scenarios are incoherent all by themselves.  
P and Q are inconsistent a priori—and would be even if  the facts of  physics in the actual 
world were different.
Note in particular that the contents of  P do not vary according as different worlds 
are considered as actual.  The actual facts of  physics take us from the description 
“complete statement of  the actual facts of  physics” to P itself, but P does not inherit the 
“actually” operator: it describes a definite set of  physical facts.  
Of  course, if  some other world is conceived of  as actual, the reference of  terms in 
P and Q might shift.  But they would shift together, since P specifies the reference of  
phenomenal terms in physical-functional terms.  So co-referring physical-functional and 
phenomenal terms will continue to co-refer, and “P & ~Q” will never be made true.
It remains to explain the apparent conceivability of  zombies.  To that I now turn.
D. The apparent conceivability of  zombies
I have argued that the intuition that global zombie scenarios are conceivable is wrong.  
But, like the intuition that Mary learns something when she sees the rose, it is supported 
by correct intuitions about related scenarios.  In this part I explain what is right about 
the intuition that zombies are conceivable, and thereby explain its plausibility.
6.4. Zombie scenarios are prima facie conceivable.
Arguing in support of  the conceivability of  zombies, Chalmers, reasonably enough, 
appeals to their prima facie conceivability.  As he says:
I confess that the logical possibility of  zombies seems […] obvious to me.  A 
zombie is just something physically identical to me, but which has no conscious 
experience—all is dark inside.  While this is probably empirically impossible, it 
certainly seems that a coherent situation is described; I can discern no 
contradiction in the description.  (Chalmers, 1996, p. 96)
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Now, Chalmers acknowledges that this sort of  introspection demonstrates only that 
zombies are prima facie conceivable.  But the apparent conceivability of  zombies is clear, 
and it would be bad news for me if  my account entailed that the idea of  zombies 
contained an obvious inconsistency.
Happily, it does not.  Genuine global zombie scenarios include P, the complete 
statement of  the actual facts of  physics.  By contrast, the following does not constitute a 
global zombie scenario: 
“The facts of  physics are the same as the actual facts of  physics, but no one is 
phenomenally conscious.”
There is no a priori contradiction in that statement.  A contradiction arises only when the 
actual facts of  physics are spelt out, as they are in P.  The phrase “the actual facts of  
physics” does not tell you what the actual facts of  physics are, and so does not contain 
the information needed to determine the reference of  phenomenal terms.  To rule out 
the quoted statement one would have to do the a posteriori investigation required to learn 
the facts of  physics. Accordingly, the quoted statement is genuinely negatively 
conceivable.  It is also positively conceivable, in the sense that arbitrary further details of 
the scenario can be specified without producing incoherence—though only primarily so.  
(The distinction between primary and secondary conceivability is explained in §6.3 
above.)  Nothing rules out there being a complete and coherent set of  physical facts 
which, if  they were actual, would make the quoted statement true.  It is not, however, 
secondarily positively conceivable, since conceiving of  it secondarily requires filling in the 
details using the actual facts of  physics, thereby generating an inconsistent “P & ~Q” 
scenario.
And of  course without ideal knowledge of  the facts of  physics, it is only 
statements like the quoted one that we can actually conceive.  We can supplement the 
scenario with what limited physical knowledge we do have, but of  course that does not 
include the critical knowledge of  the reference of  phenomenal terms.  Mary can 
conceive of  genuine global zombie scenarios; we mortals cannot.  So we are forced to 
use statements like the quoted one as proxies for genuine zombie scenarios.  And we can 
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discern no contradiction in such proxies because there is none.  
To be sure, there is also an intuition that however we fill in the missing physical 
facts, we will not generate an inconsistency, because phenomenal terms are in principle 
irrelevant to physical-functional descriptions.  As explained in the discussion of  the 
knowledge argument, I believe this sort of  intuition is a manifestation of  the analytic-
connection assumption.  See, e.g., (Chalmers, 2010, p. 155).  As before, the argument 
from the direct-reference-friendly APET explains why the assumption, and thus the 
intuition, is wrong.
6.5. Local zombie scenarios are genuinely conceivable
When Chalmers (1996) argues that zombie scenarios are conceivable, he appeals to local 
zombie scenarios—ones that specify less than all of  the facts of  physics.  (His 
restatement of  the argument in (Chalmers, 2010) deals with full-blown “P & ~Q” 
scenarios, but he does not separately argue for their conceivability.)
The main local scenario Chalmers considers is a “zombie twin”—an individual who 
is physically identical to a normal human but whose experiences lack phenomenal 
properties.  To motivate the reader to agree that zombie twins are conceivable, though, 
he also appeals to the apparent conceivability of  various similar scenarios.  In particular, 
he points to Block’s (1978) “Chinese nation” thought experiment—wherein a network 
of  people replicate the functional organisation of  a human brain—and to “silicon 
isomorphs”, beings whose brains are functionally organised like ours, but in whom the 
neuron role is played by silicon switches.
Chalmers claims that, whether or not such beings would be conscious if  
constructed, it is at least coherent to imagine that they are not.  So nation-zombies or 
silicon-zombies are conceivable.  And a zombie twin is just such a being with its 
functional components replaced by a certain kind of  cell.  Substituting neurons for 
silicon switches or Chinese people in the scenarios does not seem to introduce any 
incoherence.
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Local zombie scenarios will be apparently conceivable for at least the same reason 
global zombie scenarios are: we mortals cannot entertain a complete physical description 
of  any individual.  So we are forced to use descriptions of  zombie twin scenarios as 
proxies:  statements like “there is a particle-for-particle duplicate of  me who lacks 
phenomenal consciousness”.  And those statements contain no a priori contradiction, 
because they do not specify the physical facts involved.  No amount of  reflection on 
such statements will reveal a contradiction.
Unlike global zombie scenarios, however, zombie twins, unconscious Chinese 
Nations and silicon isomorphs are genuinely conceivable (subject to a qualification to be 
noted in the next section).  For all these scenarios are local: they include only the 
physical-functional facts relating to a single individual.  For the reasons discussed in 
§5.15, the APET does not make local supervenience statements a priori.  Since 
phenomenal terms and physical-functional terms are analytically independent, such 
statements will not be a priori without the information about reference supplied by P.
So even if  an idealised me knew all my physical properties, and included them in 
the scenario—that is, if  I could conceive of  my zombie twin in specific physical terms, 
rather than just as “my zombie twin”—there would still be no a priori contradiction.  
Give my zombie twin all my C-fibre stimulations and it is still conceivable that he feels 
no pain.  The APET yields no a priori inconsistency in local scenarios.
Compare a local zombie scenario with a scenario such as “there is someone 
physically just like me but who has only nine fingers”.  That, too, contains no a priori 
contradiction: it is not a priori that I have ten fingers.  (Nor is it necessary: slightly worse 
luck with a motorcycle and I wouldn’t.)  But once the a posteriori physical facts about me 
are specified, in particular the facts about my shape and constitution, one can deduce a 
priori that I have ten fingers—thanks to the analytic association of  “finger” with a certain 
kind of  protrusion.  And so one cannot consistently assert both that I have those 
physical features and that I have nine fingers.  In the absence of  such analytic 
connections between “pain” and physical-functional facts, however, there is no a priori 
inconsistency in the notion of  my having a zombie twin.
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Indeed, my zombie twin is positively conceivable, in the sense that I can fill in 
arbitrary physical details of  the world in which he lives.  Crucially, of  course, I can’t fill 
in those details using the actual facts of  physics, or I will have introduced P into the 
scenario, and so made it inconsistent with ~Q.  But nothing stops me completing the 
scenario using a counterfactual physics with different implications for the reference of  
phenomenal terms.  The same goes for merely functional duplicates like the Chinese 
Nation or silicon isomorphs.  If  they are described in local scenarios, they remain 
negatively, and primarily positively, conceivable.  
The physicalist may well want to say all these scenarios are impossible.  If  
phenomenal properties supervene on physical properties, and the relevant property 
instances are located inside the body, then my zombie twin is impossible.  If  
phenomenal properties are functional properties, then unconscious Chinese nations and 
silicon isomorphs are impossible.  But those impossibilities are a posteriori, and so the 
scenarios remain conceivable.
6.6. A qualification
I said above that local zombie scenarios are genuinely conceivable.  But it’s not 
implausible that the reference of  my phenomenal terms is fixed by physical-functional 
facts inside me.  If  so, then a zombie twin scenario will duplicate the reference-
determining facts.  And then my zombie twin will not be conceivable: the description of  
the scenario implies a priori that “pain” refers to C-fibre stimulation, so I cannot 
consistently imagine that I have a zombie twin with C-fibre stimulations but not pains.
Still, detecting the contradiction requires knowing the facts that fix the reference of 
my phenomenal terms.  That knowledge is not a priori; it is not even a priori that the 
relevant facts are inside my head.  (Perhaps they have a teleosemantic component which 
depends on facts about my ancestry.)  So there is no way to detect the contradiction by 
reflecting on a proxy scenario like “there is a being physically just like me who feels no 
pain.”  The contradiction will remain invisible pending a great deal of  a posteriori 
knowledge.  Mary would see that zombie twins are inconceivable, but we cannot.  So 
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zombie twin scenarios are at least prima facie conceivable.
Note that this qualification applies only to the zombie twin scenario: it does not 
affect psychophysical identity statements, or local supervenience statements concerning 
only phenomenal properties, not entire people.  (Strictly, it also applies only to my 
zombie twin.  Your zombie twin remains conceivable to me, even given complete physical 
knowledge about your insides, since the reference of  my phenomenal terms is unlikely 
to be determined by facts inside your head.)
6.7. Conclusion
As with the knowledge argument, then, the direct-reference-friendly APET explains how 
the claim which matters to physicalism—here, that global zombie scenarios are 
inconceivable—can be true.  It does so in type-C fashion, without appealing to 
implausible physical-functional analyses of  phenomenal terms.  At the same time, the 
absence of  analytic connections between phenomenal and physical-functional terms 
explains, as it does for the type-B materialist, why related scenarios are conceivable, and 
why even global zombie scenarios seem conceivable.
6.8. Addendum—the relation to the knowledge argument
My treatment of  the conceivability argument has been very similar to that of  the 
knowledge argument in the previous chapter.  Both motivating intuitions—that Mary 
learns something, and that global zombie scenarios are conceivable—were denied by 
appeal to the a priori status of  global supervenience statements, based in turn on the 
direct-reference friendly APET.  And the plausibility of  both intuitive reactions was 
explained by appeal to the absence of  analytic connections and the genuine a posteriori 
status of  local supervenience and psychophysical identities.  Given so much similarity, 
one might wonder if  the two are distinct arguments at all, or just more or less 
picturesque ways of  claiming that global supervenience statements are a posteriori.
The two arguments are certainly closely related.  But there are good reasons to treat 
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them separately, which are perhaps obscured by the similarity of  the responses.
• First, the intuition-pumping scenarios are non-trivially different.  Mary is not a 
zombie!  Finding a common explanation for both intuitions is a worthwhile project.
• Perhaps more substantively, conceivability and a posteriori status are distinct 
notions.  “Conceivability” means, firstly and traditionally, positive conceivability or 
imaginability.  The claim that the APET makes zombies inconceivable is a 
substantive one, based on the claim that, whatever positive conceivability amounts 
to, it at least implies negative conceivability and so connects to a posteriori status.
• The conceivability argument assumes that we can conceive both P and Q, 
whereas the knowledge argument presupposes only that Mary knows P.   Since 
conceiving of  ~Q requires deploying phenomenal concepts, the “missing-concept” 
reply to the knowledge argument (§5.5) is not available for the conceivability 
argument.  The apparent conceivability of  “P & ~Q” cannot be explained by 
suggesting the conceiver lacks phenomenal concepts (Stoljar, 2005, pp. 8-10), 
(Chalmers, 2010, p. 194). 
• Lastly, the role of  modality in the arguments is different.  The conceivability 
argument invokes the claim that conceivability implies possibility, and (in 
Chalmers’s hands) the two-dimensional framework, to get from the conceivability 
of  zombies to their possibility, and so to the falsity of  physicalism.  The knowledge 
argument does not explicitly appeal to modal considerations at all: it appeals only to 
the epistemic disconnection between phenomenal information and physical 
information. (Jackson explicitly distinguishes his argument from what he calls the 
“Modal argument” that zombies are possible (1982, p. 130ff).)  In fact, the 
discussion in this and the previous two chapters reveals that this difference is only 
superficial.  As argued in chapter 5, the knowledge argument depends on the APET 
to get from Mary’s learning something to the falsity of  physicalism.  And the 
argument for the APET is based on the same modal considerations—ultimately, 
modal rationalism and the rejection of  strong necessities—that underpin the 
conceivability-possibility thesis. 
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For these reasons, then, the two arguments merit the separate discussion I have 
given them.  The fact that both get the same answer is, I think, evidence that my answer 
is getting at the common source of  the epistemic gap arguments.
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7. The explanatory gap argument
A. Introduction
The third, and last, epistemic gap argument I will consider appeals to our inability to 
explain phenomenal properties in physical terms.  The argument is associated with 
Joseph Levine, who introduces it in (Levine, 1983), and defends it at length in (Levine, 
2001).  The form of  the argument is familiar: Levine asserts that a complete physical 
description of  an experience does not explain why it has its phenomenal character, or 
any phenomenal character at all.  But if  physicalism were true, he argues, those facts 
would have physical explanations.  So the inability to provide such explanations poses a 
problem for physicalism.
In part B of  this chapter I describe the explanatory gap argument in more detail, 
and accept that the APET commits physicalism to the kind of  complete explanation 
Levine demands.   In part C I give the now-familiar response that the direct-reference-
friendly APET also shows how physicalism can provide such explanations.  I also 
consider, however, the possibility that explanation requires something more than the sort 
of  a priori implication licensed by the APET.  I argue that to the extent it does, 
physicalism is not committed to providing explanations.
In part D I consider another aspect of  the explanatory gap argument, which 
emerges from Levine’s claim that psychophysical identity statements are “gappy”—
demanding explanation where other identity statements do not.  I argue that the 
gappiness of  such identities can be explained consistently with physicalism, in a way 
similar to that in which the “intuition of  distinctness” was explained in §2.11.
B. The explanatory gap argument
7.1. A familiar form
The explanatory gap argument follows a familiar pattern.  First, like the other two 
epistemic gap arguments, the claim that there is an explanatory gap is motivated by 
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thought experiments, which here are supposed to reveal the futility of  looking for 
physical explanations of  phenomenal properties.  Levine’s choice of  example might lack 
the charisma of  Mary or zombies, but it shares their form.  He reports that he is looking 
at his red diskette case, and accordingly having an experience with the phenomenal 
property of  redness.  Then he thinks about the physical events going on at the same 
time: the way light stimulates his retina and eventually causes neural events in the visual 
cortex.  And he intuits that the physical description cannot explain the phenomenal one.  
“There seems to be no discernible connection between the physical descriptions and the 
mental one, and thus no explanation of  the latter in terms of  the former” (Levine, 2001, 
pp. 76-77).
Second, the argument claims that physicalism is committed to epistemic 
connections of  the relevant sort.  
If  materialism is true, there ought to be an explanation of  how the mental arises 
from the physical: a realization theory.  […] If  nature is one large, lawful, orderly 
system, as the materialist (or naturalist) insists it is, then it should be possible to 
explain the occurrence of  any part of  that system in terms of  the basic principles 
that govern nature as a whole.  (2001, p. 69)
Interestingly, Levine believes that physicalism is not committed to a priori entailment of  
phenomenal truths, or to the inconceivability of  zombies.  So Levine takes a type-B 
position about the knowledge and conceivability gaps: they are real, but that they pose 
no problem for physicalism:
For the same reasons I do not accept the conceivability argument, I do not accept 
the knowledge argument.  Knowledge is clearly sensitive to how we conceptualize 
the object of  knowledge, and from the fact that we can’t find the right sort of  
connection between one conceptualization and another doesn’t entail that they 
aren’t, nevertheless, conceptualizations of  the very same phenomenon, or 
situation.  (2001, p. 77)
For Levine, then, the demand for physical explanations succeeds where the demands for 
a priori entailment and inconceivability do not: revealing an epistemic gap which 
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physicalism is committed to bridging.
Why does the possibility of  reconceptualisation not answer the explanatory gap 
argument as well?  The answer turns on details of  Levine’s background philosophical 
views, which will be outlined in §7.8.
7.2. Complete explanation
But, one might protest, there are plenty of  successful explanations of  phenomenal facts 
that appeal to physical facts.  For example, a doctor can explain my being in pain by 
telling me my appendix is inflamed; I can explain my headache by revealing how much I 
drank the previous night; and so on.  
The reason such explanations do not satisfy Levine is that the explanations he is 
looking for are of  a rather special kind: ones in which the phenomenal explanandum can 
be deduced a priori from the physical explanans (2001, p. 76).  As a result, given the 
explanans, it will be inconceivable that the explanandum should be false (2001, p. 79).
This is, to be sure, a very demanding requirement.  And Levine acknowledges that 
statements we accept as explanatory in practice do not typically entail their explananda.  
But, he maintains, a complete explanation will.  Ordinary explanans, he believes, are extracts 
of  salient information from idealised complete explanations—what Peter Railton (1981) 
calls “ideal explanatory texts”.  If  the ideal explanatory text was given in full as the 
explanans, it would imply the explanandum a priori.
On this “deductivist” view of  explanation (Levine, 2001, pp. 70-76) an explanation 
can be regarded as an argument, with the explanans providing premises and the 
explanandum serving as conclusion.  A complete explanation is a deductively valid 
argument, the conclusion of  which follows a priori from the premises.  Accordingly, it 
will be inconceivable that the explanans should be true and the explanandum false.  But if  
the knowledge and conceivability gaps are real, as Levine accepts, then there is no a priori  
deduction of  phenomenal statements from physical-functional ones.  One can conceive 
of  zombie appendicitis that doesn’t cause pain, just as one can conceive of  zombie C-
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fibres whose stimulation isn’t accompanied by pain.  So psychophysical explanations 
must fail Levine’s test.  The conceivability of  zombies, then, rather than directly 
falsifying physicalism, “is thus the principal manifestation of  the explanatory 
gap” (Levine, 2001, p. 79).
7.3. Summary
Given Levine’s notion of  explanations as a priori implications, the explanatory gap 
argument can be summarised as follows (borrowing from (Hill, 2009, p. 45)):
1) If  physicalism is true, there are physical explanations of  phenomenal truths. 
2) Where A explains B, then given that A is the case it is inconceivable that B 
should not be the case.
But 3) given any physical statement, it remains conceivable that any phenomenal 
statement should be false.
Therefore 4) physicalism is false.
Levine himself  does not endorse 4), the anti-physicalist conclusion.  In (Levine, 
1983, p. 354) he took the explanatory gap to be a purely epistemic problem, one which 
leaves physicalists unable to “say exactly which psycho-physical identity statements are 
true”, but from which “one cannot conclude … that materialism is false.”  More 
recently, he takes the explanatory gap to show that “we don’t really understand how 
[physicalism] could be true” (2001, p. 68), which is “a situation materialists should find 
troubling” (2007, p. 165).  On the other hand, he also sees powerful considerations in 
favour of  physicalism (2001, ch. 1).  So he does not, yet, accept his own argument for 
dualism.
Nonetheless, the argument is valid: if  one accepts Levine’s claims about the 
explanatory demands on physicalism, and the conceivability of  zombies, the anti-
physicalist conclusion follows.
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C. The type-C response
7.4. Levine’s account of  explanation accepted, arguendo
How should a physicalist respond to this argument?  One option is to reject the link 
between explanation and a priori entailment.  (Premise 2 of  the argument.)  While the 
link between a priori status and conceivability is clear (see §6.2(b) above), and the 
knowledge argument appeals to a priori deducibility directly, the claim that explanation 
requires an a priori relation is more controversial.
Nonetheless, I am inclined to accept premise 2.  To be sure, not all explanations 
make the falsity of  their explanandum inconceivable.  But understood as a requirement on 
complete explanations, the premise is reasonable.
First, like Levine, I treat explanation as a relation between statements.  One might 
instead think of  explanation as a relation between the facts stated. This is the “ontic” 
conception of  explanation (Levine, 2001, p. 75); (Salmon, 1990).  On that conception, 
talk of  a priori deductions of  explananda will make little sense.  Whether explanation as 
such is ontic or deductive, however, a priori deducibility is what is at issue.  As Levine 
points out, the question can be rephrased from the ontic perspective as whether 
descriptions of  explananda are deducible a priori from descriptions of  explanans (2001, p. 
75).
Second, it seems right that a complete explanation—in a natural sense of  
“complete”—ought to make the falsity of  its explanandum inconceivable.  For if, given a 
supposedly complete explanation E, there is a conceivable scenario in which E’s 
explanans is true but its explanandum false, it is reasonable to ask for an explanation of  
why we aren’t in that scenario.  So E is not complete after all.
Complete explanations may be impossible to give in practice.  Any ideal 
explanatory text surely involves more knowledge than we now have.  Quite likely, it 
requires knowledge that is beyond the capacity of  human brain, and it might even be of  
infinite length.  But, after happily talking about knowing or imagining all the facts of  
physics in the chapters 5 and 6, I see no reason to start cavilling at idealisation now.  
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And, once again, if  the required idealisation is illegitimate, so much the worse for the 
explanatory gap argument.  If  P is disqualified from serving as an explanans at all, its 
failure to explain Q does not raise a special problem for physicalism.
Is statistical explanation a counter-example to the deductivist view?  On some 
models of  explanation, notably Salmon’s “statistical relevance” model (Salmon, 1971) an 
explanans may tell us that there is such-and-such a chance that the explanandum will be the 
case, while leaving open a chance that it won’t be.  Such an explanans does not a priori 
imply its explanandum.
In such cases there is room to ask why, even given the explanans, the explanans is 
true rather than false.  Now one might think that an ideal explanatory text would contain 
the information required to answer that question, and that statistical explanations are 
simply incomplete.  But perhaps there is no answer: perhaps it is simply a brute fact that 
the chances come out one way rather than the other.  In that case even an ideal explanans 
will not a priori imply the explanandum.
There are two things to say in response.  One is that while statistical models of  
causal explanation are plausible, we are here looking for “constitutive” explanations of  
the instantiation of  phenomenal properties.  That is, explanations of  how physical 
phenomena constitute, or otherwise ontologically underlie, phenomenal properties.63  
And it is less plausible that constitutive explanations are statistical.  On the realisation 
account, in particular, if  realisers play the relevant roles, functional phenomena are 
instantiated; there is no further question of  how the functional facts come out.
On the other hand, if  the low-level facts (including how low-level chances come 
out) don’t determine the higher-level facts, but only fix their chances, then physicalist 
supervenience is false.  God has work left to do after fixing the facts of  physics: he must 
decide how the high-level chances come out.  But that would be a problem for 
physicalism, not for the notion of  complete explanations.  
Now, accepting Levine’s demand that explanations be complete in this sense makes 
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
166
63 For the distinction between explanations of  events and of  property instantiations, see (Cummins, 1983).  The 
term “constitutive” is from Salmon.
premise 1) stronger.  It becomes a claim that physicalism is committed not just to 
physical explanations of  phenomenal facts, but to explanations which make the falsity of 
the phenomenal facts inconceivable.  At this point, as with the other epistemic gaps, the 
APET steps in to commit physicalism to a priori implications from physical-functional 
statements (specifically, P, the complete statement of  the facts of  physics) to 
phenomenal ones, and thereby make premise 1) true.
7.5. Are a priori implications sufficient for explanation?
On the model of  the previous two epistemic gap arguments, the type-C physicalist 
response would be to deny premise 3.  And indeed, premise 3 is false, for the usual 
reason: P, the complete statement of  the facts of  physics, implies a priori any arbitrary 
phenomenal truth Q, and so makes it inconceivable that Q should be false if  P is true.
From there, the type-C response goes as before.  We can explain the sense that 
there are no complete psychophysical explanations as a result of  two things.  First, the 
analytic-connection assumption—the assumption that a priori implication requires 
analytic connections, which in the psychophysical case are nowhere to be found.  
Levine’s own report of  his intuition, quoted previously, looks like an example of  this:  
“There seems to be no discernible connection between the physical descriptions and the 
mental one, and thus no explanation of  the latter in terms of  the former” (Levine, 2001, 
pp. 76-77).
Second, the fact that local supervenience is a posteriori, which means local 
explanations will be incomplete.  When we look for constitutive explanations of  high-
level phenomena, we tend to look to the facts on which the high-level phenomena 
supervene.  Because local supervenience can be a posteriori, however, those relations need 
not be a priori—and in the case of  psychophysical supervenience they won’t be.  So such 
local explanations will be incomplete.  That, in turn, may help explain why we think 
psychophysical explanations are always incomplete.
So far, so familiar.  But in this case, that is not the end of  the story.  Although P 
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implies Q a priori, one might still doubt whether it explains Q.  To adapt a point from Hill, 
(2009, p. 46), every statement a priori implies a priori truths.   “A ! B” is a priori if  B is a 
priori.   But that does not mean that an arbitrary statement explains B: “T-rex was a 
predator” does not explain why only unmarried men are bachelors.  So it seems there is 
more to explanation than a priori implication.  And it is fair to say that there is a nagging 
sense that P does not explain phenomenal truths, possible reasons for which I will 
consider shortly.
If  a priori implication is not a sufficient condition for complete explanation, the 
explanatory gap argument might be reformulated along these lines:
1) (As before) If  physicalism is true, there are physical explanations of  
phenomenal truths. 
2' ) Where A explains B, then a) given that A is the case it is inconceivable that B 
should not be the case and b) some extra condition (call it “C”) is met.
3' ) For any physical statement and any phenomenal statement, condition C is not 
met.
This argument needs supporting in two ways.  First, it needs to be shown that 
explanation involves the extra condition C—that 2') is true.  Second, it needs to be 
shown that 1) is true even when explanations require C.  Both questions depend, of  
course, on what “C” stands for.  In §§7.6 to 7.9 I consider some candidates.  Once again, 
my response will be that the sense that something is missing can be explained in a way 
consistent with physicalism.  The dialectic here is, however, slightly different from the 
other two epistemic gaps.  In the two previous chapters I argued that the intuitions that 
physicalism could not provide the required epistemic connections were wrong.  The 
direct-reference-friendly APET showed that analytic connections were not required for a 
priori implication, and that physicalism was not committed to a priori local supervenience.  
Here I am prepared to allow that the intuitions are correct about explanation—that 
modified premise 2') of  the explanatory gap argument is correct.  If  so, the explanatory 
gap is real.  But by the same token, the resulting notion of  explanation goes beyond 
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what physicalism is committed to, and premise 1) is false.
One consequence is that my position on the explanatory gap argument might be 
either type-B or type-C physicalist, depending on what “explanation” turns out to 
involve.
7.6. Understanding?
A first stab at why P might seem not to explain phenomenal truths is this.  Recall that the 
a priori inference from P to Q proceeds via disquotation.  If  physicalism is true, P tells 
you that pain is C-fibre stimulation by telling you that “pain” and “C-fibre stimulation” 
co-refer.  That would be an important discovery, to be sure, but it might well leave one 
unsatisfied: one might perhaps that feel it tells us that pain is C-fibre stimulation but not 
really why, and that there is more explanatory work to be done.
What is missing?  One thought is that explanations ought to increase our 
understanding of  the phenomena explained, while learning identities through disquotation 
does not.64  What we want to understand is pain, a phenomenal property.  P gives us 
information about the term “pain”—which is not what we were looking for.
But that is too quick.  Learning that “pain” refers to C-fibre stimulation would tell 
us all sorts of  things about pain.  Not least, its physical basis.  But also, together with 
neural information about C-fibre stimulation, it would tell us a great deal about pain’s 
causes, effects, possible cures; we could predict pain, bring its occurrences under 
physical laws, and generally do whatever we can do with physical-functional phenomena.  
What more, then, is required to understand pain?
7.7. Analytic connections
One candidate for the missing ingredient is, once again, analytic connections.   The 
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64 (Friedman, 1974).  Friedman was objecting to Hempel’s deductive-nomological account of  explanation that 
bringing an event under a regularity tells us that the event occurs in certain conditions, but does not help us 
understand why it does so.  See (Kitcher, 1989) for discussion of  the notion of  understanding.
direct-reference-friendly APET shows why the assumption that analytic connections are 
required for a priori implication is incorrect, and need not be repeated.  But there are 
some types of  explanation which do depend on analytic connections, and it may be that 
those are what we feel is missing.
Consider “water”, which (let us stipulate) is analytically associated with a 
description that fixes its reference.  That description would be something like “the 
odourless, colourless potable liquid that fills the lakes and rivers ...”.   If  “water” is 
associated with that sort of  description, two sorts of  explanation become possible.
First, learning the facts about H2O allows us to explain why water is H2O.  Learning 
that H2O has the chemical properties we associate with water, and that it is located in the 
right places in our environment, allows us to deduce, without further empirical 
information, that water is H2O.  Unlike disquotation, this allows us to explain the 
identity via interesting facts about the substance we’re investigating: water is H2O because 
H2O has these properties (Levine, 2001, pp. 64-65).  Moreover, we get an explanation of 
why water has those properties.   The chemical properties of  H2O, combined with the 
relevant chemical laws, explain why water has its characteristic properties (Papineau, 
2002, p. 149).
Neither type of  explanation is possible without analytic connections.  Learning the 
physical-functional properties of  C-fibre stimulation isn’t enough to deduce a priori that 
pain is C-fibre stimulation; the only way to deduce the identity a priori goes via facts 
about “pain”.  And since there are no properties that pain has analytically, pain’s 
identification with C-fibre stimulation cannot explain why pain has such characterising 
properties (Papineau, 2002, p. 149).  It can explain properties of  pain, of  course, but not 
the characterising features that make it count as “pain”.  There aren’t any.
If  this is what is missing in psychophysical explanations, however, then there is no 
problem for physicalism.65  Physicalism is not committed to analytic connections.  The 
APET commits physicalism to a priori entailment, but that is consistent with analytic 
independence.  The absence of  such explanations might be unsatisfying, but it does not 
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65 Sturgeon (1994, p. 235) makes the same point.
lead to dualism.
   
7.8. “Non-gappiness”
Levine claims to have identified a source of  dissatisfaction with psychophysical 
explanations that goes beyond mere absence of  analytic connections (2001, p. 81ff).  His 
claim is that psychophysical identity statements are “gappy”, meaning that they demand 
further explanation, where statements of  other identities are simply accepted.  His claim 
is that physicalism cannot provide the needed additional explanation, so gappiness 
supports dualism.
Some dialectical context is needed to show why Levine is concerned about 
psychophysical identity statements.  Levine is a sceptic about analyticity, for Quinean 
reasons (2001, p. 42).  So he believes that no explanations proceed via analytic 
connections.66  But he also doesn’t subscribe to anything like the direct-reference-
friendly APET: he thinks implications from, say, physics to statements containing 
“water” are genuinely a posteriori (2001, p. 54).  So how do complete explanations 
happen, if  the explanans and the explanandum use distinct vocabulary?  Levine’s answer is 
that the gap is bridged by an identity statement involving one term from each 
vocabulary.  These identities cannot themselves be explained.  But according to Levine, 
they don’t need to be, because there is no need to explain why a thing is itself  (2001, p. 
54)  So identity statements can be used in an explanans without making the explanation 
incomplete.  Unless, that is, they are “gappy” in the sense just introduced.  This is why, 
on Levine’s view, the possibility of  reconceptualisation cannot explain the explanatory 
gap (as mentioned in §7.1 above).  Even if  phenomenal statements merely redescribe 
physical-functional facts in new vocabulary, the phenomenal and physical-functional 
vocabularies will be related by gappy psychophysical identity statements.
I disagree with all of  that.  I accept analyticity, and I believe that identity 
statements, at least those involving two distinct terms, need explanations.  There is, to be 
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66 With the possible exception of  those involving de re necessity (Levine, 2001, p. 43), a qualification which he 
believes does not affect the current discussion.
sure, a sense in which Levine is right that identities as such don’t need explaining.  There 
is no reason why something is itself.  So “water is water” doesn’t need explaining.  Nor 
does it makes sense to look for, say, a cause of  an identity.  But we can still look for 
explanations of  statements like “water is H2O”—and find them in a priori derivations of  
those statements from statements of  underlying facts.  And the direct-reference-friendly 
APET shows how there can be such a priori derivations even without analytic 
connections.  The type-C materialist, therefore, has no need for epistemically primitive 
identity statements.67
Unfortunately, however, rejecting Levine’s background assumptions doesn’t make 
the problem of  “gappiness” go away entirely.  The reason is that the non-gappy cases 
supposedly include many statements involving terms that I would regard as analytically 
independent, such as proper names.  So the gappiness of  psychophysical identity 
statements, if  it is real, must reflect something more than the absence of  analytic 
connections between the terms involved.  Neither does asserting the direct-reference-
friendly APET help explain the difference between gappy and non-gappy statements, 
since the APET makes all identity statements deducible a priori from P, gappy or not.
Whatever gappiness might amount to, however, the same general response applies 
as in the previous section.  If  psychophysical identity statements demand explanation in 
a sense that goes beyond a priori deducibility from physics, then they demand more than 
physicalism is committed to.  The lack of  such explanations therefore would not 
threaten physicalism.
The argument from gappy identities must be considered more detail, however, 
because it turns out to involve an independent argument against psychophysical 
identities.  In part D of  this chapter, I rebut that argument.
7.9. Reductive explanation 
The remaining potential source of  disquiet with “P ! Q” as an explanation is the idea 
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67 The term “epistemically primitive” is from (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001).
that physicalism is committed to complete reductive explanations. By “reductive” 
explanation I mean one which explains a phenomenon in terms of  phenomena on 
which it supervenes.  An explanation which appeals to facts about phenomenal terms, 
rather than facts about phenomenal properties or their physical-functional 
underpinnings, will not count as reductive.
I accept that physicalism is committed to reductive explanations, but deny that 
those reductive explanations need be complete.  Reductive explanations are statements of  
local supervenience, and so need not be a priori.
As discussed in §1.8(a), physicalism as such is committed only to global 
supervenience.  And global supervenience does not itself  entail reductive explanations 
(Hill, 2009, p. 46).  But particular physicalist accounts of  high-level phenomena will, if  
they are at all plausible, be committed to local supervenience.  Realisation physicalism, in 
particular, claims that facts about the realiser of  some high-level phenomenon, in 
conjunction with the laws that determine how the realiser behaves, metaphysically fix the 
existence of  the realised phenomenon.
But then it looks like we can explain the existence of  the high-level phenomenon by 
stating those facts about its realiser, along with the relevant laws.  So physicalism allows 
us to give reductive explanations of  high-level phenomena (Levine, 2001, p. 76).
Levine is hardly alone in thinking that physicalism is committed to reductive 
explanation.  In particular, that commitment is a guiding assumption in (Chalmers, 1996, 
p. chapter 2) and (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001).  Physicalists have also accepted it.  
Melnyk, for example, accepts that realisation physicalism is committed to what he calls 
“reductionism in the core sense”: namely, reductive explanation (Melnyk, 2003, p. 88ff).  
Indeed, the promise of  reductive explanation, of  accounting for the world’s multifarious 
phenomena in terms of  fewer and (hopefully) simpler underlying principles, is one of  
the chief  attractions of  physicalism.
I agree with Melnyk.  A statement of  the physical-functional basis of  some high-
level phenomenon amounts to a reductive explanation of  that phenomenon. Since 
realisation physicalism is committed to the existence of  such physical-functional bases, it 
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is committed to reductive explanations.
The question posed by the explanatory gap, then, is whether reductive explanations 
must be complete, in the sense that they make the falsity of  the explanandum 
inconceivable given the explanans.  Now there is a natural sense in which realisation 
physicalism does imply that reductive explanations are “complete”.  According to 
realisation physicalism, all there is to the constitution of  high-level phenomena is the 
existence of  lower-level phenomena playing the appropriate role.  Once one has stated 
the realisation facts, one has told the entire constitutive story.  Of  course, one might still 
seek explanations of  other sorts—a causal explanation of  how some high-level 
particular came into existence, for example.  But as far as constitutive explanations go, 
one has all one is going to get.
But that is not the sense of  “complete” at issue.  The question is whether reductive 
explanations make it inconceivable that the explanans should be false.  And the answer is 
that they will do so if, but only if, the high-level phenomenon is described in physical-
functional terms.
A physical-functional term (as defined in §1.19(b) above) for a high-level 
phenomenon is one which either states explicitly, or is analytically associated with a 
description of, the functional role which characterises the phenomenon.  (The 
description of  the functional role may serve as the antecedent of  an “application 
conditional” for the term, rather than amounting to a full-blown conceptual analysis of  
the term.  See the discussion in the §4.6.)  A physical-functional description of  the 
realiser, together with a description of  the relevant laws which give rise to its behaviour, 
will a priori imply that the realiser is playing that functional role.  It will therefore a priori  
imply that it satisfies a physical-functional description of  the high-level phenomenon. 
For a more detailed explication of  the a priori inference involved, see (Melnyk, 2003, 
section 3.5).
Moreover, the a priori link would not run via knowledge of  co-reference, but via 
analytic connections to the terms in the explanandum, so there seems no reason to deny 
that it would be genuinely explanatory.  Indeed, such explanations “close the question” 
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of  whether the explanandum exists: any further request for explanation becomes hard to 
understand.  To borrow Chalmers’s example, if  someone accepts that mitosis is a 
process by which a cell produces an entity similar to itself, but still asks why mitosis is 
accompanied by cell reproduction, we would think they were being silly.  That is what 
“reproduction” means; there is nothing further to explain (Chalmers, 1996, p. 43).
But if  the high-level phenomenon is described in terms which are analytically 
independent of  physical-functional terms, there will be no such a priori implication.  A 
description of  the physical-functional realiser will not, therefore, close the question of  
whether the high-level phenomenon exists.  For the reasons given in chapter 6, it will 
remain conceivable that the realiser  and the laws should exist without the high-level 
phenomenon being present.
If  phenomenal terms were physical-functional, our arbitrary phenomenal truth Q 
would follow a priori from a physical-functional statement of  its realising facts.  That 
physical-functional statement would then provide a complete reductive explanation of  
Q.  But physicalism is not committed to phenomenal terms being physical-functional. It 
is not committed to any analytic connections between phenomenal terms and physical-
functional terms.  So physicalism is not committed to complete reductive explanations.
7.10. Physicalism is still a winner
If  phenomenal terms are analytically independent from physical-functional terms, 
physicalist reductive explanations of  phenomenal statements are incomplete.  They do 
not close the question of  why there are qualia.  It will always remain sensible, though 
futile, to ask “but why does that pattern of  neural activation feel like something?”  The 
only answer deducible from the facts of  physics is that, as it happens, “pain” co-refers 
with a neurological term for that activation pattern.  If  that explanation leaves one 
unsatisfied for whatever reason, physicalism may seem less attractive.  Explanatory 
power is one of  physicalism’s chief  attractions.  It is a major reason to prefer it over a 
dualist view which takes phenomenal properties as being (or depending on) distinct 
fundamental furniture.  As Levine comments:
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It may well be that the macrofacts supervene on the microfacts, even though we 
can’t derive a description of  the macrofacts from the microfacts.  But that would 
be small comfort, for we would have lost the explanatory power we expected 
from the execution of  the materialist program.  (Levine, 2001, p. 64)
Explanatory power is not physicalism’s only putative advantage over dualism.  
Monism will always have the virtue of  parsimony.  But there is a sense in which 
explanatory power is the more desirable virtue.  We presume simplicity, but there’s no 
reason to be disappointed if  it turns out there are lots of  kinds of  things in the world.  
One might even find such diversity appealing.  But we want explanations, and it would be 
disappointing if  some interesting phenomenon didn’t have one. (This is a report of  
subjective preferences; de gustibus applies.)  So if  physicalism can’t offer complete 
explanations of  phenomenal properties, there is not only less reason to think it true, but 
less reason to hope it is.
It is not just that we do not have complete physical reductive explanations. 
Physicalism implies that, if  there are no such explanations, there are no complete 
reductive explanations at all.  For if  physicalism is true, there is nothing else such 
explanations could appeal to, save only the necessary and acausal.  So there is a sense in 
which physicalism, like dualism, leaves the connections between phenomenal and 
physical-functional truths explanatorily basic.
But even if  physical explanations aren’t completely satisfying, physicalism retains 
considerable explanatory power, enough to comfortably outscore dualism.  Physicalism 
provides reductive explanations of  phenomenal properties, described in physical-
functional terms.  If  realisation physicalism is true, phenomenal properties are physical-
functional properties, and so they can be completely reductively explained by describing 
their realisers and the relevant laws.  Those explanations won’t close questions expressed 
in phenomenal terms, but they aren’t chopped liver.  Dualism, which takes phenomenal 
properties as fundamental, offers no equivalent to them.  Dualism does have room for 
reductions within the phenomenal domain: high-level phenomenal properties (such as 
pain, perhaps) could be explained in terms of  more basic “proto-phenomenal” 
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properties (Chalmers, 1996, p. 126).  But physicalism does too: there could be a 
hierarchy of  basic and supervening (proto-)phenomenal properties that are all physical.  
Only physicalism can promise to explain the basic proto-phenomenal properties in 
terms of  something yet more basic.
Even if  the link between physical-functional and phenomenal terms for 
phenomenal properties is not explanatory, knowing that they co-refer would still be 
valuable.  Knowing that “pain” refers to C-fibre stimulation would allow us to explain a 
host of  facts about pain.  For example, although “pain” is not definable in terms of  a 
causal role, pains still have causes and effects, and identifying pain with a physical-
functional phenomenon would allow us to explain them physically.  Explaining how C-
fibre stimulation produces avoidance behaviour would tell us how pain does so.  
Dualism, by contrast, must posit fundamental psychophysical laws to explain the 
physical-functional causes and effects of  phenomenal properties (Chalmers, 1996, p. 
231ff).
Finally, since physical-functional properties can be studied from a third-person 
perspective, physicalist reductions of  phenomenal properties can also give us an 
objective way of  telling whether other creatures have phenomenal properties, and if  so 
which.  
In all these respects, physicalism retains an explanatory advantage over a dualist 
account that takes phenomenal properties as part of  the fundamental furniture of  the 
universe.
D. The argument from gappy identities
7.11. Introduction
In §7.8 above I noted that Levine’s argument involved the “gappiness” of  
psychophysical identity statements—they seem to demand further explanation.  By 
contrast, other identity statements, though equally a posteriori, do not seem to require 
explanation in the same way.
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In the last section I argued that whatever sort of  additional explanation is wanted, 
it is not one to which physicalism is committed.  But Levine also has an argument that 
the very demand for an explanation is inconsistent with physicalism, whether or not it can 
be satisfied.  In this part D, I show that his argument resembles the arguments against 
psychophysical identities discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and can be given the same sort 
of  answer.  As this argument is one that has recently exercised phenomenal-concept 
strategists, this part will also lay some groundwork for the discussion of  the 
phenomenal-concept strategy in the next chapter.
7.12. Gappy and non-gappy identities
Levine cites indexical identities (e.g. “I am Adrian Boutel”) and demonstrative ones (e.g. 
“That is Brian’s car”) as identity statements that do not present an explanatory gap, not 
because they can be explained, but because no explanation seems to be needed (Levine, 
2001, p. 82).  Levine does not say explicitly how he distinguishes between indexicals and 
demonstratives.  I take it what he has in mind is Kaplan’s distinction between pure 
indexicals like “I” and true demonstratives like “that”.  True demonstratives involve a 
demonstration—an accompanying act or intention picking out their referent—while pure 
indexicals do not.  In Kaplan’s terms, both are types of  “indexical”, since their reference 
depends on their context of  use (Kaplan, 1978), but for present purposes I will adopt 
Levine’s terminology.
Consider indexicals first.  A statement such as “I am a brother” cannot be derived a 
priori from, and so cannot be completely explained by, non-indexical statements (Perry, 
1979).  To get from non-indexical facts like “Adrian Boutel is a brother” to “I am a 
brother” you need to know an identity statement relating indexical and non-indexical 
terms, such as “I am Adrian Boutel”.  But that bridging identity statement is not 
analytically true: there is no analytic connection between “Adrian Boutel” and “I”.  Nor, 
if  Perry is right, can it be deduced a priori from P, the statement of  all the facts of  
physics.  Nonetheless, we do not feel the need for a further explanation of  Adrian 
Boutel’s being me.  Indeed, a request for such an explanation would be hard to 
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understand.
Similarly, Levine claims, for demonstratives.  We learn the truth of  “that is Brian’s 
car” only by learning a posteriori that Brian’s car is in the right contextual position to be 
the referent of  “that”.  There is no analytic connection between “that” and “Brian’s car”. 
But despite the a posteriori status of  the statement, once we learn the facts about context 
we do not demand further explanation of  why Brian’s car is that.  Again, the request for 
explanation makes little sense.  “Pain is C-fibre stimulation”, by contrast, behaves quite 
differently.  We do demand an explanation of  why pain is C-fibre stimulation.  Why do 
we do that?
Levine’s answer is that gappiness shows that phenomenal terms do not refer 
directly: they have representational modes of  presentation68 (2001, p. 84).  Those modes 
of  presentation are distinct from the modes of  presentation of  physical-functional 
terms.  So what seems to need explaining is how something presented like that—via the 
non-physical-functional mode of  presentation—could also be a physical-functional 
property.
Levine’s answer is a problem for physicalism, for the same reason using 
representational modes of  presentation to explain a posteriori status would be a problem
(see §3.3 above).   If  phenomenal terms have a representational mode of  presentation, 
then, according to the physicalist, what that mode of  presentation represents must be a 
physical-functional property of  the referent.  If  it does, there will be an identity statement 
relating the mode of  presentation to a physical-functional term for that property.  But 
since that too is a psychophysical identity statement, it will also be gappy, and its 
gappiness will require another set of  distinct modes of  presentation.  Eventually, the 
physicalist must either a) explain the gappiness of  identity statements without appealing 
to distinct representational modes of  presentation, or b) concede that the phenomenal 
property (or perhaps some mode of  presentation) is non-physical.
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
179
68 See §1.19(a) above.  Levine calls them “ascriptive” modes of  presentation, but I will stick with 
“representational”, following White (2007).
7.13. How-possibly explanations
How can the physicalist explain gappiness?  First, note that the type of  explanation 
Levine is looking for has changed.  The discussion of  complete explanations above 
concerned explanations that answered “why is it that x?” questions by ruling out 
(making inconceivable) scenarios in which x was not the case.  What was missing in the 
phenomenal case was an explanation of  why certain neural phenomena were 
accompanied by pain, rather than by pleasure, or no sensation at all.
Now, however, Levine is asking for “how possibly” explanations.69  What we want 
in the phenomenal case, he says, is an answer to the question “how could a functional or 
physiological state be that?” (2001, p. 83) (Levine’s emphasis).  What we do not demand 
in the indexical case is an answer to the question “how could that be my body?” (p. 82) 
(my emphasis).  And the question no one asks in the demonstrative case is “how could 
my red diskette case be that?” (p. 82) (Levine’s emphasis again).
What the demand for how-possibly explanations suggests is that the problem of  
gappy identities is related to the intuition of  distinctness discussed in §2.11.  An identity 
statement will need a “how possibly” explanation if  there is some background reason to 
think the two terms refer to distinct phenomena.  The role of  the explanation is then to 
overcome that obstacle, to explain how apparently distinct things can in fact be the 
same.
The two sorts of  question are related: an intuition of  distinctness will suggest that 
there are scenarios in which one phenomenon but not the other is present, making the 
identity statement appear counter-conceivable.  Conversely, a complete explanation of  
why the identity statement is true will a fortiori explain how it could be.  But the demand 
for how-possibly explanations suggests that an intuition of  distinctness is at work again.  
Accordingly, the strategy used in chapter 2 can be employed here as well.
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69 See (Dray, 1957).
7.14. The explanation of  gappy identities
What, then, explains the gappiness of  psychophysical identity statements, if  phenomenal 
terms refer directly?
I agree that a difference in representational modes of  presentation can create a 
demand for explanation.  But that need not involve two terms having different modes; it is 
enough for one term (but not both) to lack a representational mode of  presentation.
The suggestion, then, is that “pain is C-fibre stimulation” is similar to “water is 
H2O”. “Water” is an ordinary observation term, whose mode of  presentation is (let us 
assume) the reference-fixing description of  the watery role.  “H2O” is a term from 
chemistry, presented via a theoretical description of  ordinarily unobservable entities. The 
difference raises a question of  how they could refer to the same thing.  And, in such 
cases, the answer is supplied by our chemical knowledge about H2O, which tells us that it 
satisfies the watery role.
There is also a difference in representational mode of  presentation between 
phenomenal and physical-functional terms.  The latter are presented theoretically, à la 
“H2O”; the former, as I argued in chapters 2 and 3, do not have representational modes 
of  presentation at all.  They do have non-representational modes of  presentation—
properties of  or relations to the referent which determine that it is the referent.  But the 
terms are not analytically associated with terms for those properties or relations. 
The difference in representational modes of  presentation between “pain” and “C-
fibre stimulation” leads us to look for an explanation of  how pain could be C-fibre 
stimulation.  But, unlike “water is H2O”, there is no role analytically associated with the 
phenomenal term, so no explanation of  the identity is available.  (I am assuming, in 
Levine’s favour, that deriving the identity from P does not yield a satisfying explanation.)  
The demand for explanation goes unsatisfied, and the psychophysical identity statement 
appears gappy.
Now, Levine claims that terms with no representational modes of  presentation can 
only figure in non-gappy identities.  As he puts it: “difference in non-ascriptive modes of 
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presentation … isn’t cognitively significant in itself, since this is not part of  the 
conception entertained by the subject.  These causal connections work, again, ‘behind 
the scenes’.” (2007, p. 87).  Where both terms lack representational modes of  
presentation, that is right.  A difference between unrepresented reference-fixing 
mechanisms might be completely unknown to the speaker, and so would not present an 
obstacle to accepting the identity.  But in psychophysical identity statements, the 
physical-functional term has a representational mode of  presentation: its association with 
an (ordinary language or theoretical) role.  And that creates a difference, one discernible 
a priori, between it and the phenomenal term.
As Chalmers (2003a, p. 120) stresses in rejecting type-C physicalism: “Physical 
descriptions of  the world characterize the world in terms of  structure and dynamics.”  
On the other hand, since phenomenal concepts are not analytically connected to 
physical-functional terms, “truths about consciousness are not truths about structure and 
dynamics” (my emphasis).  That difference provides plenty of  material for an 
appearance of  distinctness between the two domains.
This is not to say that phenomenal properties are presented as simple and static; 
just that they are not presented as structural or dynamic.  One might infer from the 
contrast that phenomenal properties are simple and static; the inference would not be 
deductively valid, but it would be quite natural.  But even if  one reserves judgement on 
the nature of  phenomenal properties, their lack of  a physical-functional mode of  
presentation is enough to set up an apparent distinction between them and physical-
functional properties.
7.15. Explaining other identities: demonstratives, indexicals, and proper names
If  my explanation of  the gappiness of  psychophysical identity statements is right, it has 
implications for other identity statements with the same feature.  In this section I verify 
that my account holds generally, i.e. that other identity statements between terms with 
and without representational modes of  presentation are gappy.
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
182
a) Bare demonstratives
Levine claims that if  phenomenal terms do not have representational modes of  
presentation, they are what he calls “blind” demonstratives—such as “that”, when 
uttered by a speaker pointing randomly with their eyes closed.  Such a bare 
demonstrative is associated with “very little substantive conception of  what sort of  
thing we’re pointing at” (2001, p. 84).  But even in that sort of  use, “that is Brian’s car” is 
non-gappy.  
Here I think Levine has got the status of  demonstrative identities wrong.  “That” is 
analytically or ascriptively demonstrative: the role of  the pointing finger in determining 
the reference of  “that” is available a priori.  That role is the representational mode of  
presentation of  “that”.  I do not mean to claim that anything as straightforward as 
“‘that’ refers to what I’m pointing at” is a priori.  There is dispute as to what, exactly, 
fixes the referent of  demonstratives, and in particular whether the pointing finger needs 
to be supplemented with other directing or communicative intentions of  the speaker.  
See, e.g., (Kaplan, 1989a).  All I need, however, is that “that” have some ascriptive 
demonstrative element.
It is true that “that” is a “directly referring” term in Kaplan’s sense (Kaplan, 1978): 
the fact that the object stands in that relation to my finger does not figure in the 
proposition expressed by “that is a hat”.  So “that” denotes its referent rigidly, even in 
worlds where the hat is elsewhere.  But it does not refer directly in the sense at issue 
here, because it refers with the help of  a representational mode of  presentation (see 
§1.19(a) above).
And so learning that the hat is in the relevant position closes the question of  why it 
is that.  “That is Brian’s car”, like “water is H2O”, has an explanation.  Brian’s car is that 
because it is in the right contextual position.  But unlike “water is H2O”, one can gain 
the needed a posteriori knowledge without scientific investigation—one need only open 
one’s eyes.  Hence “that is Brian’s car” never appears gappy, because explaining it is easy.
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By contrast, if  phenomenal terms refer demonstratively, then as Janet Levin 
suggests (Levin, 2007, p. 104 fn. 34), they do not wear their demonstrative character on 
their sleeves.  It is a substantive philosophical thesis that they are demonstrative, if  they 
are.  This is a consequence of  their referring directly: whatever the mechanism which 
determines their reference, we do not have a priori knowledge of  what it is.  
b) Indexicals
There is another reason the demonstrative case is non-gappy.  For a how-possibly 
explanation to be called for, there must not only be a difference in representational 
modes of  presentation, but the difference must create an appearance of  distinctness.  
But being the thing I’m pointing at and being a vehicle owned by someone called Brian 
are quite consistent.  Both, generally speaking, apply to observable objects.  This point 
also helps deal with the indexical case.
The account I gave of  demonstrative identities cannot be given for “I am Adrian 
Boutel”.  Like “that”, “I” has a representational mode of  presentation: it is analytically 
an indexical term for the speaker.70  On the other hand, if  Kripke is right about proper 
names, “Adrian Boutel” has no representational mode of  presentation; at any rate it does 
not have an indexical one.
Moreover, indexical identity statements like “I am Adrian Boutel” cannot be 
derived a priori from physics at all, never mind via analytic connections.  So on my 
account it looks like “I am Adrian Boutel” should appear gappy.  But in fact it does not: 
knowing that “Adrian Boutel” is my name I am quite happy to accept the identity.  There 
seems to be no residual question about how Adrian Boutel could be me.
In response, I would suggest that there is no appearance of  distinctness here.  The 
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70 As with “that”, there are complexities here.  Quentin Smith argues that “I” is also used for persons or groups 
associated with, but not identical to, the speaker (Smith, 1989).  I do not think such cases affect the claim that it 
is analytic that “I” refers to the speaker when it does so: one knows a priori whether one is using “I” for oneself  
or (to borrow Smith’s example) the regiment one commands.  Again, however, all I need is that “I” have an 
indexical representational mode of  presentation, which is common ground with Levine (2001, p. 121).
mode of  presentation of  “I” ensures that it refers to a person, and it is, if  not a priori, 
then at least obvious that “Adrian Boutel” does too.  There is no mystery about how two 
terms that we know refer to people could refer to the same person.
The difference between the representational modes of  presentation of  “I” and of  
“Adrian Boutel” may, I suppose, raise a sort of  Cartesian question about how they could 
be the same thing.  But it is not one that is likely to bother anyone once they leave the 
study, since we all have experience of  a named person being me.
This last point is perhaps clearer with “now”.  Levine takes “now” to be an 
indexical, and “it is 2 pm now” as a non-gappy identity (2001, p. 82).  But there is a 
genuine philosophical dispute about whether “now” refers indexically, or instead refers 
descriptively to a time which bears a metaphysically irreducible property of  presenthood. 
And so there is a real question about what it is for 2 pm to be now.  See, for example, 
(Sider, 2003, pp. 13-18).  It is true that no one outside philosophy departments is 
bothered by the issue, but that is likely because we have ample experience of  moments 
being now.  While there is a question of  how 2 pm can be now, there is no real doubt that 
it can be.
c) Proper names
Third, identity statements involving proper names are non-gappy.  We may ask for 
evidence that Cicero is Tully, but we do not ask why he is.  If  Kripke is right that proper 
names generally refer directly, this shows Levine is correct that identity statements 
between two directly referring terms are non-gappy.  This is quite consistent with my 
account, on which gappiness results either from terms’ having distinct representational 
modes of  presentation or from one term referring directly and the other not. 
What if  proper names do refer by description?  Kripke accepted that some unusual 
names might do so (“Jack the Ripper”), and many disagree with him about ordinary 
proper names.  If  “Cicero” and “Tully” refer by description, then the descriptions 
associated with the two names will have a great deal of  overlap (man, Roman) and 
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mention a few distinct but perfectly consistent properties (orator, poet).  There is no 
obstacle to accepting that those properties are borne by the same person, and so no 
need for a how-possibly explanation.
Finally, identity statements between proper names and terms which have 
representational modes of  presentation can be given the same sort of  answer as 
indexicals.  “Benjamin Franklin” and “the first US Postmaster-General” both obviously 
refer to people.  There may be a technical gap, but it is not one that creates a felt need 
for a how-possibly explanation.  If  less amenable description were chosen—say, “the 
first domesticated canine”—a how-possibly explanation would be called for, 
representational modes of  presentation or no.
7.16. Alternative explanations of  gappiness
Brian Loar (1998) and David Papineau (2002), (Forthcoming) have also offered 
explanations of  gappiness in physicalist terms.   
Loar, like me, explains the perceived need for an explanation as an effect of  the 
direct reference of  phenomenal terms, but in a different way.  He suggests that because 
phenomenal terms do not refer via a contingent representational mode of  presentation, 
we expect them to do so via a necessary one, that is, we expect that they will convey a 
grasp of  the essence of  phenomenal properties.  If  they did, Loar suggests, then since 
physical-functional scientific terms also describe the essences of  physical-functional 
properties, their co-reference would be a priori, and explanations of  the type described in 
§7.7 would be available.  But since phenomenal terms in fact have no representational 
mode of  presentation, our expectations are disappointed, and the identity statements 
seem gappy.
Papineau, as discussed in §2.11, suggests that the intuition of  distinctness arises 
because tokening a phenomenal concept involves tokening the phenomenal property 
involved, while tokening a physical-functional concept for the same property does not.
I will not discuss these alternatives further, because they are not in competition 
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with my own.  An intuition of  distinctness could have many and varied sources.  But I 
will note my account is not vulnerable to Levine’s responses to them.
Levine assimilates both responses to the bare demonstrative case (2001, pp. 85-86) 
(see §7.15(a) above).  He takes Loar to be claiming that phenomenal properties are their 
own mode of  presentation (though see §3.12 for a discussion of  that interpretation), 
and claims that neither author has explained how giving phenomenal properties a role in 
our representations of  them creates any cognitive  difference from the bare demonstrative 
case.
Whether or not this criticism is fair, it does not apply to the account given above.  I 
do not claim that phenomenal terms are, or seem to be, analytically richer than 
demonstratives, but poorer. 
Finally, in (2007) Levine criticises responses to his argument which try to explain 
gappiness in terms of  the absence of  a priori derivability from physics, or which appeal 
to special features of  the way phenomenal concepts refer.  The latter issue will be 
discussed in the next chapter, but here I note that both responses leave the account I 
have given untouched.  My account does not appeal to non-derivability—for the reasons 
given in chapters 4 and 5, I take all identity statements, gappy or not, to be derivable a 
priori from physics.  Nor does my account take the direct reference of  phenomenal 
terms, in isolation, to explain gappiness.  Rather it is the contrast between their direct 
reference and the representational modes of  presentation of  physical-functional terms 
that creates an appearance of  distinctness and so a demand for how-possibly 
explanation.
7.17. Conclusion on gappy identities
The account I have given explains the gappiness of  psychophysical identity statements 
consistently with the direct reference of  phenomenal terms.  The account also explains, 
or at least is consistent with, the status of  other types of  identity statements as gappy or 
non-gappy, and it is not vulnerable to Levine’s objections to other accounts.  So Levine’s 
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argument that gappiness shows phenomenal terms have representational modes of  
presentation, and thereby create a problem for physicalism, fails.
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8. Explaining direct reference
A. Introduction
In the discussion so far, I have explained the epistemic status of  psychophysical 
identities and supervenience by appealing to the analytic independence of  phenomenal 
terms from physical-functional terms.  I have explained that independence by saying that 
the reference of  phenomenal terms is direct—that is, does not run via an associated 
description or representational mode of  presentation.  But I have not yet addressed the 
question of  how that reference is secured—how a phenomenal concept can refer to a 
physical-functional property without picking it out via a physical-functional description or 
other representational mode of  presentation.  In this chapter I turn to that question.
In part B of  this chapter I will adopt, with a few relatively minor amendments, the 
account of  direct reference offered by Brian Loar (1998), and describe some of  the 
alternatives.
The accounts discussed in part B have come as part of  the “phenomenal-concept 
strategy”.71  That strategy attempts to explain the various epistemic gaps between 
physical-functional and phenomenal truths by appeal to the way we represent phenomenal 
properties.  Like my own approach, the phenomenal-concept strategy appeals to the 
conceptual or analytic independence of  phenomenal terms from physical-functional 
terms, and explains that independence as the result of  the direct reference of  
phenomenal terms.   But the phenomenal-concept strategy seeks to explain the 
epistemic gaps, not to close them.  It accepts that phenomenal truths cannot be deduced 
a priori from physical-functional truths.  In Chalmers’s (2003a) classification, it is a “type-
B” strategy (see §1.16 above).  
Nonetheless, because the phenomenal-concept strategy shares many features of  the 
type-C account I have argued for, including the appeals to direct reference and analytic 
independence, some of  the objections that have been raised to the phenomenal-concept 
strategy could also be directed against my approach.  In the remainder of  this chapter I 
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rebut three such objections.
In part C I deal with the claim that direct reference cannot explain our so-called 
“substantial grasp” of  phenomenal properties, because directly referring terms are 
“bare” of  information about their referents.   I argue that while it is not clear what this 
grasp involves, it cannot pose a problem for physicalism.  If  it is propositional 
knowledge about phenomenal properties, the type-C strategy can handle it; if  it is not, 
then it does not give rise to epistemic gaps.
In part D I discuss psychological evidence that suggest we do not have enough 
phenomenal concepts to go around: we can distinguish more colours, pitches and other 
phenomenal properties than we can re-identify over time.  I argue that to the extent we 
lack phenomenal concepts, the problems the phenomenal-concept strategy is required to 
solve disappear along with them.
Finally, in part E, I discuss Chalmers’s “master argument” (Chalmers, 2007) that 
features of  our phenomenal concepts cannot both explain our epistemic situation with 
respect to consciousness and be physically explicable themselves.  I respond that 
Chalmers’s argument affects type-B, but not type-C physicalism.
 
B. Explaining direct reference
8.1. Why the phenomenal “concept” strategy? 
Physicalist accounts of  direct reference under the “phenomenal-concept strategy” 
banner have, as the name suggests, focussed on phenomenal concepts.  In previous 
chapters, I have generally spoken of  “terms” for phenomenal properties, rather than 
dealing separately with linguistic representations (words) and mental ones (concepts).  
Because, as I have said, I take concepts to be mental entities which represent in more or 
less the same way words do (see §1.19), the distinction has so far not been material.
Why has the phenomenal-concept strategy focussed on concepts?  Not, I think, 
because its proponents have a different view of  concepts; in general they also take 
concepts to be representations.  (For an explicit statement of  this view, see the Appendix 
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to (Balog, Forthcoming).) Rather, the reason is that when proponents come to explain 
the reference of  phenomenal terms, they tend to propose mechanisms that can plausibly 
be ascribed only to mental representations.  For example, consider Brian Loar’s 
suggestion (discussed in §8.2 below) that phenomenal concepts are “recognitional” 
concepts: we are disposed to token them when we recognise an experience as having a 
particular phenomenal property (Loar, 1998).  It is plausible that we are disposed to 
token a concept whenever we recognise a phenomenal property, but less plausible that 
we are disposed to utter a word.  The point is even clearer for accounts such as Balog’s 
(Forthcoming) or Papineau’s (2002), (2007) on which phenomenal concepts are, wholly 
or partly, constituted by tokens of  the phenomenal properties they represent.  The idea 
of  one mental phenomenon constituting another is at least intelligible.  But it would be 
bizarre to say that a spoken or printed word was made of a subjective character.
Nothing in the foregoing stops us from using words to express such phenomenal 
concepts.  But the explanations offered by the phenomenal-concept strategy typically do 
their work at the level of  concepts.
8.2. Loar’s account—phenomenal concepts as property detectors
Of  all the explanations of  phenomenal reference offered by proponents of  the 
phenomenal-concept strategy, I find Loar’s view the most plausible.  In this chapter I 
will take it as the view to be defended against the dualist objections.  I do not, however, 
propose to defend Loar’s view against its physicalist rivals, except incidentally.  It is 
enough for my purposes that some physicalist account of  the direct reference of  
phenomenal concepts can succeed.
Loar’s (1998) account proposes that phenomenal concepts refer demonstratively, 
and, more specifically, that they are what he calls “recognitional type-demonstratives”.  
On his view, phenomenal concepts are demonstrative in that their referent is not 
presented as having a particular property, but rather as that kind of  experience, where 
“that” picks out a property borne by demonstrated token experiences.  Phenomenal 
concepts are “recognitional” in the sense that their reference is determined by our 
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dispositions to recognise tokens of  experience as being of  the same kind.  A 
phenomenal concept refers to that property (if  any) which is shared by the experiences 
in response to which we token that concept.  Loar claims that such properties are, in 
fact, physical-functional properties of  the brain.  Accordingly, phenomenal terms co-
refer with physical-functional terms for those properties.  But they are analytically 
independent from those physical-functional terms because phenomenal terms pick out 
those properties directly, rather than via a physical-functional description.
I have a few relatively minor disagreements with this view.  First, as mentioned in 
§1.19(a) above, I would prefer a teleosemantic account of  reference (Millikan, 1984) to 
Loar’s strictly causal one. A teleosemantic approach, on which phenomenal concepts 
refer to the properties they are designed to respond to, rather than whatever happens to 
cause us to token them, would allow phenomenal concepts to misrepresent.  Second, 
Loar says that the properties in question are “of  the brain”. While it is almost certainly 
true that our phenomenal concepts respond to properties instantiated in our brains, I 
would want to be careful to leave open the possibility that they could be instantiated in 
things that are not brains.  
Finally, I question whether such concepts are best labelled “recognitional”. As Loar 
(1998, p. 602) notes, ordinary recognitional concepts pick out their referents by their 
appearance: by what they look like to us.  So ordinary recognitional concepts do not refer 
directly; their analytic independence from physical-functional terms comes from the fact 
that their mode of  presentation is perceptual rather than physical-functional.  Loar 
denies, however, that recognitional concepts must pick out their referents by their 
appearance, and stresses that what matters for analytic independence is not having a 
physical-functional mode of  presentation, rather than having a different kind.
It seems to me that Loar’s terminology is unnecessarily misleading.  The ordinary 
notion of  “recognising” something does involve identifying it by its appearance—giving 
rise to the impression that recognitional concepts have a perceptual mode of  
presentation, which Loar must then disclaim.  It would be better to speak of  
phenomenal concepts as detecting phenomenal properties. There is no implication that we 
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detect things by what they look like—or even that we are aware of  how the detector 
works, which may be entirely opaque to us.  So “detection” looks like a better label for 
the process Loar describes.
8.3. Other versions of  the strategy—a (very) brief  history
Since Loar first published his account in 1990, a number of  versions of  the strategy 
have been proposed, not all of  which will figure in the following discussion.  Here I will 
briefly describe some of  others.
Seeds of  the strategy are, in fact, visible in (Nagel, 1974) itself.  In footnote 11 of  
that paper, Nagel suggests that the apparent contingency of  psychophysical identities 
might be explained by the different ways we imagine phenomenal and physical-functional 
states: we imagine phenomenal states “sympathetically”, by recreating them; we imagine 
physical-functional states “perceptually”, by imagining what they look like.  Since the two 
imaginative capacities are independent, we can conceive of  one without the other, which 
creates the impression that they are distinct. 
Nagel’s suggestion resembles Papineau’s explanation of  the “intuition of  
distinctness”, discussed in §2.11.  The suggestion was repeated by Hill and McLaughlin, 
who also introduced the notion of  conceptual distinctness, between what they call 
“sensory” and “physical” concepts (Hill & McLaughlin, 1999, p. 448).
Loar, as I understand it, was the first to give an explicitly physicalist account of  the 
direct reference of  phenomenal concepts.  Others have followed.  Tye (1999) combined 
a recognitional account with an appeal to the “experience-dependence” of  phenomenal 
concepts: the fact that we can only acquire them by having an experience of  the relevant 
kind.  For him, phenomenal concepts were distinguished by a specific conceptual role 
which includes being formed in response to experiences of  the relevant kind.
Appeals to experience-dependence were criticised by Stoljar (2005), who pointed 
out that experience-dependence cannot explain why phenomenal truths are not 
deducible from physics by someone who has already had the relevant experience, and so 
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has acquired the relevant concepts.  It is for this reason that the “missing-concept 
reply”72 to the knowledge argument was rejected in §5.4 above.  Although Stoljar coined 
the term “ phenomenal-concept strategy” for his target, his attack does not affect 
versions of  the strategy which do not rely on experience-dependence.
John Perry (2001) suggested that phenomenal concepts were indexicals.  The 
epistemic gaps could then be explained by the fact that statements involving indexicals 
cannot be deduced from the objective physical facts, as Perry had argued to the 
satisfaction of  many in (Perry, 1979).  Perry’s response was discussed, and rejected, in 
§5.8, on the basis that one can remedy indexical ignorance without affecting the a priori 
deducibility of  phenomenal truths.
This is not an exhaustive history of  the strategy.  Three further versions of  the 
strategy, besides Loar’s, will be discussed in detail in what follows.  These are David 
Papineau’s early “quotational” account, his more recent “use to mention” account, and 
Katalin Balog’s “constitutive” account. It should perhaps also be noted that dualists 
often say similar things about phenomenal concepts: on Chalmers’s account, in 
particular, non-physical phenomenal properties help constitute phenomenal concepts in 
much the same way physical-functional properties do on Balog’s account.
8.4. Are phenomenal concepts demonstratives?
Loar describes his directly-referring phenomenal concepts as demonstratives.  He is not 
alone in that.  Papineau (2002) described his quotational concepts as demonstratives, and 
Levin (2007) uses “demonstrative” generally for accounts of  phenomenal concepts that 
do not invoke a relation of  acquaintance (see §8.10 below).
A demonstrative account of  phenomenal concepts has obvious attractions for the 
physicalist.  Demonstrative terms are not analytically connected to non-demonstrative 
terms for the same referent.  To know that an utterance of  “that is a hat” is true, for 
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relevant physical concepts.  See the discussion of  (Stoljar, 2001) in §1.10.
example, one needs to know a posteriori facts about the context in which “that” is being 
used.    If  phenomenal concepts are demonstratives, psychophysical identity statements 
will be a posteriori for the same reason.
On the other hand, once the a posteriori physical-functional facts are known, they 
will tell us what we need to know about the context in which the demonstrative is used 
in order to determine its reference.  So psychophysical identity statements will be 
derivable a priori from P, the statement of  all the facts of  physics.  A demonstrative view 
is therefore friendly to the type-C physicalist view about both psychophysical identities 
and psychophysical supervenience.
The demonstrative view has been criticised, however, on the basis that it makes 
phenomenal concepts bare pointers to their referents.  Phenomenal concepts, the 
objection goes, give us a substantial “grasp” of  phenomenal properties (Levine, 2007).  
Before turning to that objection in part C, it is necessary to clarify the precise sense, if  
any, in which phenomenal concepts are demonstrative.
In the discussion of  “gappiness” in §7.15(a) I rejected the idea that phenomenal 
terms were ascriptively demonstrative.  Unlike “that”, the user of  a phenomenal term does 
not know a priori that its referent is whatever bears a certain contextual relation to the 
term.  If  they did, then we would face no residual puzzlement about how pain could be 
C-fibre stimulation: once we learnt the necessary facts about reference, “pain is C-fibre 
stimulation” would no more demand explanation than “that is a hat”.  And that seems 
false.
So if  phenomenal concepts are demonstrative, they must be non-ascriptively 
demonstrative.  What would that amount to?  Taking Kaplan’s account (Kaplan, 1989b) 
of  a demonstrative as a term whose reference depends on the context of  use, there are 
two things we might say.  We might say that, like “that”, the reference of  a phenomenal 
concept varies according to which phenomenal properties are instantiated when it is 
being used.  But that seems inconsistent with the way phenomenal concepts are 
individuated.  It is not that we have a single phenomenal concept which refers to 
whatever type of  experience we are currently having.  Rather, we have a distinct 
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phenomenal concept representing each phenomenal property.  On Loar’s account, for 
example, the phenomenal concept redness picks out phenomenal redness by virtue of  
being tokened in response to red experiences.  The phenomenal concept greenness we 
token in response to green experiences is a distinct concept.  And this seems the 
appropriate treatment.  Papineau (2007, p. 113) rejects his own earlier (2002) 
demonstrative account in part for this sort of  reason. Chalmers makes the same point at 
(2003b, p. 225).
The second thing we might say is that, like a demonstrative, the referent of  a 
phenomenal concept is determined by what stands in the appropriate contextual relation 
to tokens of  the concept.  But this is true of  all directly referring terms: they refer to 
whatever stands in the appropriate reference-determining relation.  So in the end, I do 
not think much is gained by speaking of  phenomenal concepts as demonstratives, rather 
than simply as referring directly.  
8.5. Mixed demonstratives and phenomenal modes of  presentation
Loar suggests that phenomenal concepts are mixed demonstratives: they involve both a 
demonstrative “that” and a term specifying that what is demonstrated is phenomenal: 
“that type of  sensation” or “that feature of  visual experience” (Loar, 1998, p. 597) (my 
emphasis).  Similarly, Papineau (2002) took phenomenal concepts to be mixed 
demonstratives of  the form “the experience:—”, where the gap is filled by an experience 
bearing the relevant phenomenal property.  
It might seem that if  phenomenal concepts are analytically associated with terms 
like “sensation”, they do not refer directly, but rather have phenomenal modes of  
presentation.  Such terms do not, however, affect the overall story.  For the relevant 
predicates—“sensation”, “visual experience”—are themselves phenomenal terms, 
referring to subjective character itself  or to broad categories thereof.73  As I stressed in 
§2.9, the crucial feature of  phenomenal concepts is not direct reference as such, but 
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independence would be compromised.  See (Papineau, 2007).
analytic independence from physical-functional terms.  It is quite consistent with that 
independence that there be analytic connections among phenomenal terms. 
For example, let “X” be a phenomenal term for phenomenal orangeness.  (I use 
“X” in place of  “phenomenal orangeness” in this context since the term’s analytic 
connection to “phenomenal” is what is at issue.)  It might be analytic that X is the 
phenomenal colour that appears to be half-way between red and yellow.  Or it might just 
be analytic that X is a phenomenal colour.  So stipulate that “phenomenal colour” is a 
phenomenal term that serves as a representational mode of  presentation for “X”.74
This does not affect the analytic independence of  “X” from physical-functional 
terms.  A psychophysical identity statement of  the form “phenomenal colour is !-fibre 
stimulation”, where the latter is physical-functional term for a neurological property, will 
still be a posteriori and counter-conceivable.  There are the same (real or apparent) 
epistemic gaps between that statement and statements of  physics.  
The physicalist will then say a) that “phenomenal colour” also refers to a physical-
functional property, b) that “phenomenal colour” has no analytic connections to 
physical-functional terms, and c) that “phenomenal colour” refers directly to that 
physical-functional property.  Now one might deny c) by extending the process a step or 
two further: perhaps phenomenal properties in all modalities are presented as 
“phenomenal”.  But to avoid the dilemma posed by White75—regress or dualism—a 
physicalist must eventually stop positing representational modes of  presentation and 
claim direct reference.  And then the analytic independence of  “phenomenal colour” 
preserves the independence of  terms for which it serves as a representational mode of  
presentation.
The responses to apparent contingency (§2.11) and gappiness (part D of  chapter 7) 
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analytic which colour “X” referred to.  See §1.19 above.
75 See §3.3 above.  Loar (1998, p. 604) argues that the concept phenomenal concept also refers directly; 
presumably that is because the concept phenomenal property refers directly, as I have suggested, though Loar 
does not quite say so explicitly.
are only slightly different if  some phenomenal terms have phenomenal modes of  
presentation.  In the first instance, it looks like this move gives the physicalist a new 
answer: these features of  psychophysical identity statements can now be explained by 
the difference between phenomenal and physical-functional modes of  presentation.  But 
that merely shifts the problem to the phenomenal mode of  presentation, and ultimately 
to the directly referring phenomenal terms, whichever they are.  The gappiness of  
psychophysical identity statements involving those terms can still be explained by the 
difference between terms with and without representational modes of  presentation.  
That completes my characterisation of  phenomenal concepts and how they refer.  
Before turning to what I see as the major objections to views of  this type, I will briefly 
consider a few other issues it raises.
8.6. Is direct reference possible?  
A very basic question for any account that invokes direct reference is whether direct 
reference is possible at all.  This question raises general issues concerning the 
foundations of  reference, which must be set aside here in favour of  issues regarding the 
direct reference of  phenomenal terms in particular.  Nonetheless, it seems to me that 
some terms must refer directly.  I assume a realist understanding of  reference: there is a 
mind- and language-independent world, and reference is a relation between terms and 
aspects of  that world.  (See §1.19 above.)  Now, the reference of  a term which does not 
refer directly depends on, and presupposes, the reference of  its representational mode of 
presentation.  But such delegation cannot go on forever.  Reference must ultimately be 
explained by a relation that links terms to the world, not simply to other terms.  Perhaps 
that link is causal, perhaps it is teleological (Millikan, 1984), perhaps it is something else.  
But if  there is such a relation, there seems no reason to think that a term could not refer 
simply by bearing it.
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
199
8.7. Are phenomenal concepts sui generis?  
If  phenomenal concepts refer directly, are they the only ones?  Levine distinguishes 
between “exceptionalist” strategies, which claim that only phenomenal concepts bear the 
relevant features, and “non-exceptionalist” strategies, which allow that other concepts do 
too (Levine, 2001, pp. 50-51).   If  the physicalist says that only phenomenal concepts 
refer directly, it may look like special pleading, an ad hoc response to the epistemic gaps 
(Levine, 2001, p. 51), (Loar, 1998, p. 602), (Papineau, 2007, p. 130).
I take the non-exceptionalist view.  Nothing about the notion of  direct reference 
implies that only phenomenal concepts refer directly.  To be sure, concepts of  mental 
properties are perhaps the most obvious candidate for direct reference.  Mental 
properties are certainly the best placed to constitute or be quoted by concepts, as 
suggested by some versions of  the phenomenal-concept strategy.  But we might equally 
have such concepts of  non-phenomenal mental properties.  (See part C below for 
discussion of  a hypothetical example.)
Nor are mental properties the only candidates for direct reference.  There seems no 
reason to think we cannot have concepts that detect non-mental properties.  We would 
have to be related to the relevant property somehow (presumably causally), but as long 
as the concept is not analytically associated with a description of  that relation, it will still 
count as referring directly. 
As Levine notes, the non-exceptionalist position is associated with a general 
scepticism about a priori deductions from physics.  For example, Block & Stalnaker 
(1999) claim that there are few if  any analytic connections between the vocabulary of  
physics and higher-level vocabularies, and so that one cannot deduce, say, the facts about 
water from the facts about H2O.  But as was argued in chapter 4, such matters can be 
deduced a priori from P (the complete statement of  the facts of  physics) without appeal 
to analytic connections.  So one can take a non-exceptionalist position, agree with Block 
and Stalnaker about “water”, and still accept the APET.  
But if  phenomenal concepts were the only ones that referred directly, would that be 
a problem?  It would hardly be surprising if  phenomenal concepts were special, because 
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there is clearly something unusual about our epistemic relation to our experience.  It is 
not arbitrary or ad hoc to posit unusual features where there is an unusual situation to be 
explained.
Levine (2007, p. 151) suggests that the exceptionalist position leads to a 
phenomenological foundationalism.  It implies, he claims, that “only phenomenal 
concepts (along with logical, mathematical and indexical concepts, and perhaps the 
concept of  causation) are primitive, and that all of  our other concepts are ultimately 
definable in terms of  them.”  In response, I note that nothing about this account 
commits the physicalist to defining other terms in phenomenal terms.  Even if  all other 
terms have phenomenal terms as modes of  presentation, the phenomenal terms might, 
in Kripke’s terms (see §2.2(b) above) fix reference rather than give meaning.  Consider 
Stephen Yablo’s (Yablo, 2002) description of  “response-enabled” concepts, like oval: 
although we pick out ovals by their appearance, oval is still a term for figures with a 
certain geometric property, not for those which look a certain way to us.  
So the exceptionalist is not committed to a Russellian or verificationist semantics.  
Still, if  only phenomenal terms refer directly, then all other terms must refer with the 
help of  phenomenology.  If  you don’t like your empiricism quite so strong, you have a 
reason to look for direct reference in other places as well.76  But neither the 
exceptionalist nor the non-exceptionalist view would pose a problem for the defence of  
type-C physicalism.
8.8. Strong necessities
Finally, it is worth noting briefly that one of  the major challenges for the phenomenal-
concept strategy is the problem facing type-B physicalism generally, that is, the issue of  
brute or “strong” a posteriori necessities, which remain a posteriori even when all the a 
posteriori physical facts about the world, including those determining the reference of  
terms, are known.  For the reasons discussed in chapter 4, the type-B physicalist seems 
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phenomenalism (2003b, section 5).
forced to claim that psychophysical supervenience involves such necessities.  As a result, 
much of  (Chalmers, 2010), for example, is occupied with batting down purported strong 
necessities on which brutely necessary psychophysical identities might be modelled.    
More generally, it is hard to see how an account of  phenomenal terms could explain a 
non-semantic necessity.  Fortunately type-C physicalism does not face this challenge, 
since it holds that true psychophysical supervenience statements are a priori.
C. Direct reference and “substantial grasps” 
8.9. Introduction: the bareness of  direct reference
As mentioned in §8.7, nothing about the direct reference account requires that what the 
referent be a phenomenal property.  Balog (1999) imagined “yogis”, beings who have 
directly referring concepts of  some of  their non-phenomenal mental properties.  Those 
concepts function as detectors of  such properties: they are tokened when the yogi has a 
brain state with that property, but they carry no information about the physical-
functional nature of  the neural property involved.  Call one such concept flurg.  Ex 
hypothesi, flurg refers to a property of  the yogis’ brains: call it “E-fibre stimulation”.  But 
because flurg refers directly, it has no analytic connections to neurological terms like “E-
fibre stimulation”, or to physical-functional terms generally.
Balog’s intent was to provide a reductio of  the epistemic gap arguments.  She argued 
that statements involving flurg would display the same (real or apparent) epistemic 
disconnection from physical-functional statements that face phenomenal statements.  
Yogis could therefore run epistemic gap arguments to the conclusion that flurg was not 
identical to any physical-functional property.  But ex hypothesi flurg is a physical-functional 
property, so the epistemic gap arguments must be unsound.
That was then.  Balog (Forthcoming, p. 10) now claims that phenomenal concepts 
cannot be like flurg after all.  Concepts like flurg are bare pointers: they do not involve 
any information about their referent.  But phenomenal concepts, Balog argues, give us a 
“substantial grasp into the nature of  conscious states”.  
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Balog changed her view because she has been persuaded by arguments about gappy 
identities (Levine, 2001) that we have substantial grasps of  phenomenal properties in 
terms of  what it’s like to have the experiences that bear them.  These substantial grasps 
distinguish phenomenal concepts from mere brain-state detectors like flurg.  If  yogis 
learn that flurg detects E-fibre stimulation, Balog intuits, they will face no residual 
puzzlement about how flurgs could be E-fibre stimulations.  Because flurgs are non-
phenomenal states, they have no “what-it’s-likeness” to remain stubbornly unexplained.  
In the phenomenal case, by contrast, there is what-it’s-likeness, we know about it, and we 
want it explained.
For the reasons given in part D of  chapter 7, I do not believe substantial grasps 
need to be posited to explain gappiness.  Nonetheless, the idea that we have a substantial 
grasp of  phenomenal properties has some independent plausibility.  It does seem that our 
knowledge of  what it’s like to see red goes beyond having a concept that refers to 
phenomenal redness.  We don’t just have labels for phenomenal redness, it seems, we 
know something about what it’s like to see red.  Yogis would not have equivalent 
knowledge about flurgs, since there is nothing equivalent to know.  If  so, there is 
something about our epistemic situation with respect to phenomenal properties which 
cannot be explained solely by appeal to our having concepts that refer to them directly.  
In the next section, §8.10, I consider some prior physicalist responses to this problem, 
and conclude that they are inadequate.  Then, in §8.11, I explain why I am sceptical 
about substantial grasps; and why, if  we have them, they do not pose a problem for 
physicalism. 
Before turning to that, however, I need to respond to Balog’s intuition that flurg-
physical identities would not be gappy.  The explanation of  gappiness I gave in chapter 7 
implies that those identities would be gappy: flurg, like phenomenal concepts, lacks a 
representational mode of  presentation.  If  Balog is right, and they are not gappy, they 
are a counter-example to my explanation. 
My response is that yogis would face a puzzlement about how flurgs could be E-
fibre stimulation, if  flurg refers directly.  The intuition that they would not perhaps 
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stems from assuming that flurg is ascriptively a brain-state detector: that yogis know a 
priori that flurg refers to whatever type of  brain state causes them to token flurg.77  If  
they do, learning that it is E-fibre stimulation will give them all the explanation they 
need.78  But if  they do not, it seems to me that yogis would be open to analogous doubts 
about how flurgs could be complex neuro-chemical arrangements.  Flurgs don’t seem 
anything like complex neuro-chemical arrangements!  Flurg might instead be what 
Chalmers calls an “Edenic” concept, one which—like our ordinary concepts of  colours
—appears to refer to a primitive categorical property distinct from any complex physical 
basis (Chalmers, 2006).
We cannot ask yogis.  But Levin suggests that blindsight subjects might be made, 
via forced choice, to develop directly referring concepts of  the states they are in when 
they are “guess” correctly that a line is vertical (Levin, 2007, p. 91 fn.10).  If  so—and 
their concepts are genuinely referring directly, not via a description like “the state I’m in 
when I guess right”—my account predicts that they will wonder how those states could 
be complex neural-chemical arrangements.
8.10. Physicalist responses
The physicalist could explain the difference between phenomenal concepts and flurg in 
a variety of  ways.  In this section I will discuss, and reject, three proposals from (Levin, 
2007) for rescuing the idea that phenomenal concepts are bare pointers which do not 
give us substantial grasps of  phenomenal properties.  I will then discuss the converse 
approach, taken by Balog, of  explaining substantial grasps as a result of  our 
“acquaintance” with phenomenal properties, where acquaintance is a physical epistemic 
relation.  I will argue that this, too, is inadequate.  
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77 Chalmers (2007, p. 179) asserts without argument that yogis would know just that.
78 See the discussion of  “that is Brian’s car” in §7.15.
a) Distinction at the level of  reference
The first response Levin suggests is that the difference between phenomenal concepts 
and flurg or blindsight concepts is simply that phenomenal concepts are concepts of  
phenomenal properties.  Phenomenal concepts, Levin argues, demonstrate states that it is 
like something to have, while flurg does not.
This point is certainly capable of  demarcating phenomenal concepts from non-
phenomenal directly referring concepts.  It cannot, however, explain cognitive differences 
between phenomenal concepts and others.  To use Levin’s example, Ford-
demonstratives can be distinguished from Maserati-demonstratives by their referents; 
but that does not give Maserati-concepts any cognitive features that Ford-concepts lack.  
If  we know more about Maseratis than Fords, that cannot be explained by the difference 
in referent alone.  There is no explanation of  “substantial grasps” here.
b) Substantial grasps as knowledge of  intra-phenomenal relations
Levin’s second suggestion is that our substantial grasp could consist of  certain (explicit 
or implicit) knowledge about the relations between experiences: knowledge that is not 
analytic, but is nonetheless associated with the acquisition of  the concept.  Her model is 
wine-tasting: we are taught to identify, say, tannin in part by being told that there’s lots of 
it in Cabernet Sauvignon and less of  it in Pinot Noir.  When, after practice, we can 
isolate and identify what tannin feels like in the mouth, we learn that Cabernet and Pinot 
differ in that way.  
That we have this sort of  knowledge about the relations between phenomenal 
experiences is plausible enough.  And it may amount to a “substantial grasp” of  
phenomenal properties, in a natural sense.  On the other hand, our knowledge of  
phenomenal properties doesn’t seem to be limited to the relations between them: we 
seem to know how they are in themselves.  Mary, one thinks, would know what it was 
like to see red as soon as she saw the rose, before she had seen any other colours with 
which to compare it.  
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It’s also worth noting that phenomenal knowledge of  this sort would not create 
gappiness.  There is nothing mysterious about Cabernet and Pinot having some property 
in greater or lesser measure, unless the physical nature of  that property is itself  
mysterious.
c) Analytic connections between phenomenal terms
In an earlier paper, Levin (2002) suggested that phenomenal concepts are “hybrids”, 
combining relational descriptions of  quality spaces with “slots” for type-demonstratives.  
In (Levin, 2007, p. 98) she suggests that what we learn when we see a new colour is that 
that is what fits into the relevant slot in the quality space.   
Levin takes this account to be inconsistent with the demonstrative account of  
phenomenal concepts, which is why she added the suggestion about non-conceptual 
knowledge (b) above).  For the reasons given in §8.5, however, I think the present 
account is consistent with analytic independence.   But like the previous response, it 
gives us knowledge only of  relations between phenomenal properties.
d) “Acquaintance” and constitutive accounts of  phenomenal concepts
So how can we know about what it is like to have a certain experience, independently of  
how it compares to others?  Levine (2007, p. 158) suggests that we are “acquainted” with 
phenomenal properties, in the Russellian sense.  Phenomenal properties, he suggests, are 
“cognitively present” to us, in an epistemic relation that is “more intimate, more 
substantive, than the kind of  relation that obtains between our minds and other items”.  
(Levine disclaims any implication that such acquaintance is foundational to epistemology 
or to reference.) 
If  Levine is right, what is needed is a physicalist account of  the acquaintance 
relation.  Katalin Balog’s version of  the phenomenal-concept strategy attempts to give 
just this (Balog, Forthcoming).  According to her, each token of  a phenomenal concept 
is partly constituted by a token of  the relevant experience.  The concept refers to the 
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property by incorporating an instance of  that property, much as a token quotation 
incorporates a token of  the term to which it refers (as in: “the word ‘red’ ”).  
Accordingly, “when I token the concept I am acquainted with, have insight into, a 
substantial feature of  the experience” (Balog, Forthcoming, p. 24).
Papineau’s earlier “quotational” account of  phenomenal concepts was quite similar 
to Balog’s (Papineau, 2002).  He claimed that phenomenal concepts consisted of  a 
demonstrative frame “the experience:—-”, the gap in which is filled by a token 
experience bearing the relevant phenomenal property.  Papineau’s revised view (2007) 
abandons the quotational/demonstrative idea, in favour of  making the relation between 
phenomenal property and concept even closer.  On his new view, phenomenal concepts 
are perceptual concepts used to think about the perception rather than about the thing 
perceived.  In turn, perceptual concepts are tokens of  the kind of  experience in 
question: either occurrent perceptions or imagined recreations.  So a phenomenal 
concept deploys the experience to represent itself.  That is not as mysterious as it might 
sound: the same trick is pulled by self-referring terms like “this phrase”.  Ned Block 
defends a view similar to Papineau’s in (Block, 2007, p. 252).
Much more needs to be said to complete these various accounts.  The notions of  
quotation and constitution need to be cashed out in physicalistically acceptable terms.  
The accounts also need to address such questions as which of  the phenomenal 
properties borne by the quoted experience is the referent (Balog, Forthcoming, p. 31).  
There is also the question of  how we refer to phenomenal properties we do not 
currently have.  Papineau (2002) used to bite the bullet here: he claimed that we could 
not, and that to think of  a phenomenal property we had to token it (or a faint 
imaginative copy).  Other views, however, distinguish “direct” phenomenal concepts of  
occurrent phenomenal properties from “indirect” (Balog), “phenomenally 
derived” (Papineau, 2007) or “standing” (Chalmers, 2003b) concepts of  non-occurrent 
phenomenal properties.  If  those concepts also face epistemic gaps, then there is a need 
for an explanation of  of  gappiness for non-constitutive concepts.
But let’s assume for the sake of  argument that there is a workable notion of  
Could Consciousness be Physically Realised?
207
reference that proceeds via the idea of  constitution.  Could it explain our substantial 
grasp of  phenomenal properties?  Levine (2007, p. 162) responds that constitution does 
not help.  What needs to be explained is a certain cognitive relation we have to our 
phenomenal properties.  The constitutive account proposes that our phenomenal 
concepts have a certain close physical connection to the properties: they incorporate 
tokens of  them.  But there is no reason to think, Levine argues, that that physical 
connection gives rise to a close cognitive connection.
Whether this objection is valid depends on what sort of  cognitive connection is 
involved.  The constitutive account, if  true, could explain quite a bit about our epistemic 
situation.  For one thing, it would give a natural explanation of  why we cannot acquire 
phenomenal concepts without having the relevant sorts of  experience for ourselves.  It 
could explain the apparent incorrigibility of  our judgements about them: when I use the 
phenomenal concept pain to judge “I am in pain”, my judgement would be self-
verifying.  (See part B of  chapter 9 below for more on this.)  It might also explain, if  not 
knowledge, the absence of  any feeling of ignorance about phenomenal properties.  
Whenever we think about phenomenal redness using a phenomenal concept, there is a 
token of  that property in consciousness, so we never need to wonder what it’s like to see 
red.
On the other hand, Levine is right that moving the properties inside our concepts 
of  them gives us no more knowledge of  their nature than we could get by demonstrating 
them outside the concept.  As Levin (2007, p. 91) points out, there seems to be no 
reason why concepts of  non-phenomenal properties (like flurg) could not incorporate 
tokens of  their referent in the same way.
The question, then, is whether our substantial grasp on a phenomenal property 
involves knowledge about what it is like to have that type of  experience.  If  so, 
possession of  directly referring concepts will not give us that knowledge, and it must be 
explained in some other way.
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8.11. What substantial grasp?
Do substantial grasps involve that sort of  knowledge?  What is it to be “acquainted” 
with a phenomenal property, over and above having that property, and having a name for 
it?
Levine (2007, p. 159) describes acquaintance as an epistemic relation to phenomenal 
properties.  So it is fair to ask: what, exactly, do we know about what it’s like to see red 
by virtue of  being acquainted with it?  
One way—certainly not the only way, but the way I will consider first—of  putting 
that question is: what predicate “!” can we use to complete the statement “what it’s like 
to see red is !”, and thereby state the subjective character of  experiences of  red?
There are certainly things of  this form we can say about phenomenal redness, but 
none of  them seem adequate to state its phenomenal nature.  First, we can say various 
non-phenomenal things about it: that it is produced by experiences of  certain rose 
varieties, that it is common in ordinary human life, that it grabs our attention.   That sort 
of  non-phenomenal knowledge poses no problem for physicalism, of  course.  But it 
can’t be what we’re looking for: it is common ground with the dualist that no physical-
functional description of  experiences can state their phenomenal nature.
Second, we can describe them in phenomenal terms.  A particular red experience 
might be not just red but dark red, or glossy, or highly saturated.  And we can describe 
how phenomenal properties compare or relate to each other: this shade is darker than 
that one, orange appears half-way between red and yellow.
This sort of  intra-phenomenal knowledge also raises no (new) problem for 
physicalism.  The physicalist can say the same thing about “darkness” that was said 
about “redness”—Mary can deduce its physical-functional reference from P.  Likewise 
for the phenomenal properties to which redness is related or with which it is compared.
But perhaps this, too, fails to capture our substantial grasp of  our phenomenal 
properties.  Phenomenal descriptions, after all, merely push the problem to the 
properties mentioned in the description: what is our substantial grasp of  phenomenal 
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darkness, or glossiness?  Intra-phenomenal relations, likewise, can only push the problem 
around.  If  we are acquainted with phenomenal properties, we are acquainted with them 
as they are in themselves, not just in relation to others.  Mary, presumably, gets her 
substantial grasp of  phenomenal redness as soon as she sees the rose; she doesn’t have 
to wait until she has seen other colours to compare it with.
How, then, can we describe phenomenal redness as it is in itself?  One way is simply 
to call it “phenomenal redness” again, but that hardly helps.   But neither of  the 
alternatives—phenomenal or physical-functional terms—can do the trick.  The only 
remaining possibility seems to be to demonstrate a token of  the phenomenal property 
itself, and say: what it’s like to see red is that, where “that” describes it as the object of  an 
introspective demonstration.  But, as Levine argues, demonstratives do not give 
substantial descriptions of  phenomenal properties.
Balog (Forthcoming, pp. 28-29) suggests that we make judgements of  the form 
“phenomenal redness refers to *phenomenal redness*”, where “*phenomenal 
redness*” is not a term but an instance of  phenomenal redness.  It is as if  we had formed 
a Lagadonian79 name for a particular dog by putting quote marks around it, and then 
disquoted to get the dog.  This is a fascinating suggestion, but for purposes of  knowing 
something about phenomenal redness it gets us no further than the idea of  
demonstration.
In the end, as far as I can see, we cannot give a substantive answer to “what is it like 
to see red?”.  We can only compare it other phenomenal properties, or describe its 
relations to physical-functional phenomena, neither of  seem adequate to the task, and 
neither of  which raise a new problem for physicalism.  The problem is not just that we 
can’t describe what it’s like to see red to someone who hasn’t seen it—to pre-rose Mary 
or to a zombie.  We lack even a private vocabulary with which to describe phenomenal 
redness to ourselves.
I suggest what that this shows is that we do not, after all, know anything about 
phenomenal redness as it is “in itself ”.  What we gain when when we first see red is just 
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79 (Lewis, 1986, p. 145).
the knowledge that “phenomenal redness is that”, where “that” picks out phenomenal 
redness as the object of  an introspective demonstration.  The claim that we know 
something substantive about what it’s like to see red is just false.  Phenomenal concepts 
are simply names we give to those properties.  They do not describe them as they are “in 
themselves”, because we cannot describe them as they are in themselves.
But perhaps, in asking for a predicate, I have simply phrased the question too 
narrowly.  What if  our substantive grasp of  phenomenal redness simply cannot be 
expressed in predicate form?  Perhaps it is not propositional knowledge.  Perhaps the 
relation of  acquaintance gives us epistemic access to what it’s like to see red without 
giving us new predicates with which to formulate statements about it. 
Perhaps.  I do feel the intuitive pull of  the idea that Mary gains something more than 
propositional knowledge about what it’s like to see red.  But remember why we’re here.  
If  what Mary learns is not propositional, we have no reason to think it is knowledge of  
something non-physical.  The arguments for dualism depend on our inability to deduce a 
priori, or to explain, what it’s like to see red using physical-functional premises.  But if  
our acquaintance with what it’s like to see red is not propositional knowledge, then it is 
not the sort of  thing that can be deduced at all.  Nor is it the sort of  thing which can serve 
as an explanandum.  So our inability to infer it from our physical-functional knowledge 
poses no problem for physicalism.  
A non-conceptual relation of  acquaintance is unproblematic for the same reason 
that knowledge-how is unproblematic (see §5.7 above).  The physicalist can say that 
Mary gains the Nemirov-Lewis abilities—to remember, imagine and recognise red—
when she sees the rose, since possession of  an ability is not the sort of  thing she could have 
deduced, whether or not physicalism is true.  For the same reason, Mary can 
unproblematically come into new relations to phenomenal properties, since being in a 
relation is not a deducible sort of  thing either.  This is the reason that some physicalists 
have proposed that knowledge-by-acquaintance provides an answer to the knowledge 
argument (see §5.14(a) above).
To be sure, knowledge about relations, like knowledge about abilities, can be 
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deduced.  So the physicalist has to admit that Mary would know about the relation of  
acquaintance between experiencers and their phenomenal properties.  Similarly, the 
acquaintance relation itself, like the Nemirov-Lewis abilities, would need to be given a 
physical explanation; and Mary the omniscient would know what that explanation was.  
But it does not follow that Mary could think herself  into bearing that relation by 
reflecting on her physical-functional knowledge.  (This point, I think, provides a possible 
answer to the intuition reported by Graham and Horgan (Graham & Horgan, 2000) that 
Mary would be “surprised and unexpectedly delighted” on becoming acquainted with 
colours, even if  she had philosophical knowledge of  both phenomenal properties and 
phenomenal concepts.)
I said just then that Mary would know the explanation of  the acquaintance relation. 
Levine (2007, p. 163), however, suggests that because neither bare direct reference nor 
constitutive accounts of  phenomenal concepts can explain substantial grasps, the 
physicalist has no resources left with which to explain acquaintance.
Levine is right that, if  acquaintance is a genuine epistemic relation, it is something 
that a physicalist account of  consciousness—or any other—needs to explain.  Without a 
clearer understanding of  what acquaintance is supposed to tell us about phenomenal 
properties, it is hard to speculate as to how the physicalist might go about explaining it.  
But there is no reason in principle to think that, whatever acquaintance tells us, that 
knowledge cannot be explained physically.  Moreover, the problem is just as difficult for 
the dualist.  In particular, moving non-physical properties inside our phenomenal 
concepts, as Chalmers does (2003b), is no better off  as an account of  knowledge than 
the physicalist equivalent.  The only option the dualist has that the physicalist does not is 
to say, as Levine speculates (2007, p. 165), that acquaintance is a “brute relation”—a 
fundamental epistemic relation endemic to the phenomenal domain.  But that, of  
course, would be no explanation at all.
In summary: if  our “substantial grasp” of  phenomenal properties can be expressed 
propositionally, using predicates to represent what we know about phenomenal 
properties, there is no problem for physicalism, since the reference of  those predicates 
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can be deduced from P, and the type-C physicalist response to the arguments for 
dualism goes through as before.  If  we have no knowledge about phenomenal properties 
as they are in themselves, there is nothing to explain.  And if  we do have knowledge 
about phenomenal properties, but it is non-propositional, the dualist arguments do not 
get off  the ground.
D. Do we have enough phenomenal concepts?
8.12. Raffman’s evidence that we do not
The ultimate success of  the phenomenal-concept strategy depends not only on showing 
that phenomenal concepts of  the kind they describe would explain the epistemic gaps.  It 
is also necessary that our phenomenal concepts actually work that way.  This is a 
psychological question as well as a philosophical one—it would be hubristic to think we 
can gain a complete understanding of  how our phenomenal concepts operate by 
armchair investigation alone.  I acknowledge this point as a hostage to empirical fortune.  
But one result from perceptual psychology already suggests that the account must fail as 
an empirical matter, because we do not have phenomenal concepts of  all the 
phenomenal properties we experience.
Diana Raffman (1996) reports experimental evidence that we can discriminate 
between colours much more finely than we can categorise them.  If  we are 
simultaneously presented with two very slightly different red hues (“red31” and “red32”, 
say) we can distinguish them: they look phenomenally different.  But we cannot re-
identify either shade as such if  it is re-presented some time later.  Rather, we can identify 
hues only as members of  more general categories—not as general as “red”, but still 
much more general than “red31”.  In fact it turns out that we can reliably identify only a 
dozen or so categories of  hue, though we can discriminate ten times more finely. (The 
same is true for other modalities, such as hearing: we can distinguish about 1400 pitch 
steps, but identify only eighty pitch bands.)
All this is for good reasons of  cognitive economy: encoding perceptions into 
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relatively broad categories reduces information load.  We save cognitive resources by 
limiting the number of  our perceptual “schemas”—psychological structures which store 
information about how colours look.  Red31 and red32 can be distinguished by the 
perceptual system, but they activate the same schema for storage purposes.  The 
difference between them is lost to memory.
None of  this is a problem for physicalism as such.  The physicalist can 
acknowledge that we are imperfect rememberers.  Detecting differences and classifying 
for future reference are different tasks, so there’s no great mystery about how we could 
be better at one than the other.  
But this finding makes trouble for the phenomenal-concept strategy, because it is 
hard to see how we could have more phenomenal concepts than we have perceptual 
schemas.  The problem is obvious for an account like Loar’s, on which the reference of  
a phenomenal concept is determined by our dispositions to token the concept in 
response to its referent.  If  Raffman is correct, we have no dispositions to token any 
mental representation in response to red31 in particular, as opposed to red32.  But the 
problem is more general (Raffman, 1996, p. 299).  If  there is no mental representation 
which applies to red31 whenever we encounter it (modulo normal rates of  error), we do 
not have a concept that represents red31 at all.  By the same token, we do not have a 
concept of  what it’s like to see red31.  Perhaps we can think about those experiences as 
we have them—we have token representations of  token instances of  red31 and of  its 
phenomenal appearance.  But we do not have a type-concept that represents the 
phenomenal property those tokens have in common.
We can have non-phenomenal concepts of  particular properties, of  course: we can 
pick out red31 by the surface properties of  red31 objects, for example.  And if  physicalism 
is true, we can have a physical-functional concept of  its phenomenal character.  But such 
physical-functional concepts will not do the work that the phenomenal-concept strategy 
needs done (Raffman, 1996, p. 299).  Finally, our general phenomenal concepts (such as 
redness) will sometimes be tokened in response to red31, but we cannot simply classify 
those tokenings together and call them a phenomenal concept of  red31, precisely because 
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we have no way of  (phenomenally) identifying those occasions.
Now our experience of  red31, and of  other particular hues, seems no more 
susceptible to physical-functional explanation than our experience of  broader colour 
categories.  So the problem for the phenomenal-concept strategy seems obvious.  We 
cannot explain our epistemic situation with regard to phenomenal properties by 
appealing to features of  phenomenal concepts where we do not have phenomenal concepts. 
8.13. Physicalist responses to conceptual shortfall
Can the phenomenal-concept strategy survive such a shortfall of  phenomenal concepts?  
Levin (2007) suggests that if  we do not have a phenomenal concept of  red31 then we do 
not know what it’s like to see red31, except when we’re actually looking at it.  When we 
are looking at a patch of  red31, we can represent that patch with a token concept, which 
we can use to judge that “seeing red31 is like this”.  But we forget what it’s like to see red31 
when the patch leaves our field of  view, and can no longer make any such judgement.   
Loar (2003) argues that dualist arguments such as Kripke’s (see chapter 2 above) also 
depend on special features of  phenomenal concepts: namely, that they do not have 
descriptive reference-fixers.  If  there is no concept, there is no Kripkean argument that 
psychophysical identity statements must be a priori; in which case there would be no 
problem for the physicalist.  The same point can be made about Chalmers’s argument 
from the semantic stability of  phenomenal concepts, and about Levine’s claim that 
phenomenal concepts have “substantial” modes of  presentation.
It seems to me that both Levin’s and Loar’s responses have merit.  There is, 
however, a more general reply, incorporating the spirit of  both Levin’s and Loar’s 
responses.  For Raffman’s argument misconceives the burden of  the phenomenal-
concept strategy.  The “feature” of  phenomenal concepts to which the strategy appeals 
is actually a deficit: their lack of  analytic connections to physical-functional terms.  That 
lack is what makes psychophysical identity statements a posteriori, and what makes it 
harder to deduce phenomenal truths from physical-functional ones.
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If  Raffman’s psychology is correct, some of  our representations of  phenomenal 
properties are even more impoverished than is claimed by the phenomenal-concept 
strategy, to the extent that they do not even count as concepts.  If  true, that will do 
nothing to increase the supply of  a priori knowledge.  Our lacking a concept phenomenal 
red31ness will not make “phenomenal red31ness is neural property X” a priori, or improve 
our ability to deduce phenomenal statements about phenomenal red31ness from physical-
functional statements.  On the contrary (and here I endorse Levin’s response) it would 
deprive us of  the ability to formulate statements about phenomenal red31ness in 
phenomenal terms.
When Mary sees her first rose, then, she gains the phenomenal concepts 
colouredness and redness (and of  whatever subclass of  red hues triggers the same 
perceptual schema as red31).  She does not gain a phenomenal concept red31ness—
though perhaps she gains a token-concept of  the red31 appearance of  that rose then.  
Accordingly, she cannot formulate any statements about that phenomenal property.  Any 
phenomenal statements she formulates using the concepts she does gain—type or token
—are subject to the (real or apparent) epistemic gaps.  
So the dialectic situation is as Loar describes it: Raffman’s results make no 
difference to the physicalist response to the arguments for dualism.  But the physicalist 
response can go beyond pointing out, tu quoque, that Kripke’s and Chalmers’s arguments 
also depend on features of  phenomenal concepts, and so are likewise undermined by 
Raffman’s argument.  Our lack of  phenomenal concepts also blocks epistemic gap 
arguments that make no special claims about phenomenal concepts, but simply appeal to 
the APET.
What if  Levin is wrong and there is a sense in which we “know” what it’s like to 
see red31 despite lacking a concept that represents it?  Perhaps the “substantial grasp” of  
phenomenal properties discussed in part C can be had without a phenomenal concept.  
If  so, the response given there still applies: such non-propositional knowledge is not the 
sort of  thing that can be deduced.  But however our knowledge of  what it’s like to see 
red31 is characterised, nothing about Raffman’s results creates an analytic bridge between 
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our representation of  that property and physical-functional terms for the same property.
To be sure, proponents of  the phenomenal-concept strategy do make positive 
claims about phenomenal concepts, e.g. that they are recognitional, or constituted by 
phenomenal properties.  But these claims are not intended to explain the epistemic gaps.  
They are made for one of  two other reasons.  First, to explain features of  phenomenal 
concepts, such as how they refer to physical-functional properties in the absence of  
analytic connections to physical-functional terms, or why they can only be gained 
through experience of  the relevant type.  Where we don’t have phenomenal concepts, 
neither question arises.
Second, they seek to explain other features of  our epistemic situation with respect 
to phenomenal properties, such as those listed by Dennett (1990) and discussed in part 
A of  chapter 1.  Again, however, Raffman’s results remove the problem that the 
phenomenal-concept strategy seeks to solve.  Our knowledge of  what it’s like to see 
red31 can only be private or incorrigible if  we can formulate such knowledge in the first 
place. And a shortfall of  concepts is just what we’re looking for in an explanation of  
ineffability. 
E. The Master argument
8.14. Chalmers’s dilemma
Finally, I will discuss an ingenious dilemma posed for the phenomenal-concept strategy 
in (Chalmers, 2007).
A “zombie”, as described in chapter 6, is a qualia-less denizen of  a scenario that is 
physically identical to our world.  Zombies’ epistemic situation with respect to 
phenomenal properties is very different from ours, because they don’t have any.  For 
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example, where we believe truly that we are conscious, zombies will not.80 
If  the phenomenal-concept strategy is to completely explain our epistemic situation 
with respect to consciousness, it must explain why we are in our situation and not the 
zombie’s one.   A “complete” explanation, as in chapter 7, rules out any conceivable 
scenario in which the explanans is true and the explanandum false.81  But now, Chalmers 
argues, the physicalist faces a dilemma: can we conceive of  zombie scenarios in which 
zombies’ corresponding concepts lack those features?  
If  the answer is “no”, zombies’ corresponding concepts share the features that the 
phenomenal-concept strategist ascribes to phenomenal concepts.  And features we share 
with zombies cannot explain the difference between our epistemic situation and theirs, and 
so cannot completely explain our epistemic situation.
If  the answer is “yes”, on the other hand, then we can conceive of  a situation in 
which the facts of  physics are as they actually are, but the facts about phenomenal 
concepts are different.  If  so, there are epistemic gaps between the statements of  physics 
and statements about phenomenal concepts.  But the phenomenal-concept strategy was 
supposed to explain the epistemic gaps between physics and phenomenal properties.  If  
it explains those epistemic gaps only at the cost of  creating another set of  epistemic 
gaps, this time between physics and the putative explanans, then the physicalist is no 
further forward.
8.15. Type-B responses to Chalmers’s dilemma
Papineau (2007) and Balog (Forthcoming-a) have responded that the physicalist can 
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80 Chalmers also claims that we have “cognitively significant” knowledge of  phenomenal properties that zombies 
do not, since in their world there is no such knowledge to be had.  As zombies are (by definition) functionally 
equivalent to us, any extra knowledge we have makes no difference to our cognitive processes; so it is hard to see 
in what sense it could be “cognitively significant”.  Still, all that matters for the argument is that zombies’ 
situation differs from ours in some respect.
81 Chalmers uses the term “transparent” explanation, which, though not fully defined, implies at least 
completeness: see (2007, p. 174).
embrace both horns of  the dilemma.  They argue that the special features of  
phenomenal concepts can be described in either phenomenal or physical-functional terms. 
Described in physical-functional terms, zombie’s corresponding concepts will share 
those features; so zombies will face (real or apparent) epistemic gaps between statements 
expressed using their corresponding concepts and physical-functional statements.  The 
physical-functional description explains everything about our epistemic situation except 
the differences between our situation and that of  zombies.  Those differences can, 
however, be explained by the phenomenal description, which describes phenomenal 
concepts as concepts that are partly constituted by phenomenal properties.  Zombies will 
not share concepts so described.
Balog and Papineau concede that there will be an epistemic gap between the 
phenomenal and physical-functional descriptions of  phenomenal concepts.  Papineau 
(2007, p. 140) argues that the new epistemic gap can be explained by redeploying the 
phenomenal-concept strategy, invoking the direct reference of  second-order concepts of 
phenomenal concepts.  Balog (Forthcoming-a, p. 18) argues that that there is no need for 
further explanation, since the first round has shown that an explanatory gap does not 
entail ontological distinctness; there is no need to show the same thing again.  Chalmers, 
unsurprisingly, smells regress and circularity respectively (2007, p. 180).
8.16. The type-C response
Now, Papineau and Balog have reasonable answers to those charges, but they need not 
detain us, since type-C physicalism has a short answer to Chalmers’s dilemma.  
Chalmers’s target is the type-B physicalist, who accepts that there are epistemic gaps—in 
particular, that there is a conceivability gap which makes zombies conceivable.   The 
type-C response is simply that global zombie scenarios (in which qualia-less beings 
coexist with all of  the actual facts of  physics) are not conceivable (see chapter 6 above).  
Which means there is no question of  zombies being in a different epistemic situation 
from us.  The denizens of  minimal physical duplicates of  our world are either in the 
same epistemic situation as us—believing truly that they are conscious—or they are not 
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conceivable.
So there is no difference between our epistemic situation and the zombie’s for the 
phenomenal-concept strategy to explain, because zombies do not have an epistemic 
situation.  The type-C physicalist can happily accept the “no” horn of  Chalmers’s 
dilemma: statements about the special features of  phenomenal concepts can be deduced 
a priori from the truths of  physics.
I do not claim that Chalmers believes his argument applies to type-C physicalists.  
He explicitly acknowledges that it does not affect a type-A physicalist who uses features 
of  phenomenal concepts to explain why we wrongly think there are gaps (2007, p. 173), 
and his response to type-C physicalism would presumably be the same.  Nonetheless, 
avoiding Chalmers’s dilemma is a benefit of  the type-C approach.
What about local zombie scenarios?  As described in §6.5 above, my “zombie twin” 
is an unconscious being who is physically like me, but who need not live in a physically 
identical world.  It is conceivable that my zombie twin has the brain states that underlie 
my phenomenal properties.  What about his epistemic situation?  Here the type-C 
physicalist can happily occupy either horn of  Chalmers’s dilemma.  On the one hand, if  
a physical-functional description of  me implies a priori that my concepts refer directly, 
then my zombie twin will have corresponding concepts that refer directly.  And so direct 
reference will not completely explain why I believe truly that I am conscious, while my 
zombie twin believes that falsely or not at all.  This is a local version of  the second horn 
of  Chalmers’s dilemma, but there is no problem.  As I argued in chapter 7, physicalism is 
not committed to complete explanations based only on local facts.
If, on the other hand, a physical-functional description of  me does not imply a 
priori that my concepts refer directly, then it will not completely explain the direct 
reference of  phenomenal concepts.  That is the local version of  the first horn of  
Chalmers’s dilemma, but again all is well.  Physicalism is not committed to complete 
explanations of  our phenomenal concepts using only local explananda either.  
If  forced to choose, I would pick the first horn.  “Direct reference” is a physical-
functional description, and the relevant facts of  physics are likely internal to me and my 
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zombie twin.  But there is no problem either way.
8.17. Conclusion
None of  the general criticisms of  the phenomenal-concept strategy have turned out to 
refute it.  Direct reference, or at least analytic independence, can explain the epistemic 
status of  psychophysical identity statements and the (real or apparent) epistemic gaps 
between physical-functional statements and phenomenal statements.  If  we have 
knowledge about phenomenal properties that we cannot state, because we lack either 
concepts of  the properties or predicates to apply to them, the phenomenal-concept 
strategy cannot explain it; but by the same token the arguments for dualism cannot 
invoke such knowledge.  
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9. Conclusions
A. The argument so far
9.1. The type-C story summarised
In this thesis I have argued that the epistemic status of  psychophysical identities and 
supervenience can be explained by the analytic independence of  phenomenal terms and 
physical-functional terms.  That analytic independence is, in turn, explained by fact that 
phenomenal terms refer directly: their referents are not picked out by an associated 
description or other representational mode of  presentation.  On my preferred view of  
direct reference, based on Brian Loar’s (1998), phenomenal concepts are in effect 
“detectors” of  phenomenal properties, referring to the physical-functional properties 
that they are tokened in response to.
Analytic independence can then explain why psychophysical identities, such as 
“pain is C-fibre stimulation”, are a posteriori, despite being necessarily true if  they are true 
at all.  They are a posteriori simply because, in the absence of  analytic connections, there is 
no way to know a priori that the two terms involved refer to the same thing.  A posteriori 
status need not be explained by the two terms’ having different representational modes 
of  presentation.  So the arguments discussed in chapters 2 and 3 fail: phenomenal terms 
can refer directly and still figure in a posteriori identities.
By contrast, psychophysical supervenience—the other sort of  necessity to which 
physicalism is committed—is a priori.  If  physicalism is true, a complete statement of  the 
facts of  physics a priori implies any statement of  a supervening fact, including a 
phenomenal statement.
Since such implications are both a priori and necessary, there is no need to reconcile 
their epistemic and modal statuses.   What does need to be explained, however, is how 
they could be a priori despite the absence of  analytic connections between the physical-
functional terms in the antecedent and the phenomenal terms in the consequent.  The 
answer is that, if  physicalism is true, complete physical knowledge would specify the 
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physical-functional reference of  phenomenal terms.  That would allow a (superhuman) 
reasoner to deduce the co-reference of  physical-functional and phenomenal terms, and 
thus psychophysical identities, even where the terms are analytically independent.  
Analytic independence does, however, explain why such implications look impossible, 
and why they are in important respects harder than implications from physics to other 
domains.
The resulting position is a version of  type-C physicalism, in Chalmers’s (2003a) 
typology.  There appear to be epistemic gaps between physics and phenomenal truths.  
Those epistemic gaps cannot be closed by conceptual analysis, as type-A physicalism 
would have it.  Nonetheless, if  physicalism is true and phenomenal terms refer to 
phenomenal properties, with perfect physical knowledge those apparent epistemic gaps 
would disappear.  
9.2. Physicalism: A vs B vs C
The type-C position has some clear strengths relative to other physicalist positions, but 
also a few weaknesses.  Its strength relative to type-B physicalism, which accepts that the 
epistemic gaps are real, is that type-C physicalism does not need to appeal to brute or 
“strong” a posteriori necessities, the divergent modal and epistemic statuses of  which 
cannot be explained by any of  their semantic features.  The existence of  such necessities 
would imply a fundamental distinction between, on the one hand, those scenarios that 
are consistently describable in complete detail, and on the other, those scenarios which 
correspond to genuinely possible worlds.   Strong necessities, therefore, are inconsistent 
with modal rationalism.  Of  course, not everyone is a fan of  modal rationalism, so this is 
not a knock-down refutation of  type-B physicalism.  But it is at least an advantage of  
type-C physicalism:  it is better for physicalism that it not be committed to more 
controversial metaphysics than it has to be. 
On the other hand, type-B has the advantage of  respecting our intuitive responses 
to the epistemic gaps.  Those intuitions are powerful, and it must be admitted that 
rejecting them comes at a considerable cost in plausibility.  
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The type-C physicalist can, however, respect the sources of  those intuitions.  The 
absence of  analytic connections can explain why physical-functional statements appear 
irrelevant to phenomenal statements.   Moreover, the intuitions are correct about very 
similar scenarios: if  Mary only knows the facts about colour vision she can’t deduce what 
it’s like to see red; local zombie scenarios such as zombie twins really are conceivable; 
and reductive physical explanations of  phenomenal truths really are incomplete.  Finally, 
the counter-intuitive type-C answer to each of  the epistemic gaps involves the deducer, 
conceiver or explainer knowing, in physical-functional terms, what phenomenal terms 
refer to.  That is not something we know now, and it is not the sort of  thing we 
intuitively look to when reflecting on the scenarios.  So the type-C physicalist can say 
that the epistemic-gap intuitions are well motivated: they are natural reactions to genuine 
epistemic barriers that we cannot yet overcome.
The type-A physicalist, by contrast, must say that the epistemic-gap intuitions are 
not just wrong but deluded.  According to type-A physicalism, there are analytic truths
—of  the form “pain is the property related in such-and-such a way to bodily damage, 
avoidance behaviour, and so on”—with the aid of  which Mary could straightforwardly 
deduce and explain everything there is to know about the phenomenal.  If  that were 
true, physicalism about phenomenal properties would involve no special puzzlement, no 
intuition of  distinctness, no “gappiness”; physical-functional explanations would be 
completely satisfying.  It would take a heroic temperament to make such claims.  And 
they’d still be false.
The only reason to bemoan the truth of  type-C physicalism is the possibility that 
we will never have completely satisfying explanations of  phenomenal properties in 
physical-functional terms.  Thanks to analytic independence, there will always be a 
nagging open question about why that neuro-psychological property is pain, a question 
that may not be put to rest by knowledge about the term “pain”.  On the other hand, 
perhaps with scientific success such nagging would be quieted; the intuition of  
phenomenal distinctness overcome as intuitive vitalism was overcome.  One can hope.
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B. Are phenomenal properties peculiar?
9.3. Looking back
In part A of  chapter 1, I discussed some apparent peculiarities of  phenomenal 
properties.  Those alleged peculiarities served to specify what was meant by 
“phenomenal properties”: viz., the properties of  our experience which have, or seem to 
have, those peculiar features.   The thesis has since been concerned with whether the 
properties so identified can be physical.   In this section, I briefly discuss what the 
answer to the dualist arguments implies about the peculiarity of  phenomenal properties.
Those peculiarities can be divided into two kinds: peculiarities of  phenomenal 
properties themselves, and of  our epistemic relations to them.  In the first category, 
phenomenal properties appear to be atomic and intrinsic: simple, unanalysable, and 
distinct from both the stimuli that produce them and the cognitive and behavioural 
effects they in turn produce.  
In the epistemic category, we are supposed to have privileged epistemic access to 
our own phenomenal properties.  That apparent privilege is both relative—we have 
better access to our own qualia than to other people’s—and absolute—our access is 
direct in a way that makes our judgements about our own qualia incorrigible or infallible.  
Moreover, we cannot share our privileged access, because phenomenal properties are 
ineffable.
9.4. Epistemic peculiarities
The property-detector view of  phenomenal concepts suggests some straightforward 
explanations of  the epistemic peculiarities.  On that view, I am disposed to token the 
phenomenal concept redness in response to the phenomenal property of  redness: when 
I have a red experience, my redness detector goes off.  Its firing, therefore, tells me I am 
having a red experience.  But it does not tell me any more: in particular, it does not tell 
me about the neural or functional nature of  the property it detects.  
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a) Privacy
Type-C physicalism implies that there is no ultimate barrier to knowing about other 
people’s phenomenal properties, including whether they have any and whether they are 
inverted.  But it can explain why it is easier for us, who lack a finished physical-
functional theory of  consciousness, to know about our own phenomenal properties than 
about others’.
I know that I have a particular phenomenal property because my detector fires and 
I token the relevant phenomenal concept.  In saying that, I assume the detector is 
sufficiently reliable for my judgement to count as knowledge, and that the judgement 
doesn’t fall foul of  any other constraints on justification.  (There is, for example, a 
concern that the judgement is not justified by inference.  Such controversial matters of  
epistemology are obviously implicated here, but they must be left for another context.) 
But assuming the mechanisms that underpin that causal relation are realised 
neurally, they do not run between brains: nothing connects my phenomenal-property 
detectors to other people’s phenomenal properties.  So when someone else has a red 
experience, my phenomenal-redness detector is quiet, and I am not disposed to token 
redness.
My knowledge of  other people’s phenomenal properties is therefore inevitably less 
direct than that of  my own.  I have to, for example, work out which stimuli and 
behavioural effects are associated with a particular phenomenal property, and observe 
when other people are undergoing those stimuli or displaying those effects.  I hear David 
scream, notice a wasp fly off  his arm, and infer that he is in pain.  That’s not a bad 
inference.  But it’s not as reliable as my detectors: David might be faking pain, or just 
shooing the wasp away.  Moreover, because wasp venom is not associated with my 
concept pain analytically, the possibility remains that David is an invert or a zombie, 
whose stimuli and behaviour are mediated by different phenomenal properties or by 
none at all.  We could rule out those possibilities if  we knew exactly what neural 
properties we were detecting, but we don’t. 
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b) Infallibility
There is an obvious sense in which our knowledge of  our own phenomenal properties is 
incorrigible: our detectors are the best way we have of  knowing when we have the relevant 
properties.  No better evidence is available with which to confirm or reject the results of 
our detectors.  At least, not until we find out what they detect.
Infallibility is a more complex question.  The property-detector account suggests 
obvious ways in which our knowledge of  our phenomenal properties could go wrong: 
the detector could malfunction, either failing to fire in the presence of  its target 
property, or firing in its absence.  But this is a  little too quick.  On Loar’s account, 
phenomenal concepts refer to whatever they detect: that is, whatever we are disposed to 
token phenomenal concepts in response to.  If  that’s right, then our judgements that we 
are currently having particular phenomenal properties would be infallible, albeit in a 
rather trivial way.  Like “I am here”, or “the metre stick is a metre long”, they will be a 
priori true at the cost of  telling us anything substantial about the world.
Even on Loar’s view, however, one could preserve the possibility of  detector 
malfunction, by appeal to the purpose of  the detector.  Presumably we have such 
detectors for a reason, and they might come to operate in a way which no longer serves 
that purpose.  As I suggested in §8.2, one might couple that with teleosemantics, and say 
that phenomenal concepts refer to what the detector is supposed to detect, not whatever 
actually triggers it.  That would rescue the possibility of  mis-reference by phenomenal 
concepts.  Alternatively, Loar suggests that a malfunctioning detector is less likely to be 
triggered by a genuine physical-functional property, rather than an unnatural disjunction, 
and so would not refer at all (Loar, 1998, p. 612). 
Constitutivist views of  phenomenal concepts, such as Balog’s (Forthcoming) 
suggest another sort of  infallibility.  My judgement “I have phenomenal redness now” 
must be true if  my phenomenal concept redness incorporates a token of  the 
phenomenal property to which it refers.  The judgement is self-verifying: it can only be 
made if  it is true.
This, too, is a thin kind of  infallibility.   Incorporating a phenomenal property does 
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not guarantee that a phenomenal concept will not behave cognitively in ways that are 
radically inappropriate.   The judgement that “I am in pain” might lead me to seek out 
rather than avoid the relevant stimuli, or even say things like “mm, that feels nice”.   I 
may not even notice that my concept incorporates pain rather than pleasure, and so that I 
am behaving inappropriately.  See (Hawthorne, 2007).  As was suggested in chapter 3, 
even if  our concepts cannot mis-refer, we may be wrong about which concepts we are 
using. 
So versions of  the phenomenal-concept strategy can explain infallibility, at least in a 
thin sense.  But the strategy does not suggest that we are infallible in all our judgements 
about phenomenal properties.  Importantly for the question of  physicalism, they do not 
imply that we have a grasp of  phenomenal property’s essence or underlying nature, so 
they are consistent with the a posteriori status of  psychophysical identities.  
Are we infallible in a way that goes beyond what the phenomenal-concept strategy 
can explain?  There are, of  course, Wittgenstinian concerns about whether infallible 
judgements can have any content (Wittgenstein, 2009, p. §258).  And there is empirical 
evidence that we are not, in fact, infallible.  Consider the “cutaneous rabbit” case cited 
by Dennett (1991, p. 142): one’s wrist is tapped a number of  times, then one’s elbow, 
then one’s upper arm.  Subjects report that the tapping progresses up the arm in 
equidistant small hops, so that the second tap was between the wrist and the elbow—
even though when that tap happened the subject had no idea there would eventually be 
taps on the elbow. At the time of  the second tap, neither the tap itself  nor its subjective 
character could have been felt mid-forearm; reports that they were are clearly in error.  
The best view, I venture, is that phenomenal judgements are in principle open to error, 
like any ordinary judgement, even if  our evidence is unusually direct and reliable.
If  we are fallible, the property-detector account suggests an explanation of  why we 
might think we are: the apparent infallibility of  our judgements is an illusion produced 
by their incorrigibility.  Our phenomenal judgements are not infallible, but they are, for 
the time being, final.
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c) Ineffability
The remaining epistemic peculiarity of  phenomenal properties is that they are ineffable. 
We are, it seems, unable to describe what it is like to see red—at least in a way that would 
enlighten Mary or a zombie, or rule out the possibility that one’s audience’s qualia are 
inverted.  
Type-C physicalism implies that our phenomenal properties are not genuinely 
ineffable: they can be completely described in physical-functional terms.  Nonetheless, 
thanks to analytic independence and intuitions of  distinctness, such descriptions may 
still leave a nagging sense that they fail to capture what it’s like to have experiences.
In addition, the property-detector account happily explains why we cannot describe 
phenomenal properties, even in physical-functional terms.  For our detectors do not give 
us any information about the physical-functional nature of  our phenomenal properties.  
And then, as described above, privacy prevents my phenomenal terms from being 
unambiguous to an audience.  I can put a label on what my concept redness detects
—“phenomenal redness”, say—but hearing me use that label won’t tell you which of  
your detectors it corresponds to.  Only future neuro-psychological knowledge can resolve 
that ambiguity.
Nor will a description of  a phenomenal property get the job done.  Suppose I say 
that “phenomenal redness is !”, where “!” is a description in either physical-functional 
or phenomenal terms.  The description may give the audience helpful information about 
what experiences with a particular character are typically caused by, or which other 
experiences they resemble.  But if  “phenomenal redness” refers directly, “!” will not be 
analytically associated with it.  So the audience will still be left with an open question as to 
which of  their detectors “redness” corresponds to.  They cannot rule out the possibility 
of  inversion.  A fortiori for attempts to describe phenomenal properties to a zombie, 
whose phenomenal-property detectors, if  he has any, will never have fired.  Lacking 
phenomenal concepts, a zombie can understand phenomenal properties only in physical-
functional terms.  While we lack knowledge of  their physical-functional natures, we 
would have no way to describe them to the poor creature at all.
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9.5. Non-epistemic peculiarities
The property-detection account of  phenomenal concepts offers a natural explanation of 
why phenomenal properties appear atomic and intrinsic.  For phenomenal concepts are 
not associated with any information about phenomenal properties, including information 
about internal structure or functional role.  Our detectors simply do not pass along any 
of  that information.  So phenomenal properties appear simple and intrinsic:  and from 
that we naturally conclude that they have no internal structure, and that all their 
connections to experience and behaviour are contingent.  See (Hill, 2009, p. 117).  
Of  course, that inference is not deductively valid, but it would be understandable.  
We make a similar mistake with colours.  Colours are physically complex phenomena, 
involving the behaviour of  photons of  varying wavelengths and amplitudes interacting 
with surfaces with varying reflectance properties, which themselves have complex bases.  
Colours are also importantly dispositional, since the classification of  the results of  those 
interactions is as much a matter of  how our perceptual systems react to them as the 
properties of  the objects in themselves.  Why, then, do we naturally think of  colours as 
simple, categorical properties of  objects?  Because, quite plausibly, our perception of  
colours does not convey any information about all that complexity.  It is not surprising 
that we make the same leap for phenomenal properties, including the phenomenal 
appearance of  colours.
To be sure, the property-detector account does not rule out that phenomenal 
properties really are intrinsic and atomic.  Those peculiarities are, however, problematic 
for the reasons mentioned in chapter 1.  Though there may well be intrinsic and atomic 
physical properties—the fundamental categorical properties at the bottom of  physics—
those are not attractive candidates for identification with phenomenal properties.  
There are other philosophical problems with intrinsicality.  Lewis (2009) argues that 
it leads to scepticism.  If  phenomenal properties are independent of  any relations in 
which experiences stand, the argument goes, then they could logically be permuted, so 
that phenomenal redness stood in all the causal and other relations actually stood in by 
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greenness, or by pain.  That would mean, in turn, that we can have no evidence as to 
which phenomenal properties are in fact playing which roles, since we can distinguish 
among them only by their relations to us.  So we cannot know which phenomenal 
properties we are, in fact, having.  This would obviously be much worse than the 
possibility of  qualia inversion in other people.
A similar epistemic problem arises from the possibility of  zombies: if  phenomenal 
properties can be removed from the world without changing anything physical, then 
phenomenal properties are physically epiphenomenal.  Zombie worlds must be 
physically like our own at all times, not just at an instant, so if  they are possible, 
removing phenomenal properties does not affect subsequent physical-functional events.  
But then judgements such as “I am in pain” cannot be causally produced by pain itself  
(Shoemaker, 1975).  
Chalmers’s response to this argument may equally be applied to the problem with 
intrinsic properties.  In (2003b, p. 254ff) he argues that even if  epiphenomenalism is 
true, phenomenal properties can still play a role in phenomenal beliefs by partly 
constituting phenomenal concepts.  The constitutive relation need not be a causal one.  
If  so, my zombie twin will not think “I am in pain” when he stubs his toe.  Not 
because the absence of  pain has had any physical-functional effects, but because his 
corresponding concepts will not contain a (non-physical) token of  pain.  Of  course, this 
response leaves the downstream cognitive and behavioural affects of  the zombie’s 
judgements unaffected, so that we would not notice if  our phenomenal properties were 
removed.
9.6. Conclusion on the peculiarity of  qualia
The conclusion I draw from all this is that qualia are not as special as they seem.  They 
appear, for quite explicable reasons, to be intrinsic, atomic qualities to which we have 
privileged epistemic access.  But they aren’t.  
Unlike Dennett, I do not take this as eliminativism about phenomenal properties.  
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But that difference perhaps reflects not so much substantive disagreement about the 
peculiarities of  phenomenal properties, as disagreement about the meaning of  
“phenomenal”.
C. Looking forward—what next for type-C physicalism?
9.7. Physicalism 
This thesis has attempted to rebut some arguments that phenomenal properties cannot be 
physical, because physicalism implies false things about their epistemic relations to 
physical-functional properties.  If  the thesis is correct, those arguments fail.  The 
obvious next question is whether phenomenal properties are, in fact, physical.
That debate will be partly philosophical.  There are general philosophical 
considerations in favour of  physicalism—parsimony, explanatory power.  There are also, 
to be sure, philosophical problems with physicalism, most of  which have been set aside 
in this thesis so as to focus on whether phenomenal properties pose a special problem.  
Even if  physicalism is false in general, however, one might still want to ask whether 
phenomenal properties are non-physical in a distinctive way—are they distinct from the 
phenomena described by physics in a way that chemistry or biology is not?  If  there is 
any sense in which high-level phenomena can be reduced to or explained by 
fundamental physical phenomena, then parsimony and explanatory power will cut in 
favour of  taking phenomenal properties the same way.
But the debate about physicalism is also partly empirical.  There is the issue of  the 
causal closure of  physics.  This is an empirical finding (or at least a very fruitful 
methodological assumption) which, if  true, means either that non-physical properties 
have no physical effects, or that their physical effects are universally overdetermined by 
physical causes (Papineau, 2002, Appendix A).  Of  course, the consistency of  causal 
closure with dualism is itself  a philosophical question.  More generally, the best way to 
determine whether phenomenal properties are special is probably to find out what they 
are.  An empirically successful theory of  phenomenal properties that ascribes them a 
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physical-functional basis would give us solid reason to think they are physical.   On the 
other hand, if  no such theory is to be found, and if  a developed neurology and 
psychology turn out to have no place for anything of  the kind, then phenomenal 
properties are (at best) non-physical. 
9.8. Phenomenal concepts
The property-detector account does a reasonable job of  explaining the peculiar 
appearance and epistemic status of  phenomenal properties.  The obvious next question 
is why we have such detectors.  Why should we be so peculiarly sensitive to certain 
properties of  experience?  It is hard to imagine an answer to that question which does 
not appeal in part to the nature and role of  phenomenal properties themselves.  But 
there are plenty of  other questions about phenomenal concepts themselves to 
investigate: how many we have, how they function, how we acquire them, how reliable 
they are, and so on.
These include some other special features of  philosophical interest.  Two of  these 
have been encountered in the course of  the argument.  First, our concepts of  
phenomenal properties seem to be experience-dependent: only those who have had an 
experience with a particular phenomenal property can have a phenomenal concept that 
represents that property.  And phenomenal concepts are importantly indexical: their 
reference comes from the experiencer’s own first-person perspective on their 
phenomenal properties.  Both indexicality and experience-dependence were rejected as 
explanations for the epistemic gaps.  (See §§5.8 and 5.5 above, respectively.)  But that is 
not to reject them as features of  phenomenal concepts.  The phenomenal-concept 
strategy suggests explanations of  both features.  
As to indexicality: thanks to privacy, the reference of  phenomenal concepts is 
determined by their relations to properties instantiated by the concept’s owner.  So to 
deduce what one of  my phenomenal concepts refers to from an objective description of 
the world, I need to know who I am.  Ascriptions of  phenomenal properties to other 
people are justified by finding, and applying, objective descriptions of  what those 
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concepts refer to.
As to experience-dependence: some accounts of  phenomenal concepts offer 
experience-dependence as a natural consequence.  On Balog’s view, for example, what 
she calls “direct” phenomenal concepts are partly constituted by tokens of  phenomenal 
properties.   Possession of  such a concept obviously presupposes having a token of  the 
phenomenal property.  And her “indirect” phenomenal concepts, which do not 
incorporate tokens of  their referent, are derived from direct concepts.
The property-detector account is, I think, neutral on the question.  It is quite 
plausible that a detection mechanism that has yet to be triggered will not generate any 
representations.  Indeed, it is conceivable that our detectors themselves are formed in 
response to the types of  experience we encounter.  Still, the detector account does not 
tie concept to property as closely as a constitutive account does.  One might well have a 
detector-concept which predates any examples of  what it detects.  So it will be an 
empirical question as to how much, if  any, of  our phenomenal vocabulary is innate.  
This is, I think, an advantage: it is better not to rule out the possibility that we have at 
least some innate phenomenal concepts. 
Balog (Forthcoming, p. 13) mentions yet another peculiarity: transparency.  When 
we attend to phenomenal properties of  perceptual experience, we are aware of  the 
features of  what is perceived, not just features of  the perceptual experience itself.  
Constitutivist views like Balog’s and Papineau’s can explain transparency by saying that 
token experiences retain their representational features when they are incorporated into 
phenomenal concepts.  So to attend to phenomenal properties using phenomenal 
concepts is also to attend to those representations (Balog, Forthcoming, p. 20), 
(Papineau, 2007, p. 124).  The property-detector account has no such direct explanation, 
but it can suggest a similar one.  Since our phenomenal concepts are not associated with 
information about phenomenal properties, they are not a lot of  use for reflective 
purposes.  It is helpful, then, when thinking about phenomenal properties to focus 
attention on the experience itself, imaginatively recreating it if  necessary.  
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9.9. What are phenomenal properties?
Finally, the big one.  What sort of  things are phenomenal properties?
According to realisation physicalism, they must be functional properties.  But there 
are other versions of  physicalism.  And even if  they are functional, that leaves the 
question of  what their functional role is.  
A number of  theories of  consciousness compatible with physicalism have been 
proposed.  There is representationalism, according to which phenomenal properties are 
representational properties of  experiences.  E.g., (Tye, 2000).  There is a “higher-order 
thought” view (Rosenthal, 1986)—a sort of  internal representationalism, on which 
mental states are conscious when we have a (higher-order) mental states that represent 
them.  Dennett’s (1991) “multiple-drafts” account is not dissimilar, modulo his rejection 
of  the label “phenomenal”: to be conscious of  a mental phenomenon is just to record it 
for later processing.  
Which, if  any, of  these candidates is correct is a mixed question of  fact and 
philosophy.  Like accounts of  phenomenal concepts, theories of  consciousness must 
meet both philosophical challenges and the need for empirical confirmation.
If  the arguments in this thesis are correct, the investigation cannot proceed via 
conceptual analysis of  phenomenal terms.   This is both a problem and an opportunity.  
A problem, because there is a sense in which we don’t know what we’re looking for.  As 
Jackson (1998) argues, conceptual analysis is helpful in understanding the target of  our 
investigations, and for knowing it when you find it.  The search of  the physical basis of  
consciousness will have to be more bluntly empirical.  That is not an insurmountable 
hurdle: we have plenty of  a posteriori associations with phenomenal properties to guide 
our search.
But type-C physicalism also does the investigation a big favour.  The investigators 
do not need to face the “hard problem” problem (Chalmers, 1995).  According to 
Chalmers, because physical science is limited to explaining structural and dynamic 
phenomena, it can explain the “easy” problems of  consciousness—its computational 
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and functional aspects—but must leave the “hard” problem of  phenomenal 
consciousness untouched.
It is true that the problem of  phenomenal consciousness is conceptually distinct from 
the “easy” computational or functional aspects of  consciousness, as it is from physical-
functional matters generally.  But that conceptual gap does not imply that phenomenal 
properties cannot be physically explained, possibly even by the “easy” aspects of  
consciousness themselves.
This point applies just as much to disputes about particular physicalist theories as 
to the general question of  physicalism.   Block’s (1997) distinction between access 
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, for example, is worth making, but does 
not imply a priori that accounts of  access consciousness are irrelevant to phenomenal 
consciousness.  Perhaps Dennett (1997) is right and the distinction is merely one of  
richness of  content or degree of  influence.  Similarly, one cannot refute a particular 
physicalist theory of  consciousness by imagining scenarios in which its explanans is 
present but phenomenal consciousness absent—or vice versa.  So the conceivability of  a 
Blockhead or Chinese nation with functional properties but no phenomenal ones does 
not show that functionalism is false.  Conversely, one might imagine that a 
spontaneously-formed “swampman” (Davidson, 1987) would have phenomenal 
properties, even though he has no representational states.  But the conceivability of  such 
a being would not show that representationalism is false.
Here, then, is the moral of  this thesis.  Phenomenal consciousness can be 
investigated scientifically—in the familiar naturalistic way—despite the apparent epistemic 
gaps: we just have to stop being distracted by them.  Facing up to the hard problem 
requires neither finding analytic connections nor accepting dualism.  The nature and 
ontological status of  phenomenal consciousness are both, as a naturalist would hope, 
matters for empirical discovery.
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